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A college degree is not a homogenous investment across fields of study (Arcidiacono, 
2004; Zhang & Thomas, 2005). Even after accounting for selection, STEM degrees pay 
substantially more than other fields (Altonji et al., 2012) and earnings disparities across majors 
have increased substantially over time (Altonji et al., 2014).   
Even though STEM degrees yield greater labor market returns, the number of STEM 
graduates and professionals remains low and the disparities in STEM attrition are alarming. As a 
result, STEM education has been elevated as a national priority in the U.S. and considered to be 
in high demand in the global economy. Yet, there is a lack of consensus on how to boost STEM 
graduation.  
My dissertation is motivated by the need to improve the number and composition of 
STEM graduates and to evaluate policies that can mitigate STEM attrition. In my dissertation I 
focus on the effect of college grades and grading policies on STEM graduation. College grades 
are important determinants of course and major choices and research suggests that grades have 
differing effects for STEM minorities and non-minorities. Moreover, disparities in grades 






grade inflation and compression of grades near the top affect sorting into majors, making grades 
less informative and distorting major choices (Bar et al. 2012). 
In my first essay, I examine the possible differential effect of college grades on STEM 
attrition gap by gender and race. Non-grade explanations such as pre-college factors, instructor 
gender and race and peer effects are also examined as potential determinants of STEM attrition 
gaps. However, I focus on grades because there is evidence that grades affect sorting into majors, 
and grades may have differing effects for minorities and non-minorities. This review uncovers 
evidence supporting the importance of institutional grading policies to shape student‘s major and 
course choices. Despite the fact that institutional grading policies have been studied at some 
extent, none of these studies have addressed the differential effect of these policies on those who 
might be more sensitive to grades (i.e., women and racial minorities).  
In the second essay, I explore what factors explain the gender and race disparities in 
STEM attrition. This study utilize Florida‘s Education Data Warehouse to conduct a reweighted 
Oaxaca decomposition of racial and gender differences in STEM attrition, with a particular focus 
on how STEM- intending students respond to college grades in introductory courses. The 
decomposition results show that women mainly leave STEM by switching into non-STEM 
fields, particularly due to non-STEM college factors such as grades and credits attempted in 
lower-division courses. In contrast, racial minorities mainly leave STEM by dropping out of 
college towards graduation, and they differentially leave STEM due to their lower high school 
preparation in STEM and consequently lower grades in lower-division STEM courses during 
their first two years of enrolment. 
In the third essay (which is also my job market paper) I examine the effect of changing 






choice. In this study, I examine the effect of changing the grading scale from whole-letter grades 
to plus/minus grades on STEM graduation/major choice. I use administrative data from the 
Florida Department of Education that combines students‘ pre-college characteristics with 
students‘ enrolment and transcript records. I rely on a difference in differences framework that 
compares STEM graduation/major choice rates during the early 2000s versus the late 1990s for 
students whose grading differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses were reduced 
versus students whose grades were not differentially affected. I find significant effects of 
changing the grading scale on reducing grading differentials and improving STEM 
graduation/major choice. These results represent the first direct, quasi-experimental evidence 
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"I'm naturally more inclined to do well in English," she says. "It's harder for me to get the same 
grades in science and math.” Chronicle of Higher Education, 1994 
 
A college degree is not a homogenous investment across fields of study (Arcidiacono, 
2004; Zhang & Thomas, 2005). Even after accounting for selection, STEM degrees pay 
substantially more than other fields (Altonji et al., 2012) and earnings disparities across majors 
have increased substantially over time (Altonji et al., 2014).   
Even though STEM degrees yield greater labor market returns, the number of STEM 
graduates and professionals remains low and the disparities in STEM attrition are alarming. 
According to the National Student Clearinghouse (2015), only 18 percent of all 2014 BA‘s were 
conferred in STEM.
1
 While STEM entrance rates are not significantly different from non-STEM 
fields, STEM attrition rates are stark. Among bachelor‘s degree students entering STEM fields 
between 2003 and 2009, 48 percent had left these fields by Spring 2009 (Chen, 2013).
2 
 
There are disparities in STEM education by gender and race. Studies have frequently 
found that women and racial minorities (hereafter called STEM minorities) leave STEM fields at 
higher rates than their counterparts (Anderson & Kim, 2006; Griffith, 2010; Hill et al., 2010). 
The persistence rate of women in STEM is less than that of men and proportionally more women 
than men left STEM fields by mostly switching to a non-STEM major (Chen, 2013). While one 
third of White students and 42 percent of Asian-American students who started college as 
intended STEM majors graduated with STEM degrees, compared to 22 percent of Latino 
students and 18 percent of African-American students (Hurtado et al., 2010). 
                                                 
1
STEM for NCES is math, physical science, biological sciences, engineering and computer science. 
2
It is worth noting that proportionally more men than women left STEM fields by dropping out of college 





As a result, STEM education has been elevated as a national priority in the U.S. and 
considered to be in high demand in the global economy. Yet, there is a lack of consensus on how 
to boost STEM graduation. The literature has discussed many possibilities for improving STEM 
persistence such as preparing high-school students better (Arcidiacono et al., 2015; Bonous-
Hammarth, 2000; Riegle-Crumb & King, 2010; Sondgeroth & Stough, 1992; Tyson et al., 2007), 
having college instructors of your own gender and race (Bettinger & Long, 2005; Carrell et al., 
2010; Hoffmann & Oreopoulos, 2009; Price, 2010), and improving the quality of peers (Ost, 
2010). Even though all of these likely reflect important factors in STEM retention and 
graduation, these solutions can also be hard to implement and most of these studies do not find 
statistically significant effects on STEM persistence. 
My dissertation is motivated by the need to improve the number and composition of 
STEM graduates and to evaluate policies that can mitigate STEM attrition. In my dissertation I 
focus on the effect of college grades and grading policies on STEM graduation. College grades 
are important determinants of course and major choices (Campbell, 1993; Chen, 2013; Crisp 
et al., 2009; Fournier & Sass, 2000; Johnson, 2003; Ost, 2010; Rask, 2010; Rask & Tiefenthaler, 
2008; Sabot & Wakerman-Linn, 1991; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2011; Strenta et al., 1994), 
and research suggests that grades have differing effects for STEM minorities and non-minorities 
(Arcidiacono et al., 2012; Ost, 2010; Owen, 2008; Rask, 2010).  
Moreover, disparities in grades between STEM (low-grading departments) and non-
STEM (high-grading departments) due to grade inflation and compression of grades near the top 
affect sorting into majors (Johnson, 2003; Ost, 2010; Sabot & Wakerman-Linn, 1991), making 





In my first essay, I examine the possible differential effect of college grades on STEM 
attrition gap by gender and race. Non-grade explanations such as pre-college factors, instructor 
gender and race and peer effects are also examined as potential determinants of STEM attrition 
gaps. However, I focus on grades because there is evidence that grades affect sorting into majors, 
and grades may have differing effects for minorities and non-minorities. Furthermore, STEM 
majors are not only known as the most profitable professions, but also as the stingiest about 
awarding high grades. Thus, STEM minorities who are particularly sensitive to grades in their 
major choice might be more likely to distort their choices than non-minorities.  
As to the role of grades in explaining STEM attrition gaps, while the research has 
produced conflicting results, the existing literature has not directly addressed the differential 
effect of both absolute and relative grades, and has been more focused on the gender gap rather 
than racial gaps. Moreover, the samples used in prior research have been from single and 
selective institutions with mostly high ability students, and thus have questionable relevance to 
STEM policy more broadly.  
Rigorous grading standards and a potential grading gap from grade inflation may 
exacerbate the importance of absolute and relative grades on STEM course choice, and this may 
in turn deter students, who are more sensitive to grades, from persisting and majoring in STEM. 
In fact, when equalizing expected grades across STEM and non-STEM fields, Arcidiacono et al. 
(forthcoming) identify grading policies as the most important source of the gender gap in STEM.  
This review uncovers evidence supporting the importance of institutional grading policies 
to shape student‘s major and course choices. Despite the fact that institutional grading policies 
have been studied at some extent, none of these studies have addressed the differential effect of 





minorities). Also, this literature does not offer enough information of how these policies have 
differentially affected students‘ outcomes in low versus high-grading departments, given that 
grade inflation has disproportionally affected high-grading departments. 
In the second essay, I explore what factors explain the gender and race disparities in 
STEM attrition. This study utilize Florida‘s Education Data Warehouse to conduct a reweighted 
Oaxaca decomposition of racial and gender differences in STEM attrition, with a particular focus 
on how STEM- intending students respond to college grades in introductory courses. The Oaxaca 
decomposition enables me to estimate what proportion of these gaps can be explained by 
differences in observable predictors (and if so, which ones are most important) and what 
proportion appears attributable to differential ‗returns‘ to these factors.  
The decomposition results show that gender differences in leaving STEM by switching 
into non-STEM are mainly explained by differences in the unexplained component of the gap, 
particularly by non-STEM college factors such as grades and credits attempted in lower-division 
courses. In contrast, gender differences in leaving STEM by dropping out of college are negative 
and mostly explained by compositional differences associated with STEM and non-STEM 
college factors. By comparison with STEM attrition gaps between racial minorities and non-
racial minorities, the unexplained component of the gap is not as significant and important as 
compositional differences. Racial minorities mainly attrite by dropping out of college towards 
graduation, and they differentially leave STEM due to their lower high school preparation in 
STEM and consequently lower grades in lower-division STEM courses during their first two 
years of enrollment. 
In the third essay (which is also my job market paper) I examine the effect of changing 





choice. I use administrative data from the Florida Department of Education that combines 
students‘ pre-college characteristics with students‘ enrollment and transcript records. I rely on a 
difference in differences framework that compares STEM graduation/major choice rates during 
the early 2000s versus the late 1990s for students whose grading differentials between STEM 
and non-STEM courses were reduced versus students whose grades were not differentially 
affected.  
I evaluate the effect of a change in grading scale on patterns of early college grades and 
STEM graduation/major choice. Specifically, I test two related hypotheses. First, all else equal, a 
more continuous grading scale will lead to reduce grading differentials between STEM and non-
STEM courses. Second, a reduction in grading disparities will make students more attracted to 
STEM courses, which in turn will improve STEM graduation/major choice.  Third, a reduction 
in grading disparities will lead to an improvement in the gender and race gap in STEM attrition, 
based on the empirical evidence that suggests that STEM minorities value grades more than their 
counterparts.  
To preview the results, I find that a change in the grading scale from whole-grade grading 
scale to plus/minus grading has a substantial effect on first year grade differentials between 
STEM and non-STEM lower-division courses. Students who attended institutions that changed 
their grading scale experience a smaller difference between their STEM and non-STEM GPAs 
during the first year of enrollment than similar students attending institutions that did not 
implement any grading reform (approximately a reduction of 0.152 points). This significant 
effect on grade differentials is translated into large impacts on STEM graduation/major choice 
outcomes. For example, after the grading policy change, students attending treated institutions 





STEM major at the beginning of their second and third year of enrollment. On average before the 
implementation of the new grading scale, about 7 percent of students attending treated 
institutions graduated in STEM, therefore a relative increase of 3 percentage points is substantial. 
These positive effects on STEM outcomes seem to be equally explained by a reduction in the 
probability of majoring in non-STEM and dropping out of college without earning a BA.  
I also find that this grading policy has complex heterogeneous effects in the way students 
are discouraged from leaving STEM. This policy has larger effects for men than women and for 
racial minorities than non- minorities. However, for women the effects on STEM outcomes seem 
to be explained by a reduction in the probability of leaving STEM by switching into non-STEM, 
whereas for men these effects come from a decrease in the probability of dropping out of college. 
In fact, men were relatively more affected at the bottom of their grade distribution which might 
explain why overall impact estimates are higher for men. These results represent the first direct, 
quasi-experimental evidence regarding the effect of a change in the grading scale. 
Results from the three essays suggest that some students may come to college with lower 
perceptions of ability believing they are not "naturally inclined" toward STEM simply because it 
is harder to get good grades in those courses. Others might come with the idea of majoring in 
STEM and then end up majoring in non-STEM or dropping out of college because they get low 
grades and cannot prove themselves they are academically good enough to graduate in STEM. If 
anything, low grades in STEM matter and might be steering students away at a time when the 
number and composition of STEM graduates is concerning.  
Therefore, if we are particularly interested in higher STEM graduation rates for racial 
minorities and women, before diverting more resources towards STEM departments by trying to 





freezing STEM tuition rates, it may be more cost-effective to adopt grading policies intended to 







Essay 1: Studying the Race and Gender STEM Attrition 




Technological innovation improves the competitive position of U.S. industries, drives 
export growth, and supports high quality jobs (Freeman, 2006). Science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education equips Americans with knowledge, skills and 
abilities required to create technological innovation and improve productivity.
1
 Therefore, 
undergraduate education in STEM fields is critically important to improve global 
competitiveness and economic growth.   
There is a shortage of highly skilled STEM students and professionals, which undermines 
the U.S. ability to innovate and globally compete. The U.S. ranks 52nd in the quality of 
mathematics and science education (far behind Asian countries) and 5th (and declining) in 
overall global competitiveness (Schwab, Sala-i-Martin, & Greenhill, 2011). Furthermore, over 
two thirds of the engineers who receive Ph.D.‘s from U.S. universities are not U.S. citizens 
(NSF, 2011). While the number of degrees awarded in STEM fields has increased modestly over 
the past five years, only 15.6 percent of bachelor‘s degrees were awarded in these fields, and the 
overall share of degrees awarded in STEM fields actually shrank during this period (BHEF, 
2010). Meanwhile, China awarded nearly half of its first university degrees in STEM fields 
                                                 
1
Based on survey data, 94 percent of U.S. patent inventors between 2000 and 2003 held a university 
degree, including 45 percent with a PhD. Of those, 95 percent of their highest degrees were in STEM fields, 
including more than half in engineering (Walsh & Nagaoka, 2009). Still, most innovators— inventors or 





(46.7 percent); Singapore awarded 51 percent; South Korea awarded 37.8 percent; and Chile 
awarded 24.2 percent (BHEF, 2010).  
STEM education is not only important to economic development, but also to ensure 
prosperity to individuals, especially to those who are underrepresented in STEM fields (i.e., 
women, minorities and low-income students). A college degree is not a homogenous investment 
across fields of study (Arcidiacono, 2004; Zhang & Thomas, 2005), and STEM degree holders 
enjoy higher earnings, regardless of whether they work in STEM or Non-STEM occupations 
(Langdon, McKittrick, Beede, Khan, & Doms, 2011).  
STEM workers earn higher wages and are more likely to be employed. STEM workers 
earn 26 percent higher salaries than non-STEM workers. Those with bachelor‘s degree only in a 
STEM job earned more than $35 per hour, nearly $8 more per hour on average than those with 
non-STEM jobs in 2010.
2
 
STEM jobs were less negatively affected by the recession. While the unemployment rate 
for STEM workers rose from 4.8 percent in 2007 to 5.5 percent in 2009, the unemployment rate 
for non-STEM workers rose from 4.8 percent in 2007 to 9.5 percent in 2009. In fact, STEM 
occupations face better job prospects and are projected to grow by 17 percent from 2008 to 2018, 
compared to 9.8 percent growth for non-STEM occupations (Beede et al., 2011).  
As a result, STEM education has been elevated as a national priority in the U.S. and 
considered to be in high demand in the global economy. A report by the President‘s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology (2012) suggests substantial needs to increase the number of 
STEM majors. In fact, federal government agencies and non-profit organizations have 
undertaken different actions to improve STEM education. The National Science Foundation 
                                                 
2






(NSF) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have sponsored a number of initiatives aimed 
at increasing undergraduate students‘ interest in studying STEM, improving STEM bachelor‘s 
degree completion rates generally, and improving STEM completion rates among 
underrepresented racial minority students specifically. In 2007, U.S. House passed the America 
COMPETES Act, reauthorized in 2010, to increase economic competitiveness by promoting 
STEM education and increasing research investment. The National Academy of Sciences, 
National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine report Rising Above the Gathering 
Storm also calls for increased funding for K–12, college, and graduate education in STEM fields 
and for research and development.  
One focus area for increasing STEM fields has been to reduce disparities in STEM 
employment and to increase the number of college graduates in STEM by gender and race. Two 
reasons explain the race and gender imbalance in U.S. college graduates in STEM fields: women 
and racial minorities are less likely to pick a STEM major initially, and if they do, less likely to 
remain in that major (Chen, 2009). Among STEM entrants, the percentage of racial minorities is 
similar to that of non-minorities. However, the gap in STEM attrition rates between racial 
minorities and non-minorities is alarming (Hurtado, Eagan, & Chang, 2010). The number of 
women in science and engineering is growing, yet men continue to outnumber women, 
especially at the upper levels of these professions. Even though more women than men graduate 
from college with a bachelor‘s degree, men earn a higher proportion of degrees in many science 
and engineering fields of study (NSF, 2013). The difference is dramatic, with women earning 
only 20 percent of STEM bachelor‘s degrees (Hill, Corbett, & St. Rose, 2010). Among first-year 
college students, women are much less likely than men to say they intend to major in STEM and 





percent vs. 26 percent), while proportionally more men than women left STEM fields by dropping 
out of college (24 percent vs. 14 percent)  (Chen, 2013).  
These imbalances have led policymakers and economists to investigate why attrition rates 
in STEM fields are highest for women and racial minorities (hereafter called minorities). Even 
though the evidence suggests the need to change the STEM gap, it is not clear whether efforts are 
justified given the possibility that these differences could simply result from different 
preferences or preparation. However, the path toward a career in science is not primarily 
determined prior to college entry (Federman, 2007; Riegle-Crumb, King, Grodsky, & Muller, 
2012; Xie & Shauman, 2003), and women, for instance, enter college as prepared as men in math 
and sciences and they even exert more effort by spending more hours studying a week than their 
male counterparts (Arcidiacono, Aucejo, & Spenner, 2012).  
While initial major intention partly explains the gap in STEM graduation, I will focus on 
the gap in STEM attrition, given that individual preferences greatly influence initial major 
intention and higher education policies cannot be drawn upon that.  STEM attrition is defined as 
the proportion of students who initially intended to major in STEM and leave STEM fields either 
by switching their major to a non-STEM field or by dropping out of college without earning a 
bachelor‘s degree.  
This review will examine in particular the possible differential effect of college grades on 
STEM attrition gap by gender and race. Non-grade explanations such as pre-college factors, 
instructor gender and race and peer effects will also be examined as potential determinants of 
STEM attrition gaps. However, I will focus on grades because there is evidence that grades 
affect sorting into majors, and grades may have differing effects for minorities and non-





but also as the stingiest about awarding high grades. Thus, minorities who are particularly 
sensitive to grades in their major choice might be more likely to distort their choices than non-
minorities.  
The purpose of this literature review is to discuss some of the existing literature that has 
identified the key components of the persisting STEM attrition gap. Studies included are related 
to the STEM attrition gap in two ways: they focus on STEM or majors wherein the persistence 
gap has been studied, and estimate the effect of different factors related to the STEM persistence 
gap either by gender or race.  
Again, the advantage of focusing on grades is that there is evidence that minorities might 
respond differently to grades, whereas for non-grade explanations the literature is inconclusive 
and scarce. Still, it is important to differentiate grade from non-grade explanations because both 
of these factors contribute to STEM attrition gap at different extent. In the literature, college 
grades have been identified as the main source of the female-male gap (Arcidiacono et al., 2015), 
while differences in pre-college preparation seems to explain better the race gap (Arcidiacono 
et al., 2013).  
I begin by documenting the STEM attrition gap and motivating why it is important to 
understand this gap. The second section provides a conceptual framework. The third and fourth 
sections of this review focus on empirical analysis of the different factors that are associated with 
the gender and race STEM attrition gap. The third section focuses on potential non-grade 
explanations for STEM gaps, while the fourth one on the role of grades. In these sections, I put 
emphasis in how researchers address econometric challenges such as selection bias and omitted 
variable bias. Finally, the fifth section argues how grading policies might influence STEM major 





The questions I hope to answer in this literature review include: 
 How large are gender and race STEM attrition gaps and why are they important? 
 What non-grade factors do explain the gender and race STEM attrition gap? 
 How do college grades affect STEM course and major choices, and why might women and 
minorities respond differently to grades?  
 How might institutional grading policies influence STEM gaps? 
Motivation: How large are STEM gaps and why do they matter?  
 
Despite the efforts of researchers, policymakers and administrators over the last few 
decades, the number of STEM graduates and professionals in the United States remains low. 
STEM workers account for just 6 percent of the U.S. workforce. According to the 2011 
American Community Survey (ACS), there were 7.2 million STEM workers aged 25 to 64 (and 
half of STEM workers worked in computer occupations), and nearly 70 percent of them had at 
least a bachelor‘s degree, while 30 percent of STEM workers had less than a bachelor‘s degree. 
While STEM entrance rates are not significantly different from non-STEM fields, STEM 
attrition rates are stark. Among 2003-2004 beginning bachelor‘s degree students, STEM fields 
attracted proportionally more students (28 percent) than did many non-STEM fields.
3
 Yet, 
among bachelor‘s degree students entering STEM fields between 2003 and 2009, 48 percent had 
left these fields by spring 2009 (Chen, 2013). 
One focus area for increasing the number of STEM graduates and workers has been to 
increase the number of college graduates in STEM by gender and race. Historically, women, 
Blacks, and Hispanics have been underrepresented in STEM employment. Because most STEM 
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workers have a science or engineering college degree, underrepresentation among science and 
engineering majors could contribute to the underrepresentation of minorities in STEM 
employment. Even though women hold nearly half of the workforce in the U.S., they make up 
less than 25 percent of STEM jobs, as well as a disproportionally low number of STEM degrees 
(Beede et al., 2011). This has been the case throughout the past decade, even as college- 
educated women have increased their share of the overall workforce. In fact, the most recent 
decades show less growth in STEM employment among younger women (Landivar, 2013). 
Blacks and Hispanics have been consistently underrepresented in STEM employment. In 2011, 
11 percent of the workforce was Black, while 6 percent of STEM workers were Black (up from 
2 percent in 1970). The Hispanic share of the workforce has increased significantly from 
3 percent in 1970 to 15 percent in 2011; however, Hispanics were 7 percent of the STEM 
workforce in 2011 (Landivar, 2013). 
The disparities in STEM employment are somewhat similar to those in STEM education. 
Nonetheless, the patterns that explain these disparities between women and men and racial 
minorities and non-minorities are different. For women, the lower likelihood of graduating with 
a STEM major is explained by a disproportional entrance into STEM fields upon initial 
enrollment as well as a lower likelihood to remain in STEM majors. In contrast, for racial 
minorities, the absolute STEM graduation gap is mainly explained by lower STEM persistence 
rates.  
While there is an increasing gap in college enrollment and graduation in favor of women, 
women are significantly less likely than men to graduate with a STEM major. By the 1980s, 
women gained a clear advantage over men in persistence to college graduation (Diprete & 





socioeconomic distribution (Goldin, Katz, & Kuziemko, 2006).
4
 Despite the fact that high 
schools girls take as many advanced math and science classes as boys and perform at similar 
levels on average, among first-year college students, women are much less likely than men to say 
they intend to major in STEM (Anderson & Kim, 2006; Hurtado et al., 2010). The percentage of 
men entering STEM fields was higher than that of women between 1995 and 2001 (33 percent 
vs. 14 percent), especially in fields like mathematics and engineering (Chen, 2009).  
The percentage of racial minorities who intend to major in STEM is similar to that of 
non-minorities. In 2010, 36.5 percent of Black and 40.7 percent of Latino students intend to 
major in science and engineering upon college enrollment, while 37 percent of White students 
and 49 percent of Asian-Americans intended to major in STEM.  
Studies have frequently find that women and racial minorities leave STEM fields at 
higher rates than their counterparts (Anderson & Kim, 2006; Griffith, 2010; Hill et al., 2010; 
Huang, Taddese, & Walter, 2000; Kokkelenberg & Sinha, 2010; Shaw & Barbuti, 2010). The 
persistence rate of women in STEM is less than that of men and proportionally more women than 
men left STEM fields by mostly switching to a non-STEM major (32 percent vs. 26 percent) 
(Chen, 2013).
5
 The gap in STEM attrition rates between racial minorities and non-minorities is 
alarming. One-third of White students and 42 percent of Asian-American students who started 
college as intended STEM majors graduated with STEM degrees by the end of five years, 
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compared to 22 percent of Latino students, 18 percent of Black students, and 20 percent of 
Native American (Hurtado et al., 2010). 
There are several reasons to be concerned about gender disparities in STEM education. 
The choice of math and science classes is a good predictor of college attendance and completion 
(Goldin et al., 2006), performance in mathematics also predicts future earnings (Altonji & Blank, 
1999; Bertrand, Goldin, & Katz, 2010; Brown & Corcoran, 1996; Grogger & Eide, 1995; 
Joensen & Nielsen, 2009; Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, & Tyler, 2000; Weinberger, 1999, 
2001), and the STEM education gap partly accounts for the wage gap between minorities and 
non-minorities.  
Research has shown that gender differences in entry into science careers explain a 
substantial portion of the gender pay differential among college graduates (Brown & Corcoran, 
1996; Weinberger, 1999) and that the low representation of women in such careers may reduce 
aggregate productivity (Weinberger, 1999). Graduates who major in female-dominated earn 
substantially lower incomes than do graduates who major in male-dominated fields (Roksa, 
2005; Grubb, 1993; Brown & Corcoran, 1996). Other studies have indicated that anywhere from 
15 percent to 45 percent of the gender wage gap can be attributed to gender differences in 
selection of major (Gerber & Cheung, 2008; Daymont & Andrisani, 1984; Brown & Corcoran, 
1996; Joy, 2003; Shauman, 2006; Bobbitt-Zeher, 2007). Researchers have also shown a similar 
relationship between race and major selection, which also tends to generate a wage gap (Thomas, 
1985; Powell, 1990; Eide, 1997).  
STEM workers earn higher wages and are more likely to be employed. STEM workers 
earn 26 percent higher salaries than non-STEM, regardless of whether they work in STEM or 





per hour, nearly $8 more per hour on average than those with non-STEM jobs in 2010. It is 
worth noting that the earnings premium for having a STEM job or a STEM degree is quite 
similar, at 13 percent and 11 percent, respectively. While the unemployment rate for STEM 
workers rose from 4.8 percent in 2007 to 5.5 percent in 2009, the unemployment rate for non-
STEM workers rose from 4.8 percent in 2007 to 9.5 percent in 2009. STEM occupations face 
better job prospects and are projected to grow by 17 percent from 2008 to 2018, compared to 9.8 
percent growth for non-STEM occupations (Beede et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, and despite the prevalent gender disparity, STEM jobs are also more 
inclusive than non-STEM jobs, having a gender wage gap that is smaller in STEM jobs than in 
non-STEM jobs. In 2009, the gender wage gap for STEM jobs was 14 percent whereas that for 
non-STEM jobs was 21 percent. Women with STEM jobs earned 33 percent more than 
comparable women in non-STEM jobs – considerably higher than the STEM premium for men. 
Similarly, women STEM degree holders earn
9
 percent more than women with other degrees, 
regardless of their job (Beede et al., 2011).  
Finally, studying and understanding the STEM persistence gap is also important to make 
scientific research more inclusive. Scientific research using human and animal models have been 
biased in favor of men. For decades, researchers were gender bias and avoided female animals 
for fear that their reproductive cycles and hormone fluctuations would cofound the results of 
their experiments.
6
 Having less female scientists may also have implications in lab experiments 
given that exposure of rodents to male but not female experimenters produces pain inhibition, 
which in turn can affect apparent baseline responses in behavioral testing (Sorge et al., 2014).  
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In fact, as federal health officials have stated,
7
 women are often underrepresented in 
clinical trials carried out by drug companies and medical device manufacturers, and as a result 
women experience more severe side effects from new treatments. For instance, Jagsi et al. (2009) 
find that 75 percent of the cancer-drug studies under-represent women, suggesting that women 
are not getting fair access to experimental drugs and the effectiveness of some treatments may 
not be fully understood. Therefore, more women in STEM fields may also help to improve these 
gender imbalances in research and drug treatments. 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Economists have developed models of college major choice based not only on the current 
state of the world when students choose a college major, but also on what they expect will 
happen after graduating from college (Zafar, 2011; Arcidiacono et al., 2015; Arcidiacono et al., 
forthcoming). Zafar (2012) provides a model that includes non-grade factors (pre-college 
preparation and beliefs about enjoying coursework) and takes into account group-specific belief 
distributions in order to explain the gender and race gap in the choice of college major. 
Arcidiacono et al. (2015) intend to explain major persistence and include a vector for the cost of 
switching majors when students arrive on campus with an initial major.  Arcidiacono et al. 
(forthcoming) offer a model of course choices that helps to understand how differences in non-
grade and grade factors can explain some of the persistent gender gap in STEM majors. In this 
section, I will focus on how these models to explore the determinants of STEM major choice and 
how differences in non-grade and college grade factors between minorities and non-minorities 
might explain the gender and race gap in STEM.   
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Zafar (2011) offers a model that helps to study the determinants of college major choices. 
He assumes that students are rational maximizers and that they choose a major to maximize a 
combination of their in-school and post-school utility, or pecuniary or non-pecuniary concerns. A 
vector of in-school utility represents outcomes such as the hours per week spent studying, the 
pleasure of enjoying a particular college major, parental approval, the possibility of completing 
(graduating) a field of study in four years, and graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5 in the field 
of study. A vector of post-school utility is measured by the outcomes that take place in the labor 
market after leaving college such as employment status and earnings. Empirically, this model 
was evaluated using an experimentally generated panel of beliefs, obtained by providing students 
with information on the true population distribution of various major-specific characteristics. He 
finds that while earnings are a significant determinant of major choice, tastes, which are 
heterogeneous, are the dominant factor in the choice of major.  
Zafar‘s (2011) model is useful to understand how grade factors (graduating with a high 
college GPA and in four years) may indirectly impact in-school utility for choosing a STEM 
major. During college, grades serve as one of the few signals students receive about their 
progress in a course and/or field of study and their relative performance or weaknesses. Grades 
can serve as a feedback mechanism through which students define their comparative advantage 
and choose their courses and majors on that basis.  
In fact, minorities and non-minorities may value grades differently. When decomposing 
these results by gender, Zafar (2011) finds that perceived ability differences across majors are 
more important for women than men. For women, the negative component from ability, 
reflecting lower perceived ability in STEM majors relative to non-STEM, is more important than 





The author then extends his model to account for heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs 
across different groups. Zafar (2012) includes additional factors to the vector of outcomes 
realized in college and after graduating from college in order to explain the underlying factors 
for the gender gap in STEM. In this model, he includes beliefs about enjoying course, which 
decreases the gender gap in engineering by half. This additional factor can explain how other 
non-grade factors may be differentially affecting the gender and race gap in STEM persistence. 
As he suggests, one possible channel to make courses more enjoyable for women is by 
increasing the representation of female professors. By the same token, I would expect that a 
greater representation of student‘s peers of her own gender or race would make STEM courses 
more enjoyable. 
Arcidiacono et al. (2015) provide a useful model of student‘s decision to persist in and 
graduate with their final choice of major. They assume that a student‘s utility from graduating 
with a major depend on three components: (i) the net returns she expects to receiving from 
graduating with this major from this college; (ii) the costs of switching one‘s major; and (iii) 
other idiosyncratic factors. The cost of switching majors depends on student‘s initial major and 
pre-college preparation as well as family background. This cost is paid when students decide to 
switch to and graduate with a different major.   
The net return is the difference between the expected present value of future benefits of 
having a major/college combination minus the costs associated with completing it. These costs, 
in turn, depend on the effort a student would need to exert to complete her major, where this 
effort is likely to vary with pre-college preparation (high school GPA and math SAT scores) and 
the quality of college and its students. In the case of the factors that explain STEM attrition gaps, 





include pre-college factors and the quality of college measured by their peers and instructors. 
Pre-college preparation, for instance, may have a differential advantage in STEM persistence 
between minorities and non-minorities, whereas the quality of peers may not have a differential 
effect in reducing the STEM gap. Differences in these non-grade factors between minorities and 
non-minorities may account for differences in the degree of success in graduating more students 
in STEM.   
Finally, Arcidiacono et al. (forthcoming) develop a model of course choice based on pre-
college preparation, the value of college grades, course preferences, and the cost of effort. This 
model allows the authors to decompose differences in course choices, grades, and study effort 
between men and women. Pre-college preparation is a vector of ACT scores, high school grades, 
race, etc. Course preferences include variables that affect preferences for particular departments 
such as gender of the instructor. Cost of effort reflects study time, and preferences for college 
grades are allowed to vary by gender. Putting together non-grade and college grade factors on the 
demand-side of his model, the authors are able to differentiate the relative importance of each of 
these factors in explaining the gender gap in STEM.    
Potential Non-Grade Explanations for STEM Gaps 
 
Although differences in STEM persistence are well documented, the reasons why women 
and racial minorities have lower persistence rates are less well understood. A number of 
plausible non-grade explanations may underlie the STEM attrition gap: (i) pre-college factors 
such as pre-college preparation, performance levels in standardized tests and high school 
achievement, and (ii) college experiences such as instructor gender and race and peer effects. 





choice and performance (e.g. major choice, course selection, GPA) in general as well as those 
that explain STEM attrition and STEM attrition gaps between minorities and non-minorities. 
Pre-College Factors 
 
Several pre-college factors that have been shown to influence minorities‘ interest in 
STEM fields include pre-college preparation (Tyson, Lee, Borman, & Hanson, 2007), test scores 
(Barton, 2003; Rakow & Bermudez, 1993) and prior achievement in mathematics (Astin & 
Astin, 1992; Moreno & Muller, 1999; Simpson, 2001). More specifically, student achievement in 
the form of grade point average and mathematics SAT scores has been found to be associated 
with the persistence of undergraduates in STEM majors (Bonous-Hammarth, 2000; Sondgeroth 
& Stough, 1992). 
Pre-college preparation is one of the variables that explain enrollment, persistence and 
completion of a STEM field major. Rigorous high school course taking is related to college 
aspirations (Burkam & Lee, 2003) and persistence (Horn, Kojaku, & Carroll, 2001). The 
decision to persist in a STEM major, conditional on initial intention, has been shown to be 
influenced by a student‘s entering mathematics training prior to enrolling in college, as well as 
his or her academic aptitude (Astin & Astin, 1992). Minority students who take high-level 
courses are as likely as White students to pursue STEM degrees (Tyson et al., 2007). Evidence in 
Florida 4-year universities suggests that high school science and mathematics course-taking 
creates pathways toward future baccalaureate degree attainment in STEM majors (Tyson et al., 





likely to pursue STEM, but racial disparities occur because fewer Black and Hispanic students 
are prepared for STEM in high school.
8
  
Regarding high school achievement, the literature has produced different results for the 
gender and race gaps in STEM. While Crisp, Nora, & Taggart (2009) find that student‘s high 
school achievement and aptitude for math are related to STEM outcomes at a Hispanic Serving 
Institution, Riegle-Crumb et al. (2012) find no evidence of the importance of prior high school 
achievement. Using a multinomial logistic regression and nationally representative databases,
9
 
Riegle-Crumb et al. (2012) investigate how disparities in prior achievement between men and 
women explain gender differences in entrance into STEM majors. Analyses use data from three 
national cohorts of college matriculates across three decades to consider differences across 
several indicators of high school math and science achievement at the mean and also at the top of 
the test distribution. The authors also examine the different comparative advantages men and 
women enjoy in math/science versus English/reading. They find that regardless of how prior 
achievement is measured, very little of the strong and persistent gender gap in physical science 
and engineering majors over time is explained. On similar study but only using ELS 2002, 
Riegle-Crumb & King, (2010) find virtually no evidence that math attitudes prior to college 
contribute to gender and racial disparities in STEM major choice.  
Turner and Bowen (1998) used a different approach to examine the gender gap in major 
choice. Building on the work of Jacobs (1995), they decomposed the factors leading to major 
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segregation by gender into two main influences, SATs and everything else (tastes, preferences, 
background, collegiate influence, etc.). They find that SATs accounted for less than half of the 
continuing gender gap, a gap that continues even though SATs are somewhat converging. Their 
results also highlight the growing importance of other factors- including differences in 
preferences, labor market expectations, gender-specific effects of the college experience, and 
unmeasured aspects of academic preparation- in contributing to the persistent segregation across 
fields of study. It is worth noting that this study is focused on the probability of majoring in 
different fields, including STEM, which is not necessarily the same as explaining the STEM 
attrition gap. Majoring in STEM involves initial interest at college entry as well as persistence, 
and different factors might explain at different extent each of these stages of STEM graduation.  
Arcidiacono et al. (2015) use a nested logit model and student-level data for racial 
minorities and non-minorities who first enrolled at one of the University of California (UC) 
campuses between 1995 through 1997 to examine the differences in graduation of minorities in 
STEM fields. To account for selection differences the UC campus in students enrolled, the 
authors estimate a choice model, employing data on where students submitted applications and 
where they admitted. They find that differences across minorities and non-minorities in 
persistence in the sciences within the UC system reflect, in part, differences in academic 
preparation between minority and non-minority students. Students entering with better pre-
college preparation (high school GPAs and SAT scores) relative to the campus average are more 
likely to persist in and graduate with a STEM major.  
These studies are mostly descriptive and even though authors control for pre-existing 
student characteristics it is likely that unobserved pre-existing differences among students are 





have an important effect on student‘s major choice and without holding it constant, students with 
identical observable characteristics may non-randomly self-select different majors and 
subsequently make persistence decisions that differ due strictly to differences in their 
unobservable characteristics.  
With respect to the STEM attrition gap and according to the existing literature, pre-
college factors matter but do not seem to differentially affect STEM attrition between minorities 
and non-minorities. Yet, the literature also suggest that pre-college preparation may explain 
better the STEM attrition gap between racial minorities and non-minorities than that between 
women and men.  
Instructor Gender and Race 
 
Some researchers have argued that professor gender may perpetuate the gender gap in 
STEM and that this gap could be mitigated when female and racial minorities have professors of 
their gender and race. It is hypothesized that students experience better educational outcomes 
when they are able to interact and associate with faculty who are of their own race or gender. 
Rothstein (1994) utilizes data from the National Longitudinal Study of 1972 and find a positive 
correlation between the percentage of female faculty at the school and the probability that a 
woman attains an advanced degree. Using data from the State University of New York at 
Binghamton, Robst, Keil, and Russo (1998) examine the fraction of classes that are taught by 
female instructors and also find a positive correlation between the percentage of science and 
math courses taught by female instructors and retention of women in those majors.  
In contrast, Canes and Rosen (1994) look within three institutions, Princeton University, 
the University of Michigan, and Whittier College, and find no evidence that the share of women 





department. Similarly, but focusing only on the economics major, Robb and Robb (1999) 
estimate the likelihood that a student will take additional courses in economics after the first year 
and find no evidence that the gender of instructor matters. Even though Rask and Bailey (2002), 
using data from Colgate University, find that the higher the proportion of courses that a woman 
took with a female faculty member the more likely she was to major in that department, they 
conclude little or no role-model effect of female faculty role models and that everyone tends to 
be influenced by those of their own gender and race.  
These studies describe an association between female instructors and academic outcomes 
for women, but may not identify a causal relationship. More recent studies have focused on 
estimating the causal effect of an instructor‘s gender on academic outcomes of female college 
students, while accounting for possible selection issues but still suffering from external validity 
concerns. Even though female college students get better grades when a course is taught by a 
female instructor (Bettinger & Long, 2005; Carrell et al., 2010; Hoffmann & Oreopoulos, 2009), 
these studies also note that female instructors do not increase future performance or persistence 
in the subject of the course. In fact, there is no statistically significant evidence that having a 
female instructor affects STEM persistence and performance. However, as restricting the sample 
to only include high ability women, the estimated effects of professor gender become significant 
and larger (Carrell et al., 2010). 
Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009) examine the effect of female instructors in first 
semester STEM and non-STEM courses on academic performance and the number of additional 
same-subject courses taken, using data from University of Toronto‘s Arts and Science Faculty. 
To account for potential selection biases the authors focus on large classes with multiple sections 





students that have limited flexibility in choosing courses. They assert that introductory courses 
are chosen independent of gender of instructors and provide evidence that sections taught by 
female instructors (within a course) do not have a significantly higher share of female students 
than sections taught by male faculty. They show that women‘s average grade performance is not 
significantly higher when their introductory courses are taught by female instructors, but male 
student performance decreases with female instructors. Pooling men and women and estimating 
the effect of same-sex instructor, they show that having an own gender instructor in a math or 
science course actually decreases grade performance and the number of same-subject courses 
taken in later years. 
In their randomized study, Carrell et al. (2010) use data from U.S. Air Force Academy 
(USAFA) to randomly assign professors for a wide variety of mandatory standardized courses to 
focus on the role of professor gender in STEM attrition or persistence. They find that compared 
to men with the same entering math ability, women perform substantially less well in their 
introductory math and science courses and that the gender gap is considerably mitigated when 
women have female professors. The effect of female professors on women is largest and 
statistically significant among students with high math ability women (as approximated by their 
SAT math scores). Across the full sample, there is no statistically significant evidence that 
having a higher proportion of female professors affects a woman‘s likelihood of withdrawing, 
her performance in follow-on coursework, her probability of taking higher-level math courses, or 
her probability of graduating with a STEM major.  
By exploring the same research question but better accounting for external validity 
concerns, Bettinger and Long (2005) study is among the first, large-scale studies to estimate the 





approach to avoid biases due to course selection and student preferences.  They use term-by-term 
variation in the proportion of courses taught by female faculty in a department that is related to 
student‘s likelihood of having a female instructor but unrelated to a student‘s pre-college interest 
in a subject. Their estimates suggest that female instructors have mixed effects on the interests of 
women. In the sciences, women who initially had women professors were significantly less 
likely to take additional courses in biology and physics than similar women who had male 
faculty members in their first course. In terms of major choice, they do not find statistically 
significant effects on the fields in which women are underrepresented, such as engineering, 
mathematics, physics, and computer science. On the other hand, female instructors positively 
impacted the likelihood of taking an additional course and the total number of subsequent credit 
hours in geology and mathematics and statistics. Particularly in the most quantitative major, 
women students who initially had a female faculty member were nearly twice as likely to take an 
additional course and on average took 5.2 more credits than other women.  
Similar to the previous study, Price (2010) uses data from public 4-year universities in 
the state of Ohio and an instrumental variable approach to determine if racial minority and 
women are more likely to persist in a STEM major when they enroll in classes taught by 
instructors of their own race or gender. His instrument is similar to that used by Bettinger and 
Long (2005), but can be seen as an improvement because it aggregates fields to classify them as 
STEM versus non-STEM. Results indicate that black students are more likely to persist in a 
STEM major if they have a STEM course taught by a black instructor. However, women are no 
more likely to persist when more of their STEM courses are taught by female instructors.  
This literature is not conclusive regarding whether having instructors of your own gender 





statistically significant effects on STEM persistence. With respect to racial minorities, even 
though evidence from Ohio suggests that black students who have instructors of their own race 
are more likely to persist in STEM, this literature is still scarce and inconclusive. Further studies 
that differentiate the student composition of the institution may be very valuable to better 
understand the effect of having instructors of your own race on reducing the STEM attrition gap. 
As Allen (1992) find, African American students who attend Predominantly White Colleges and 
Universities (PWCUs) indicate less favorable relations with their professors compared with their 





Peer quality has been shown to be an important determinant of academic performance in 
a variety of settings (Carrell, Fullerton, & West, 2008; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Han 
& Li, 2009). This literature has explored a range of peer influences by using different measures 
of peer groups, i.e., the entire school cohort (Carrell et al., 2008), roommate in a college dorm 
(Sacerdote 2001), roommates with strong peer interactions (Han & Li, 2009), classmates or 
course section (Ost, 2010; Ficano, 2012). Studies have mostly addressed the impact of peer 
academic ability on own academic performance. Nonetheless, there is very limited information 
regarding the influence of peers on major persistence and choice and how peers may 
differentially affect the STEM attrition gap. Persistence in STEM majors can be affected by the 
gender and racial composition of students‘ peers. Basically, the greater the proportion of 
student‘s peers of her own gender or race who are persisting in STEM, the greater the likelihood 
that that student will end up persisting in the same field. 
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Sacerdote (2001) exploits a natural experiment at Darmouth College, where freshmen are 
randomly assigned a roommate, to solve the selection problem. To account for the endogeneity 
problem, he uses a structural model that yields enough information to identify peer effects. He 
finds that peer effects are very important in determining levels of academic effort and in 
decisions to join social groups such as fraternities. No significant effects were found on major 
choice, but this is very likely since roommates may take different classes and have completely 
different college experiences. Moreover, the mechanism through which peer effects affect major 
choice might have not been strong enough (i.e. information gathering) to explain major 
persistence.  
A major drawback of studies among roommates and/or dorms, that mostly find small and 
or no evidence of peer effects, is that roommates are only a subset of a student peer group. Using 
a broad peer group and data from the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), Carrell et al., 
(2008) estimates peer effects in college achievement using a dataset in which individuals are 
exogenously assigned to peer groups of about 30 students with whom they are required to spend 
the majority of their time interacting.
11
  Students were also randomly assigned to roommates 
within the peer-group. The authors find that peer effects are largest in STEM courses and that the 
freshman peer effects persist at a diminished rate into sophomore, junior and senior years.  
In addition to study peers effect on academic GPA and math grades at the U.S Military 
Academic in West Point,
12
 Lyle (2007) reports results for selection of academic major and the 
decision to remain in the Army longer than five years.  Conditional on gender, race, recruited 
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athlete, and measures of prior performance and behavior, freshmen cadets are randomly assign to 
one of 36 companies. The author finds that preexisting attitudes of members of a social group 
toward academic majors influence an individual‘s choice of academic major. Sophomores who 
serve as role models to freshmen students during professional development sessions have a 
positive and significant effect only on the decision to study engineering by the end of their 
sophomore year, conditional on intending to major in engineering. It is worth noting that 44 
percent of all incoming cadets intended to study engineering. Using pretreatment measures of 
academic ability, no significant peer effects were found on GPA, math grades and major choice.  
Using a longitudinal administrative data from a large elite research university for every 
entering student from 1997-2003 and a multinomial logit regression with cohort and course fixed 
effects, Ost (2010) investigates the existence of peer effects in one‘s courses. In order to control 
for endogenous and exogenous peer effects, he estimates the propensity to persist using pre-
college characteristics and calculates average propensity scores by class. For the physical 
sciences, he finds evidence of positive peer effects in one‘s core physical science classes 
suggesting that classmates may have a larger influence on academic decisions than roommates. 
To my knowledge, and despite internal validity issues, the only study that addressed the 
effect of peers on the STEM persistence gap is Ost (2010). For the physical sciences, he finds 
evidence that women are more influenced by their peers than men. While both men and women 
benefit from exposure to higher quality peers, the effect is more than twice as large for women as 
compared to men. A 10 percentage point increase in the propensity scores of one‘s peers 
increases the likelihood of a female persisting by 3.70 percentage points compared to only 1.37 






Studies that looked at major choice as outcomes have not found significant effects of 
peers and the impact of peers on the STEM persistence gap is unclear and limited to one study. 
Nevertheless, having a higher share of peers of your own gender and race may influence STEM 
persistence despite their quality, but this has not been explored in the literature.  
The Role of Grades in STEM Gaps 
 
How do college grades affect STEM course and major choices?  
 
The importance of grades in determining course and major choices has been documented 
extensively. In this literature grades are classified into absolute and relative grades, where for a 
given student relative grades measure relative performance in introductory STEM courses 
relative to the same student in other non-STEM courses.  
Students come to college with expectations and preferences based at least in part on their 
high school experience, achievement, and parental and social influences. During college grades 
serve as one of the few signals students receive about their progress in a course and/or field of 
study and their relative performance or weaknesses. Grades can serve as a feedback mechanism 
through which students define their comparative advantage and choose their courses and majors 
on that basis. Thereby, grades reinforce or alter students‘ initial expectations and preferences, 
which, in turn, influence their final college and major choices (Attewell, Heil, & Reisel, 2011; 
Crisp et al., 2009; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2011).  In particular, if students enter college 
with incorrect information regarding their relative strengths, grading provides a potentially 
effective mechanism for informing a student which major field they should choose 





STEM majors generally require more effort (Badcok & Marks, 2010) and greater 
investment of time and money
13
 (Stange, 2013) and are associated with higher grading standards 
and higher study time than non-STEM majors (Arcidiacono, 2011; Barnes, Bull, Campbell, & 
Perry, 2001; K. Rask, 2010; Johnson, 2003). In most colleges and universities STEM majors 
have more rigorous grading policies than non-STEM disciplines (Arcidiacono, 2011; Angelo & 
Cross, 1993; Barnes, Bull, Campbell, & Perry, 2001; K. Rask, 2010; Johnson, 2003). 
Furthermore, grade inflation has disproportionately affected non-science fields and a grading gap 
has emerged which provides students with an incentive to defect from the sciences. Rigorous 
grading standards and a potential grading gap from grade inflation may exacerbate the 
importance of absolute and relative grades on STEM course choice, and this may in turn deter 
students from persisting and majoring in STEM.  
Grades and grading policies influence course and major choices. Fournier and Sass 
(2000) find that instructors‘ grading policies influenced students‘ subsequent curriculum choices.  
Johnson (2003) analyzes data from an experiment conducted at Duke University during the 
academic year 1998–99 and showed that students tend to choose courses offered by leniently 
grading instructors. Using data from Williams College, Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991) 
estimate how students respond to letter grades and examine how differential grade inflation 
across disciplines might distort major choice decisions. The authors find that controlling for 
performance in other subjects, receiving an A instead of a B in an introductory course increases 
the likelihood of taking a second course by approximately 10-20 percent for economics and 
English. In fact, Sabot and Wakeman-Linn show that if economics is graded as leniently as 
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English at Williams College, enrollment in higher-level economics courses would rise by 11.9 
percent. K. Rask (2010) also finds that the effect of equating grading standards across 
departments would increase persistence in STEM majors, which have with higher grading 
standards, by 2-4 percent.
14
 
Lower absolute grades have been linked to major attrition in general (DeBerard, 
Spielmans, & Julka, 2004; Murtaugh, Burns, & Schuster, 1999; Nora, Cabrera, Hagedorn, & 
Pascarella, 1996; Reason, 2009) and in STEM specifically (Campbell, 1993; Strenta, Elliott, 
Adair, Matier, & Scott, 1994; Ost, 2010; Crisp et al., 2009; K. Rask, 2010).  Many studies have 
focused on the role that performance in introductory economics classes play in the decision to 
become an economics major and have concluded that students who perform better in economics-
principles classes are more likely to major in economics (Horvath, Beaudin, & Wright, 1992; 
Dynan & Rouse, 1997; Chizmar, 2000). Rask (2010) finds that letter grades are important in 
predicting persistence in STEM fields such that a one letter grade change increases the 
probability of persisting by approximately five percentage points. He find that absolute grades 
are one of the largest and most persistent factors in the attrition of undergraduates from STEM 
departments.  Strenta et al. (1994) examines the determinants of majoring and persisting in 
natural science and engineering at four highly selective institutions and similarly finds that letter 
grades are strongly correlated with declaring and remaining in these science majors.  
There is also literature concerned of the relative performance of college students in 
introductory courses as a determinant of undergraduate major choice (Sabot & Wakeman-Linn, 
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1991; Horvath et al., 1992; Dynan & Rouse, 1997; Robb & Robb, 1999; Chizmar, 2000; Jensen 
& Owen, 2001; K. Rask, 2010; K. N. Rask & Bailey, 2002; Ost, 2010; Seymour & Hewitt, 1997; 
Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2011; K. Rask & Tiefenthaler, 2008).  Relative grades as a 
measure of relative course performance are indicative of relative strengths even though grading 
standards are not consistent across disciplines, and STEM majors are among the lowest grading 
departments. Ost (2010) suggests that in fact students are pushed away of their STEM intended 
major by their high grades in non-science courses.  
Most of the aforementioned studies are small-scale, although these results have been 
replicated using a nationally representative dataset, BPS 2004/09. STEM leavers tend to earn 
lower grades in STEM courses during the first year than did their counterparts who persisted in 
STEM fields through 2009. In addition to this, among bachelor‘s degree students who entered 
STEM fields in the first year, about one-fourth of STEM leavers earned STEM grades that were 
lower than their non-STEM grades by at least one grade point; in contrast, 11 percent of STEM 
persisters had STEM grades that averaged at least one grade point below their non-STEM GPA 
(Chen, 2013).   
Prior research has examined the more specific issue of how grades in introductory 
courses may affect women and men differently in their decision to choose STEM as an initial 
major, to persist after declaring STEM upon enrollment or to major in STEM. A small number of 
studies are mainly focused on the gender gap in STEM persistence or attrition and all are limited 
analyses of a particular university with mixed results.  
To my knowledge, K. Rask (2010) and Ost (2010) are the only two studies that have 





none of these studies directly addressed how differential responses by race and gender to the 
same college grades may influence gaps in STEM persistence.  
Using administrative records of a small northeastern liberal arts college, K. Rask (2010) 
modeled attrition decision from STEM as a student progresses from a first course to a second 
course, and a second to a third and find that grades received in a course are important 
determinants of whether a student takes another course in the major. To predict the probability of 
majoring in STEM, he used the grade associated to each specific STEM department
15
 and the 
GPA received during the same semester outside of the introductory course as his main 
covariates. However, it is not clear whether or not he included other STEM grades in his measure 
of relative grades instead of combining STEM grades from all STEM departments to measure 
STEM absolute grades.  For instance, students who intend to major in computer science may 
take courses in the math department, and if the author included math grades as a relative grade 
for these students then this may understate the importance of relative grades in non-STEM 
departments. K. Rask (2010) finds mixed and inconsistent results for relative grades across 
departments and gender. Men appear to be more sensitive than women to the grades received in 
their STEM courses both in terms of statistical significance and magnitudes. He also finds that 
the intended major or pre-collegiate preferences is also a primary factor in the decision to pursue 
courses in a STEM department, and that while men appear to be more sensitive to grades than 
women, preferences have a stronger influence on women than men.  
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Ost (2010) utilized a probability model with fixed effects and data from a single 
institution
16
 to examine patterns of STEM persistence. STEM persistence was measured as the 
probability of choosing one‘s field through the fourth year, restricted to those who intend to 
major in the physical or life sciences. Ost‘s measure of relative grades is each student‘s overall 
GPA in first year courses. He find that the gender gap in persistence is solely driven by a gender 
gap in the physical sciences. The raw STEM persistence gap is nearly 10 percentage points and 
this gap drops to just 2.7 percentage points when controlling for major field performance and 
outside option performance and course fixed effects. Similarly, but focusing only on the 
economics major, K. Rask and Tiefenthaler (2008) suggest that this sensitivity differential in the 
effect of grades explains part of the gender imbalance in economics in higher level courses since 
women with equal performance to men leave economics at a higher rate. Results from estimation 
of a series of selection models of the decision to take more economics courses indicate that 
women are more responsive to the relative grade received in the second semester of economics 
than are men. Dynan and Rouse (1997) find similar results and assert that an important part of 
the reason that women are less likely to major in economics is that they have more aptitude for 
other subjects, or at least perceive that they do.  
Even after controlling for performance, unobserved factors that influence both major 
choice and course grades might bias impact estimates given that students may put more effort 
into their intended major‘s introductory courses, and we would expect to see students with the 
highest performance also to be the most likely to graduate. Owen (2008) and Main and Ost 
(2014) address this concern by providing the most compelling causal analysis of the effect grades 
in major choice and course performance; however, their results are contradictory. Owen (2008) 
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finds that changing from a B to an A increases the probability of majoring in economics by 15 to 
20 percentage points among women while having no statistically significant impact for men. In 
contrast, Main and Ost (2014) using a larger sample and considering a different institution and 
six disciplines grouped into economics, engineering and physical science and life science, find 
insignificant and inconclusive effects of grades earned on major in course subject and credit 
hours in subject during following three semesters.  
There are several possible reasons that explain why Owen (2008) and Main and Ost 
(2014) results differ, despite the fact that both studies used a different but highly selective 
research university located in the Northeastern United States and a regression discontinuity 
approach. The institution Owen analyzed gives grades without plusses and minuses, thereby 
making sharper discontinuities. However, Owen extends her analysis to a liberal arts college that 
uses a plus/minus grading system and finds large effects.
17
 Meanwhile, Main and Ost used an 
institution that makes median grade reports public to the student body, and therefore these 
students are well informed about average grades across disciplines, which may affect course 
choices understating the effect of grades. Given that science and economic courses have a 
reputation of giving relatively low grades, only the students who are least responsive to course 
grades would elect to enroll in such a course. Hence, initial course enrollment may be driving 
major and course choices.  
The racial differences in STEM attrition rates are also a widespread concern, especially 
because the literature suggests that racial minorities are even more likely to choose a STEM field 
than their counterparts. Student response to grades may also explain racial imbalances in certain 
majors even though only a handful of studies have examined this relationship.  Based on data of 
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a large elite research university, Ost (2010) finds that conditional on high school performance 
and preparation, black and Hispanic students are more likely than white students to pursue 
physical or life science majors.  Similarly, Arcidiacono et al. (2012) examines racial differences 
in GPA and major choice at a private university, and find that even though conditional on gender 
black students have stronger initial preferences regarding to whether to major in the more strictly 
graded fields than whites, they are less likely to graduate in one of these majors due to their 
academic background. Differences in variance of grades across time as well as differences in 
grading practices across courses or departments dissuade blacks from majoring in natural 
sciences, engineering and economics.  
While the research on the role of grades in STEM attrition has produced conflicting 
results, the existing literature has not directly addressed the differential effect of both absolute 
and relative grades, and has been more focused on the gender gap rather than racial gaps. 
Moreover, the samples used in prior research have been from single and selective institutions 
with mostly high ability students, and thus have questionable relevance to STEM policy more 
broadly. 
Why might women and minorities respond differently to grades?  
 
Experimental and psychological studies have documented that equally skilled men and 
women exhibit differences that might affect their career choices, including differences in self-
perceptions of ability or self-confidence, competitive attitudes, levels of risk aversion and 
expectations about future performance (Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1994; Niederle & Yestrumskas, 
2008; Beyer & Langenfeld, 2000; Eckel & Grossman, 2008), but there is also research 






Minorities intending to major in STEM fields upon enrollment may be differentially 
changing their minds because of the following two factors: (i) they have lower perceptions of 
ability and are more vulnerable to lower grades in a stereotyped environment; (ii) they are less 
comfortable performing in a competitive setting like STEM, and particularly in a stereotyped and 
male-and-nonminority dominated environment, which might be translated into lower grades 
and/or loss of STEM interest (or a combination of these two factors, students with low 
perceptions of ability studying in a stereotyped and competitive environment).  
In addition to this, if there is any disconnect between grades and ability due to grade 
inflation or higher grading standards in STEM departments, then less confident students who are 
still learning their own ability, who are less competitive and enter into a stereotyped, competitive 
and male-and-nonminority dominated environment may be discouraged from persisting in STEM 
after updating their ability beliefs, especially through the relative grades they receive in non-
STEM courses before officially declaring their major. These students may also be more sensitive 
to maximize grades in the short-term, which may act contrary to their long-term interests. They 
may pursue courses, or even majors, that fall outside their stronger interests, and in some cases, 
aptitude (Sabot & Wakeman-Linn, 1991).  This may, in turn, disproportionately affect STEM 
attrition among minorities.   
STEM Perceptions of Ability in a Stereotyped Environment  
 
Minorities may have inaccurate information regarding the possibility of achieving or 
successfully graduating with a STEM major. Their STEM perceptions of ability may not reflect 
their actual ability, and this could differentially affect STEM persistence between minorities and 
non-minorities. On the top of this, it could also be the case that minorities may not persist in 





non-minorities outnumber them. Then, how do grades explain the STEM persistence gap? In a 
stereotyped environment, in which minorities are less confident of their ability than their peers, 
grades may differentially affect STEM perceptions of ability. As a result, minorities may switch 
out of STEM due to loss of interest or (perceived) academic failure and switch into a non-STEM 
field or a more stereotype-consistent career interest.  
Both psychological and economic theories provide useful frameworks for studying and 
understanding the differential effects of college grades on STEM attrition.  
Psychology Theories 
Social psychology theories of stereotype threat and self-perception provide lens to view 
and explain disparities in STEM attrition. Steele and Aronson's (1995) theory argue that in a 
situation where women spend considerable time in a competitive and male-oriented environment, 
a stereotyped threat could foster low performance expectations that would cause participants to 
withdraw effort. The reasoning behind this is that this threat can affect the self-confidence 
identified with the academic domain and pressure disidentification so as to remove the domain as 
a self-identity, as a basis of self-evaluation (Steele, 1997). As a result, a stereotype threat may 
affect motivation and persistence in the field of study for which adaptation is too costly and 
stereotypes are applied in spite of initial academic interest and academic ability.  
In three studies J. R. Steele and Ambady (2006) demonstrated that gender-stereotyped 
threat negatively affects women‘s interests towards math, the gender stereotyped domain, in 
favor of arts-oriented fields. The authors attribute these results to a change in self-concept, which 







. Moreover, evidence of the effect of stereotype threats posits that it mostly 
affect numerical minorities (Sekaquaptewa & Thompson, 2003; Ülkü-Steiner et al., 2000), which 
is the case of women and racial minorities pursuing STEM fields.  
This expectation is consistent with empirical findings that posit that self-perceptions of 
ability (i.e. self-concept, self-efficacy and perceived ability) have an influence on persistence and 
educational attainment, and that this differs between men and women. Academic self-concept 
and self-efficacy have been found to have positive effects on academic outcomes, for instance, 
on subsequent academic achievement (Marsh & Martin, 2011; Marsh, 1990; Valentine, DuBois, 
& Cooper, 2004), academic interests (Marsh, Trautwein, Lüdtke, Köller, & Baumert, 2005), 
course and major choices (Marsh & Yeung, 1997; Hackett & Betz, 1995), and occupational 
aspirations (Ireson & Hallam, 2009). In the long run, self-concept predicts higher educational 
attainment and course-work selection, beyond what can be explained in terms of prior measures 
of academic interest, school grades and standardized test scores (Marsh et al., 2005; Guay, 
Marsh, & Boivin, 2003; Marsh & Yeung, 1997).  
Women are less likely to enter and persist in math and physical science than men because 
they have less confidence in their abilities (Eccles, 1994; Ülkü-Steiner, Kurtz-Costes, & Ryan, 
2000). Men show greater self-concept in STEM domains relative to women (Simpkins, Davis-
Kean, & Eccles, 2006).
19
 Even though research on academic and domain-specific self-concept 
among racial minorities in college remains scarce, it suggests that math self-efficacy of African 
Americans is lower than that of White students (Pajares & Kranzler, 1995), and that it also 
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depends on the institution‘s racial composition. According to Fleming (1984), Black men 
attending predominantly PWCUs seem to suffer from interpersonal issues, academic 
demotivation, and lower academic self-concept, whereas Black men at HBCUs show greater 
academic gains and higher academic self-concept (Gerardi, 1990). 
Economic Theories 
Influential economists have incorporated social psychology theories into economic 
models of behavior. Some economists have been particularly interested in modeling how 
stereotype threat and individual‘s social identity differentially affect choices by influencing both 
student effort (and career choice) and performance (Akerlof & Kranton, 2002; Dee, 2009; 
Humlum et al., 2012). This theory is relevant because STEM fields are stereotyped, male 
dominated and competitive, and this institutional environment is comparatively more adverse for 
STEM minorities. Therefore, differences in non-pecuniary identity payoffs may differentially 
affect the decision of leaving STEM.  
Other economists have presented theoretical models to explain the effect of information 
on beliefs and self-perceptions of ability (Ertac, 2011; Azmat & Iriberri, 2009), wherein in 
educational settings performance feedback information could be provided by college grades. 
This theory together with the theory of gender differences in updating beliefs by Mobius et al. 
(2010) might explain why STEM minorities differentially attrite because they have more 
pessimistic beliefs about their own ability.  
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an 
economic model of behavior. In the utility function, identity is associated with different social 
categories that establish how people should behave or make economic decisions. In their view, 





prescribed behaviors that affirm one‘s self-image or identity. Violating these prescriptions 
creates anxiety and disutility in oneself and in others. In this model, an individual gains utility 
when her attributes and actions (and those of others) enhance her self-image or match the ideal of 
her category, and as she belongs to social categories with high status. Social categories are 
associated with the prescribed or ideal characteristics and behavior, and individuals see 
themselves as belonging to a specific category and are by others considered to be in that 
category. For instance, men have a high status in STEM because these fields are manly and 
stereotyped, whereas women have a lower status in STEM because they are supposed to choose a 
girly major like non-STEM fields. In this environment women might feel misplaced and men 
might contribute to making them feel like that. Thus, women who intend to major in STEM have 
already deviated from the ideals of their category and start off with an identity disutility, which 
might increase as they receive ego-relevant information such as grades.  
Ertac (2011) develops a model to emphasize the importance of self-perception as a 
determinant of behavior in many settings characterized by imperfect self-knowledge. For 
instance, in educational settings, as the author asserts, students are often unsure about their 
likelihood to succeed in a course or field of study, and tend to develop an academic self-concept 
over time. In the presence of imperfect self-knowledge, individuals tend to learn their ability by 
updating their beliefs based on previous successes and failures. The main feature of his model, 
which was adapted by Azmat and Iriberri (2009), is the assumption that students use both own 
performance feedback information and social comparison information, measured as one‘s 
performance in comparison to others‘ performance, to learn about their own ability.  
Latest research had documented differences in processing information by demographic 





process information more optimistically than they should. In other words, when they receive 
negative feedback, confident subjects assign higher probabilities to the optimistic state than they 
should in a self-relevant context. In his experiment, he finds evidence that men and women 
process information differently when they both perform a task perceived highly difficult. Women 
commit significantly more pessimistic deviations from Bayesian benchmarks than men in 
response to positive feedback, suggesting that pessimistic beliefs are more persistent in women. 
Mobius et al. (2010) also find evidence of greater conservatism in women than in men, 
concluding that men tend to update beliefs too little in response of new information. They also 
find that men are significantly less conservative than women. 
Attitudes towards Competition in a Stereotyped Environment  
 
Gender differences in competitiveness are often discussed as a potential explanation for 
gender differences in education and labor market outcomes. If women (and racial minorities) are 
more reluctant to compete, then they may be less likely to seek promotions or to enter and persist 
in male-dominated and competitive fields. They also may get more anxious once they have to 
perform in a competitive environment, which in turn might affect their performance. According 
to this literature, competitiveness predicts career interests and performance of students in 
different fields of study, particularly in STEM that is considered a competitive and stereotyped 
environment.  
Experimental economists have conducted a series of laboratory studies that address 
attitudes towards competition. These studies have examined performance in competitive 
environments under various incentive schemes as well as the decision to enter competition. 
Laboratory studies have strong internal validity, but questionable external validity. Laboratories 





differences in competitiveness (e.g. labor market discrimination, preferences). However, these 
studies are small scale, and in some cases conducted in environments that may not be easily 
extrapolated to the U.S. context. Yet, these results can be replicated and the same experiment can 
be conducted multiple times with different individuals with diverse educational backgrounds and 
demographics.  
There are two strands in this literature, choosing to enter a competitive environment or a 
tournament compared to a non-competitive environment or a piece-rate scheme (Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2010) and performing well in a competitive environment (Gneezy, Niederle, & 
Rustichini, 2003). Both strands of this literature conclude the same. Conditional on performance, 
women are more reluctant to compete than men and in mixed-sex settings women fail to perform 
well in competitions. The gender gap in performance is often greater in a competitive 
environment that in a noncompetitive one due to the fact that men respond more positively to an 
increase in competition than women.  These differences in attitudes towards competition may in 
turn explain the gap not only in STEM initial major intention, but also in persistence. It is worth 
noting that this literature is primarily focused on the gender gap, but I hypothesize that racial 
minorities have a similar response as women in competitive environments. Studies looking at 
racial differences in competitiveness are practically nonexistent.  
Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) conduct an experiment that was then replicated by many 
other researchers who find similar results (reviews of Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011). They 
examined whether men and women with the same ability differ in their selection into a 
competitive environment. 40 men and 40 women from the Pittsburgh Experimental Economic 
Lab were asked to add up sets of five two-digit numbers for five minutes under different 





solved correctly and incorrectly in each task. Participants did not receive information on the 
performance of anyone else until the end of the study. Although gender was never mentioned 
during the experiment, participants could see the gender composition of the group. Participants 
first performed the task under a noncompetitive piece rate of 50 cents per problem solved. Then, 
they perform in tournaments of two men and two women in which the participant with the largest 
number of correctly solved problems was paid $2 per correct problem and the others received no 
payment.  
Although the researchers did not find gender differences in performance, men select the 
tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next 
performance (73 percent versus 35 percent). On average, men in the worst-performance quartile 
enter the tournament more than women in the best-performance quartile. To account for the 
potential effect of confidence and its influence on earnings from the tournament, researchers 
controlled the tournament-entry decision by beliefs on their relative performance ranking and a 
choice of compensation scheme for past performance (that is, the choice of tournament does not 
require participants to subsequently perform in a competition). They find that even though both 
genders are overconfident, men are more overconfident than women (75 percent believed they 
are the best in their group of four versus 43 percent of women). Moreover, while men are more 
overconfident than women about their piece-rate performance, the difference in overconfidence 
is even greater when it comes to the tournament performance. This could suggest that women are 
not so competitive or that women may get more stressed and anxious in a competitive 
environment (Steele, 1997).  
Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) also control for gender differences in overconfidence, 





decision. They still find significant and large differences, and thereby they conclude that the 
tournament entry gap is driven by men being over confident and by a sizeable gender differences 
in preferences for performing in a competition.   
C. R. Price, (2010) replicates Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) study using a different 
university, Purdue University, and fails to replicate their results without finding any difference in 
male and female choices in the replication. He asserts that the main reason to explain why his 
results differ from Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) is that male and female subjects in the 
replication do not seem to differ in their level of confidence whereas Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2005) find a sizeable difference in levels of confidence.  
Competitiveness significantly correlates with educational choices such as science and 
math and explains an economically and statistically significant part of the gender gap in those 
choices. Buser (2012)
20
 conducted a classroom experiment in four schools in and around 
Amsterdam among students who are enrolled in the pre-university track, just before students 
chose one of four study profiles: the science-oriented profile Nature & Technology (NT), the 
health-oriented profile Nature & Health (NH), the social science-oriented profile Economics & 
Society (ES) and the humanities oriented profile Culture and Society (CS). Generally and based 
on the difficulty and amount of mathematics and science in the curriculum.
21
 In each school of 
the four schools, they captured all students in the 3rd year of the pre-university track for a total 
of 397 students in 16 classes. First, the authors used a classroom experiment to measure 
competitiveness in a stereotypical male task several months before they make their profile choice 
and while they still share the same classroom experience in school. The design closely follows 
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Niederle and Vesterlund (2005). Confidence, risk attitudes and ability (and subjective ability) 
were also measured and controlled for.  
The authors find that the choice of the tournament scheme in the experiment is 
significantly positively correlated with the prestige and math and science intensity of the chosen 
academic track, and that while boys and girls have very similar levels of academic ability, boys 
are substantially more likely than girls to choose more prestigious and science-oriented profiles. 
They also find that competitiveness is as important a predictor of profile choice as gender. More 
importantly, up to 23 percent of the gender difference in profile choice can be attributed to 
gender differences in competitiveness. Gender difference in choices is significantly smaller when 
they consider competitive girls and non-competitive boys than when they consider competitive 
boys and non-competitive girls. Moreover, they also show that the effect of competitiveness is 
not driven by a possible effect of confidence or risk attitudes on academic track choice. When 
they control for the experimental measures of confidence and risk attitudes, the decision to enter 
the tournament still closes the gender gap in the prestige of chosen tracks by a significant 16 
percent.  
This strand of the literature is focused on gender differences in competition-entry 
decisions, and it suggests that both academic confidence and preferences for competition might 
determine a STEM major choice. College students make dynamic and ongoing decisions to entry 
into a competitive environment like STEM through their course choices and before officially 
declaring their majors. Therefore, I hypothesize that competitiveness may not only influence 
initial interest in STEM, but increasing STEM persistence and solidifying interests in STEM.   
The second strand of this literature has been less studied, and it is more related to how 





grades than their less competitive peers, and thereby these students may be more persistent. On 
the other hand, competitiveness may lead overconfident students to surpass their academic 
ability and enter very competitive and difficult fields of study.  Buser (2012) find that some boys 
aim for the most mathematically heavy academic track while scoring high on competitiveness 
but not so much on the math grade.  
The most important study that explores gender differences in competitive performance 
was conducted in Israel at a competitive institution where students receive a degree in 
engineering (Gneezy et al., 2003). In this experiment participants were presented with an 
incentive scheme and asked to solve mazes on the Internet for 15 minutes.  
Thirty women and 30 men perform under each of the four different incentive schemes, 
with no one performing under more than one incentive scheme. Participants could figure the 
gender composition of the group even though gender was not explicitly mentioned. In order to 
determine how the gender gap responds to an increase in competition, the researchers started 
with a noncompetitive environment in which the gender gap in performance is small, with men 
solving an average of 11.2 mazes and women solving 9.7 mazes.  
Using a different set of participants, three men and three women were asked to compete 
in a tournament incentive scheme. Under this scheme, the participant with the highest 
performance in each group receives a payment of $3 per maze, while the other members of the 
group receive no payment. This scheme creates a significant gender gap of 4.2 mazes, which is 
three times greater than that under the piece-rate payment.  To account for gender differences in 
the effect of risk aversion or uncertainty on performance, a randomly scheme was implemented 
where participants understood that one member of each group would be selected randomly after 





while the others would receive nothing. Given that the average performance gap under random 
pay is similar to the one in the piece rate, the researchers conclude that risk aversion does not 
play a substantial role in explaining the behavior in mixed-sex tournaments.  
A final treatment examines performance in single-sex tournaments to understand whether 
or not women perform well under competition or if it is the composition of the group that affects 
their performance in a tournament. The resulting gender gap in mean performance is 1.7 in the 
single-sex tournament, only 0.2 higher than in a piece-rate scheme, and significantly smaller than 
the 4.2 gap in the mixed-sex tournament. Therefore, researchers conclude that women do not 
compete well in competitions against men. This argument has also been used to support single-
sex schools (Roland G. Fryer & Levitt, 2009; Datnow & Hubbard, 2013).  
To explain why they observe a difference in reaction to competition, they explore how 
confidence and ability may explain these differences by first distinguishing their responses by 
ability. The researchers find that in both noncompetitive treatments and single-sex tournament, 
women account for 40 percent of those in the top two quintiles, but in mixed-sex tournaments 
this fraction of women with a performance in the top two performance quintiles significantly 
decreases to 24 percent. Then, the researchers measure if men and women feel differently 
competent in solving mazes to account for confidence. Results, which were attenuated in single-
sex competitions (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011), suggests that men feel more confident and 
competent that women. 
Experiments have shown that for women both the performance in as well as the 
willingness to enter competitive environments is reduced in mixed-sex tournaments (Gneezy 
et al., 2003; Niederle et al., 2013). Similarly, Huguet and Régner (2007) show that girls 





believe measures mathematical ability. Most competitiveness studies build on tasks such as 
solving mazes and measuring math ability, which are generally considered as male tasks or a 
stereotyped domain. Günther et al. (2010) and Grosse and Riener (2010) find a gender difference 
in performance change in a math task but not in a word task, whereas Wozniak et al. (2009), 
using a maze task and the same word task, find no difference in the gender gap between the two 
tasks. Even though there is mixed evidence on the role of the task on the gender gap in 
competitiveness, this kind of stereotype threat has been suggested as one reason why women in 
mixed-sex groups compete less than men in some of the tasks previously studied in this literature 
(Gneezy et al., 2003).  
It is important to understand the extent to which competitiveness influence STEM course 
and major choices of students from initial enrollment to major declaration, and the extent to 
which it affects STEM and non-STEM grades once they choose a major. If competitiveness 
mostly affects choices, then STEM persistence would be directly affected by competitiveness 
and its effect on initial major intention as well as consecutive major declaration. If in addition to 
this, competitiveness mostly affects performance, then its effect on grades would negatively and 
differentially affect STEM persistence by undermining STEM grades of women and racial 
minorities relative to their non-STEM grades. This in turn would widen even more the STEM 
persistence gap between minorities and non-minorities.   
Institutional Grading Policies and their Potential Influence on 
STEM Persistence 
 
Concerns over grade inflation and disparities in grading practices are widespread 
phenomena in higher education and have led institutions in the United States to adopt various 





information on which to base their decisions and students might not obtain reliable signals 
regarding their own academic and relative abilities (Bar, Kadiyali, & Zussman, 2012), which in 
turn distorts students‘ course and major choices across fields. Therefore, the main objective of 
these grading reforms is to make grades more informative and to curb grade inflation. 
Institutions have commonly followed one of three types of policies: (i) implementing grade 
targets; (ii) changing the grading scale, and (iii) providing information on the distribution of 
grades in different courses to students, graduate schools, and employers.  
Due to grade inflation, and the resulting compression of grades near the top, students who 
are sensitive to grades in their major choice will distort their choices if there is differential grade 
inflation and compression across disciplines. Given that grade inflation has disproportionately 
affected non-STEM fields, a grading gap has emerged that provides students with an incentive to 
switch out of STEM (Ost, 2010). A discrepancy between grades in STEM and non-STEM 
courses not only may discourage students from majoring in subjects from low-grading 
departments
22
 but also sends incorrect signals to students about their relative abilities in different 
fields. Even though studies aimed at evaluating the impact of grading reforms on curbing grade 
inflation do not address the differential effect of these policies on the STEM persistence gap, it is 
worth to review this line of research.  
Adoption of Grading Targets  
 
Grade targets restrict instructors‘ choice of grading policies. In April 2004, the Princeton 
University adopted a grading policy that aimed to provide common grading standards across 
academic departments and to give students clear signals from their teachers about the difference 
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between good work and their very best work. The policy recommended that, over time, each 
department award no more than 35 percent of A-range grades for course work and no more than 
55 percent of A-range grades for junior and senior independent work.  
In 2013, an ad hoc faculty committee surveyed current faculty members and 
undergraduates to evaluate their perspectives and experiences under the grading policy. Even 
though, both the average GPA and the fraction of A-range grades declined after the 
implementation of the current grading policy, while the fraction of B-range grades increased 
significantly, the faculty report suggests that increased faculty attention to grade inflation— not 
the grading reform — may have played the key role in reducing grades. Based of self-reported 
and online responses, this report asserts that the grading policy does not help to maintain fair and 
consistent grading standards across academic departments. However, quantitative data shows 
that there has been some reduction in the disparity of grades across departments, but depending 
on the department and course level. While the grading policy had little effect on the grades in the 
Mathematics department, it has had a substantial impact on the Engineering departments, which 
have significantly lowered the fraction of A-grades in both lower-level and upper-level courses. 
This report concludes that the overall fraction of A-range grades across departments is not a 
reliable measure of fairness because some departments (e.g. Engineering) offer service courses 
with large enrollments, while others do not.
23
 Based on this report and its recommendation to 
eliminate the 35 percent rule, Princeton‘s president has endorsed the recommendation. 
Another grade rationing policy aimed to curb grade inflation and enhance institution‘s 
credibility and reputation was implemented in Wellesley College. Yet, this grading policy, as 
opposed to that of Princeton, took into account the nature of its departments and course levels. In 







Fall 2004 Wellesley College implemented the following: average grades in lower-level courses 
with at least 10 students should not exceed a 3.33, or a B +. Only courses in high-grading 
departments in the humanities and social sciences (except economics) needed to change grading 
practices in order to comply. Butcher, McEwan, and Weerapana (2014) evaluate the 
consequences of the policy by comparing outcomes in departments that were obligated to lower 
their grades with outcomes in departments that were not.  
Using a standard difference-in-differences methodology, the authors find that the policy 
brings average grades down in high-grading departments, reducing compression at the top of the 
grade distribution: students were 14 percentage points less likely to get an A in the treated 
departments and there is little evidence that they increased the use of very low grades. For 
African-American students and students with low initial test scores, the gap in GPA with their 
peers increased in the departments where grades were reduced. This policy also affected course 
choice by reducing enrollment in treated departments by about 19 percentage points. 
Consequently, students were 30 percentage points less likely to major in one of these courses, 
indicating that students‘ choices about their majors are linked with grades. The fraction of a 
graduating class majoring in, harder grading, economics
24
 (and to a lesser extent in the sciences) 
increased, and the fraction of a graduating class majoring in other, easier grading, social sciences 
fell, with the fraction remaining flat in the humanities. It is worth nothing that the authors are 
focused on graduation rates across departments using the number of majors the student had listed 
as her major in her final semester, instead of also exploring the effect on persistence or the 
probability of switching out of STEM or a low-grading department. The effect on graduation 
rates may be driven by lower enrollment rates in treated departments.  
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Change in Grading Scales 
 
A change in grading scale from whole-grade grading scale to plus/minus grading has 
been adopted in US universities as a way to reduce grade inflation, enhance better differentiation 
among students, and increase student motivation. Although several descriptive studies have 
reported a reduction in grade inflation using plus/minus grading (Shannon, 1979; Farland & 
Cepeda, 1989; Bressette, 2002), other institutions have reported that the use of + and – qualifiers 
have no effect on curbing the grade inflation (Baker & Bates, 1999).  
Bressette (2002) analyzes the differential effect of this change across departments and 
concluded that schools with higher GPAs were associated with larger predicted reductions in 
overall GPAs while schools with lower average GPAs tended to have lower predicted reductions 
in their average GPAs. Using data from Washington State University, North Carolina State 
University, and Berry College, the author showed that a plus/minus grading scale decreased the 
common inflation in GPA of 1 percent per year, suggesting a corresponding decrease in grade 
inflation. The finer distinctions available from the plus/minus grading scale allow a better 
representation of a student‘s level of performance reducing the likelihood that faculty will bump 
students up to the next grade level (Bressette, 2002).  
K. D. Barnes and Buring (2012) also investigates the change in grading scales from 2005 
to 2010 at the University of Cincinnati College of Pharmacy. The authors find that the type of 
grading scales used did not affect the mean cumulative GPA. The use of a plus/minus grading 
scale led to an increase in mean GPA for 3 courses and a decrease of mean GPA of 4 courses.  
To my knowledge, there is no study that had analyzed the differential effect of a change 
in grading scale across different departments or between high and low-grading departments, and 





evaluated with respect to its expected effect on grade inflation rather than on other academic and 
more policy-relevant outcomes such as course and major choices, persistence and graduation 
rates. 
Grade Reporting Policies  
 
This type of grading reform is based on providing transcript readers with information on 
the distribution of grades in different courses with the aim of improving the reliability of grades 
as signals of student quality. Those who support this type of policy expect students to have 
weaker incentives to select leniently graded courses, which in turn may assist in curbing grade 
inflation. Some proponents of this approach also expect that faculty would be more reluctant to 
grade leniently if they knew this information would be exposed to their colleagues and to readers 
of transcripts (Bar et al., 2012).  
In 1996, the Cornell University‘s Faculty Senate approved two new grade reporting 
policies: (i) the Office of the University Registrar would publish median grades and enrollments 
for undergraduate courses in a median grade report, and (ii) transcripts would record the mean 
grade and course enrollment, as well as a student‘s grade, for all courses with at least 10 
students. The first ―median grade report‖ was available online by the Spring of 1998; however, 
the reporting of course median grades in the transcripts was not implemented until the Fall 2008. 
Bar et al. (2009) evaluate the effect of the first policy change on patterns of course choice and 
grade inflation by using a dataset of grades assigned in undergraduate level courses at the 
College of Arts and Sciences between the spring semester of 1990 and the fall semester of 2004. 
The authors exploit persistent differences in course medians that are in place prior to the policy 
change. They find that the provision of grade information led to increased enrollment into 





a negative effect on social welfare. They also find that the tendency to select leniently graded 
courses was weaker for high-ability students.  Based on these results, the Cornell‘s Faculty 
Senate voted in May 2011 to cease the online posting of median grade reports for Cornell 
courses. Yet, median grades will continue to be published on students‘ transcripts. 
A recent study, Bar et al., (2012), provides a model to demonstrate how grading policies 
can have complex effects on patterns of student course enrollment. In fact, they show that the 
provision of information about grading policies could result in an increase in grade inflation and 
in a decrease in the reliability of information on student ability conveyed to transcript readers. 
When information of grades is given only to students, some of them become more attracted to 
leniently graded courses.  When information is provided to both students and employers, some 
students have an incentive take strictly graded courses. Other students may prioritize grades 
instead of their careers or choices of major by choosing leniently graded courses where they can 
receive a higher grade and be pooled with higher ability students. This study concludes that the 
effect of providing information about grades on grade inflation ultimately depends on changes in 
students‘ course selection patterns.   
Grade inflation has been often blamed for distorting students‘ course and major choices 
across fields, therefore we might expect that a change in grading policy would lead students to 
make different choices about which course to take or in which departments to major. Grading 
policies to curb grade inflation in higher education have gained traction across the country in 
recent years, yet there are some questions still left unanswered. It may appear that the three 
approaches to implement grading policies - adoption of grading targets, change in grading scales 
and grade reporting policies-would have the same results, but the literature shows the opposite. 





result in an increase in average grades. Furthermore, these types of institutional grading policies 
also vary with respect to the pressure to reverse the grade policy. Both grade targets and median 
grade reports have been carefully studied and their findings have led institutions to remove these 
policies. At Wellesley College and Princeton, for example, prospective students, current 
students, and alums all worry that systematically lower grades may disadvantage them relative to 
students at other institutions when they present their grades to graduate school or potential 
employers. For this kind of policies, colleges and universities would have to act together in 
response to grade inflation so as to curtail pressures on reversing the grade policy. One the most 
accepted and long-lasting grading policies has been changing the grade scale, even though the 
literature shows conflicting results pertaining to its effect on reducing grade inflation.   
Arcidiacono et al. (forthcoming) estimate an equilibrium model of grading policies to 
decompose differences in female/male course taking courses across fields using a detailed 
student enrollment data from the University of Kentucky (UK). With the estimates in the 
equilibrium model, they find that female value grades a little over 20 percent than men, and that 
the most important source of the gender gap in STEM is the expected grades across courses for 
the average student. While equalizing average grades across fields reduces the STEM gap by 41 
percent, accounting for both taste differences for departments and female professor preferences 
closes the gap by 34 percent.
25
 
Despite the fact that institutional grading policies have been studied at some extent, only 
one study, that of Arcidiacono et al. (forthcoming), has addressed the differential effect of these 
policies on women. Also, the literature does not offer enough information of how these policies 
have differentially affected students‘ outcomes in low-grading (STEM) versus high-grading 
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I now return to the original research questions and consider implications for future 
research and policy. First, the leaky STEM pipeline has not only been a concern of the 
government and research communities. The media and general public has recently questioned 
why STEM majors, as with economics, begin with few minority students enrolling and end with 
even fewer graduating. Despite the efforts of researchers, policymakers and administrators over 
the last few decades, the number of STEM graduates and professionals in the United States 
remains low. While STEM entrance rates are not significantly different from non-STEM fields, 
STEM attrition rates are stark. Among 2003-2004 beginning bachelor‘s degree students, STEM 
fields attracted proportionally more students (28 percent) than did many non-STEM fields26. 
Yet, among bachelor‘s degree students entering STEM fields between 2003 and 2009, 48 percent 
had left these fields by spring 2009 (Chen, 2013). One area for increasing STEM fields has been 
to increase the number of college graduates in STEM by gender and race.  
The patterns that explain disparities in STEM college graduation between women and 
men and racial minorities and non-minorities are different. For women, the lower likelihood of 
graduating with a STEM major is explained by a disproportional entrance into STEM fields upon 
initial enrollment as well as a lower likelihood to remain in STEM majors. In contrast, for racial 
minorities, the absolute STEM graduation gap is mainly explained by lower STEM persistence 
rates. Therefore, and despite the fact that initial major intention partly explains the gap in STEM 
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graduation, this review is focused on the gap in STEM attrition, given that career interests 
greatly influence initial major intention and higher education policies cannot be drawn upon that.  
Second, a number of plausible non-grade and grade factors may underlie the STEM 
attrition gap. In order to identify these factors we need to better understand to what extend 
gender and racial gaps in STEM persistence can be influenced by pre-college factors as well as 
early college experiences that might shape students‘ major choices. Research into the causes of 
the gap in STEM persistence can be categorized into a broad range of pre-college factors and 
college experiences such as instructor gender and race, peer effects, and absolute and relative 
course performance.  
Pre-college factors include pre-college preparation, test scores, academic experiences in 
mathematics and science prior to high school and prior achievement in mathematics. These 
studies are mostly descriptive and even though authors control for pre-existing student 
characteristics it is likely that unobserved pre-existing differences among students are driving the 
differences in STEM persistence. According to the existing literature, even though pre-college 
factors matter they do not seem to differentially affect STEM attrition between minorities and 
non-minorities. Pre-college preparation may explain better the STEM persistence gap by race 
than by gender. 
In general, results from studies focused on disparities in STEM persistence explained by 
instructor gender and race and peer effects are very mixed, even though this literature utilizes 
better identification strategies to address causality. Having instructors of your own gender has 
mixed results on STEM course taking and performance, although most of these studies do not 
find statistically significant effects on STEM persistence. With respect to racial minorities, 





likely to persist in STEM. With regard to peer effects, studies that looked at major choices as 
outcomes have not found significant effects of peers, and the impact of peers on the STEM 
persistence gap is unclear and limited to one study. This study finds larger and positive effects of 
peers on persistence for women in physical sciences and no significant differences between men 
and women for the life sciences.  
As to the role of grades in explaining STEM attrition gaps, while the research has 
produced conflicting results, the existing literature has not directly addressed the differential 
effect of both absolute and relative grades, and has been more focused on the gender gap rather 
than racial gaps. Moreover, the samples used in prior research have been from single and 
selective institutions with mostly high ability students, and thus have questionable relevance to 
STEM policy more broadly. Still, this line of research has found evidence that grades affect 
sorting into majors, and minorities value grades more than non-minorities influencing gaps in 
STEM persistence. 
Rigorous grading standards and a potential grading gap from grade inflation may 
exacerbate the importance of absolute and relative grades on STEM course choice, and this may 
in turn deter students, who are more sensitive to grades, from persisting and majoring in STEM. 
In fact, when equalizing expected grades across STEM and non-STEM fields, Arcidiacono et al. 
(forthcoming) identify the most important source of the gender gap in STEM.  
Third, pertaining the mechanisms underlying the differential effect of grades in STEM 
persistence, minorities intending to major in STEM fields upon enrollment may be differentially 
changing their minds because of the following two factors: (i) they have lower perceptions of 
ability and are more vulnerable to lower grades in a stereotyped environment in which the cost of 





competitive setting like STEM, and particularly in a male-and-non-minority dominated 
environment, which might be translated into lower grades and loss of STEM interest (or a 
combination of these two factors, students with low perceptions of ability studying in a 
stereotyped and competitive environment).  
Based on first theory, I would expect that a low grade in a STEM course for a female or 
racial minority student might undermine her perception of ability and act to reaffirm her self-
image and negative stereotype. Also, a higher grade in a non-STEM course relative to a STEM 
one may also contribute to the idea that she is better at non-STEM fields, the non-stereotyped 
domain that matches her ―ideal‖ social category. The second theory about the influence of 
competitiveness in STEM persistence as a mechanism by which grades have differential effects 
is still less clear. Results suggest that men feel more confident and competent, and that women 
perform better in single-sex environments. 
Certainly it will be helpful to have more studies that disentangle the effect of 
competitiveness and minority stereotypes in STEM from initial enrollment to major declaration 
and graduation so as to promote institutional environments more conducive to improve 
disparities in STEM. More research is also needed to design interventions aimed at improving 
minorities‘ confidence in their own ability and at changing stereotyped environments so as to 
reduce or eliminate the cost of not choosing your ―ideal‖ social category.     
Ultimately, my review has uncovered evidence supporting the importance of institutional 
grading policies to shape student‘s major and course choices. Institutions have commonly 
followed one of three types of policies: (i) implementing grade targets; (ii) changing the grading 
scale, and (iii) providing information on the distribution of grades in different courses to 





have been studied at some extent, none of these studies have addressed the differential effect of 
these policies on those who might be more sensitive to grades (i.e., women and racial 
minorities). Also, this literature does not offer enough information of how these policies have 
differentially affected students‘ outcomes in low versus high-grading departments, given that 








1 Allen, W. R. (1992). The Color of Success: African-American College Student Outcomes 
at Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities. Harvard 
Educational Review, 62(1), 26–44. 
2 Altonji, & Blank. (1999). Race and Gender in the Labor Market. In Handbook of Labor 
Economics, 3c, 3144–3259. 
3 Anderson, E. L., & Kim, D. (2006). Increasing the success of minority students in science 
and technology. American Council on Education Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
http://opas.ous.edu/Committees/Resources/Publications/ACE-MinorityStudents.pdf 
4 Arcidiacono, P. (2004). Ability sorting and the returns to college major. Journal of 
Econometrics, 121(1–2), 343–375. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2003.10.010 
5 Arcidiacono, P., Aucejo, E. M., and Spenner, K. (2012). What happens after enrollment? 
An analysis of the time path of racial differences in GPA and major choice. IZA Journal of 
Labor Economics, 1(1), 1–24. http://doi.org/10.1186/2193-8997-1-5 
6 Arcidiacono, P., Aucejo, E. M. and Hotz, V. Joseph (2015a) University differences in the 
graduation minorities in STEM fields: evidence from California. American Economic 
Review . ISSN 0002-8282 
7 Arcidiacono, P., Ahn, T., Hopson, A., and Thomas, J. (2015b) Equilibrium Grade Inflation 
with Implications for Female Interest in STEM Majors. Paper presented at the Economics 
and Education Workshop at Teachers College at Columbia University, New York. 
8 Astin, A. W., & Astin, H. S. (1992). Undergraduate Science Education: The Impact of 
Different College Environments on the Educational Pipeline in the Sciences. Final Report. 
Retrieved from http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED362404 
9 Attewell, P., Heil, S., & Reisel, L. (2011). Competing Explanations of Undergraduate 
Noncompletion. American Educational Research Journal, 48(3), 536–559. 
http://doi.org/10.3102/0002831210392018 
10 Baker III, H. E., & Bates, H. L. (1999). Student and faculty perceptions of the impact of 
plus/minus grading: a management department perspective. Journal on Excellence in 
College Teaching, 10(1), 23–33. 
11 Barnes, K. D., & Buring, S. M. (2012). The Effect of Various Grading Scales on Student 
Grade Point Averages. American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education, 76(3). 
http://doi.org/10.5688/ajpe76341 
12 Barnes, L. L. B., Bull, K. S., Campbell, N. J., & Perry, K. M. (2001). Effects of Academic 
Discipline and Teaching Goals in Predicting Grading Beliefs Among Undergraduate 
Teaching Faculty. Research in Higher Education, 42(4), 455–467. 
http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011006909774 
13 Bar, T., Kadiyali, V., & Zussman, A. (2012). Putting grades in context. Journal of Labor 
Economics, 30(2), 445–478. 
14 Barton, P. E. (2003). Hispanics in Science and Engineering: A Matter of Assistance and 
Persistence. Policy Information Report. Retrieved from http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED481749 
15 Beede, D., Julian, T., Langdon, D., McKittrick, G., Khan, B., & Doms, M. (2011). Women 
in STEM: A Gender Gap to Innovation. ESA Issue Brief# 04-11. US Department of 





16 Bertrand, M., Goldin, C., & Katz, L. F. (2010). Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young 
Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors. American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 2(3), 228–255. http://doi.org/10.1257/app.2.3.228 
17 Bettinger, E. P., & Long, B. T. (2005). Do Faculty Serve as Role Models? The Impact of 
Instructor Gender on Female Students. The American Economic Review, 95(2), 152–157. 
18 Beyer, S., & Langenfeld, K. (2000). Gender Differences in the Recall of Performance 
Feedback. Retrieved from http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED444079 
19 BHEF. (2010). BHEF_STEM.pdf. Retrieved November 25, 2014, from http://www.ncci-
cu.org/downloads/BHEF_STEM.pdf 
20 Bobbitt-Zeher, D. (2007). The Gender Income Gap and the Role of Education. Sociology 
of Education, 80(1), 1–22. 
21 Bonous-Hammarth, M. (2000). Pathways to Success: Affirming Opportunities for Science, 
Mathematics, and Engineering Majors. The Journal of Negro Education, 69(1/2), 92–111. 
22 Bressette, A. (2002). Arguments for Plus/minus Grading: A Case Study. Educational 
Research Quarterly, 25(3), 29. 
23 Brown, C., & Corcoran, M. (1996). Sex-Based Differences in School Content and the 
Male/Female Wage Gap (Working Paper No. 5580). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w5580 
24 Burkam, D. T., & Lee, V. (2003, February 20). Mathematics, Foreign Language, and 
Science Coursetaking and the NELS:88 Transcript Data. Retrieved November 26, 2014, 
from http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=200301 
25 Burtner, J. (2005). The Use of Discriminant Analysis to Investigate the Influence of Non-
Cognitive Factors on Engineering School Persistence. Journal of Engineering Education, 
94(3), 335–338. http://doi.org/10.1002/j.2168-9830.2005.tb00858.x 
26 Buser, T. (2012). The impact of the menstrual cycle and hormonal contraceptives on 
competitiveness. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(1), 1–10. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.006 
27 Butcher, K. F., McEwan, P. J., & Weerapana, A. (2014). The Effects of an Anti-Grade-
Inflation Policy at Wellesley College. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(3), 189–
204. 
28 Campbell Jr, G. (1993). Visions of engineering education in century II. The Porth 
Distinguished Lecture, University of Missouri at Rolla, MO. 
29 Canes, B. J., & Rosen, H. S. (1994). Following in Her Footsteps? Women’s Choices of 
College Majors and Faculty Gender Composition (Working Paper No. 4874). National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w4874 
30 Carrell, S. E., Fullerton, R. L., & West, J. E. (2008). Does Your Cohort Matter? Measuring 
Peer Effects in College Achievement (Working Paper No. 14032). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w14032 
31 Carrell, S. E., Page, M. E., & West, J. E. (2010). Sex and Science: How Professor Gender 
Perpetuates the Gender Gap 
*
. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3), 1101–1144. 
http://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1101 
32 Chen, X. (2009). Students Who Study Science, Technology, Engineering, and 
Mathematics (STEM) in Postsecondary Education. Stats in Brief. NCES 2009-161. 





33 Chen, X. (2013). STEM Attrition: College Students‘ Paths into and out of STEM Fields. 
Statistical Analysis Report. NCES 2014-001. National Center for Education Statistics. 
Retrieved from http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED544470 
34 Chizmar, J. F. (2000). A Discrete-Time Hazard Analysis of the Role of Gender in 
Persistence in the Economics Major. The Journal of Economic Education, 31(2), 107–118. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00220480009596768 
35 Correll, S. J. (2004). Constraints into Preferences: Gender, Status, and Emerging Career 
Aspirations. American Sociological Review, 69(1), 93–113. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/000312240406900106 
36 Crisp, G., Nora, A., & Taggart, A. (2009). Student Characteristics, Pre-College, College, 
and Environmental Factors as Predictors of Majoring in and Earning a STEM Degree: An 
Analysis of Students Attending a Hispanic Serving Institution. American Educational 
Research Journal, 46(4), 924–942. http://doi.org/10.3102/0002831209349460 
37 Datnow, A., & Hubbard, L. (2013). Gender in Policy and Practice: Perspectives on Single 
Sex and Coeducational Schooling. Routledge. 
38 Daymont, T. N., & Andrisani, P. J. (1984). Job Preferences, College Major, and the 
Gender Gap in Earnings. The Journal of Human Resources, 19(3), 408–428. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/145880 
39 DeBerard, M. S., Spielmans, G. I., & Julka, D. L. (2004). Predictors of Academic 
Achievement and Retention among College Freshmen: A Longitudinal Study. College 
Student Journal, 38(1), 66. 
40 De Giorgi, G., Pellizzari, M., & Redaelli, S. (2010). Identification of Social Interactions 
through Partially Overlapping Peer Groups. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 2(2), 241–275. http://doi.org/10.1257/app.2.2.241 
41 Diprete, T. A., & Buchmann, C. (2006). Gender-specific trends in the value of education 
and the emerging gender gap in college completion. Demography, 43(1), 1–24. 
http://doi.org/10.1353/dem.2006.0003 
42 DiPrete, T. A., & Buchmann, C. (2013). Gender Disparities in Educational Attainment in 
the New Century: Trends, Causes and Consequences. Retrieved from 
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report07172013.pdf 
43 Dynan, K. E., & Rouse, C. E. (1997). The Underrepresentation of Women in Economics: 
A Study of Undergraduate Economics Students. The Journal of Economic Education, 
28(4), 350–368. http://doi.org/10.1080/00220489709597939 
44 Eamon, M. K. (2005). Social-Demographic, School, Neighborhood, and Parenting 
Influences on the Academic Achievement of Latino Young Adolescents. Journal of Youth 
and Adolescence, 34(2), 163–174. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-005-3214-x 
45 Eccles, J. S. (1994). Understanding Women‘s Educational And Occupational Choices: 
Applying the Eccles et al. Model of Achievement-Related Choices. Psychology of Women 
Quarterly, 18(4), 585–609. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1994.tb01049.x 
46 Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2008). Forecasting risk attitudes: An experimental study 
using actual and forecast gamble choices. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
68(1), 1–17. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.006 
47 Eide, E. (1997). Accounting for Race and Gender Differences in College Wage Premium 





48 Elliot, A. J., & Harackiewicz, J. M. (1994). Goal setting, achievement orientation, and 
intrinsic motivation: A mediational analysis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 66(5), 968–980. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.968 
49 Ellison, G., & Swanson, A. (2010). The Gender Gap in Secondary School Mathematics at 
High Achievement Levels: Evidence from the American Mathematics Competitions. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(2), 109–128. http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.24.2.109 
50 Farland, R., & Cepeda, R. (1989). Plus and Minus Grading. Retrieved from 
http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED309802 
51 Federman, M. (2007). State Graduation Requirements, High School Course Taking, and 
Choosing a Technical College Major. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 
7(1). Retrieved from 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap.2007.7.1/bejeap.2007.7.1.1521/bejeap.2007.7.1.1
521.xml?onlyResultQuery=hsk 
52 Ficano, C. C. (2012). Peer effects in college academic outcomes – Gender matters! 
Economics of Education Review, 31(6), 1102–1115. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.07.012 
53 Foster, G. (2006). It‘s not your peers, and it‘s not your friends: Some progress toward 
understanding the educational peer effect mechanism. Journal of Public Economics, 90(8–
9), 1455–1475. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.12.001 
54 Fournier, G. M., & Sass, T. R. (2000). Take My Course, ―Please‖: The Effects of the 
Principles Experience on Student Curriculum Choice. The Journal of Economic Education, 
31(4), 323. http://doi.org/10.2307/1183146 
55 Freeman, R. B. (2006). Does globalization of the scientific/engineering workforce threaten 
US economic leadership? In Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 6 (pp. 123–158). 
The MIT Press. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0207.pdf 
56 Gerardi, S. (1990). Academic self-concept as a predictor of academic success among 
minority and low-socioeconomic status students. Journal of College Student Development, 
402–407. 
57 Gerber, T. P., & Cheung, S. Y. (2008). Horizontal Stratification in Postsecondary 
Education: Forms, Explanations, and Implications. Annual Review of Sociology, 34(1), 
299–318. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134604 
58 Gneezy, U., Niederle, M., & Rustichini, A. (2003). Performance in competitive 
environments: Gender differences. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-
CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS-, 118(3), 1049–1074. 
59 Goldin, C., Katz, L. F., & Kuziemko, I. (2006). The homecoming of American college 
women: The reversal of the college gender gap. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w12139 
60 Griffith, A. L. (2010). Persistence of women and minorities in STEM field majors: Is it the 
school that matters? Economics of Education Review, 29(6), 911–922. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2010.06.010 
61 Grogger, J., & Eide, E. (1995). Changes in College Skills and the Rise in the College 
Wage Premium. The Journal of Human Resources, 30(2), 280–310. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/146120 
62 Grosse, N. D., & Riener, G. (2010). Explaining gender differences in competitiveness: 






63 Grubb, W. N. (1993). The varied economic returns to postsecondary education: New 
evidence from the class of 1972. Journal of Human Resources, 365–382. 
64 Guay, F., Marsh, H. W., & Boivin, M. (2003). Academic self-concept and academic 
achievement: Developmental perspectives on their causal ordering. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 95(1), 124–136. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.95.1.124 
65 Günther, C., Ekinci, N. A., Schwieren, C., & Strobel, M. (2010). Women can‘t jump?—An 
experiment on competitive attitudes and stereotype threat. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 75(3), 395–401. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.05.003 
66 Hackett, G., & Betz, N. E. (1995). Self-Efficacy and Career Choice and Development. In J. 
E. Maddux (Ed.), Self-Efficacy, Adaptation, and Adjustment (pp. 249–280). Springer US. 
Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-6868-5_9 
67 Halpern, D. F., Aronson, J., Reimer, N., Simpkins, S., Star, J. R., & Wentzel, K. (2007). 
Encouraging girls in math and science. Retrieved from 
http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/4889482 
68 Han, L., & Li, T. (2009). The gender difference of peer influence in higher education. 
Economics of Education Review, 28(1), 129–134. 
69 Hill, C., Corbett, C., & St. Rose, A. (2010). Why So Few? Women in Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Mathematics. American Association of University Women. Retrieved 
from http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED509653 
70 Hoffmann, F., & Oreopoulos, P. (2009). A Professor Like Me The Influence of Instructor 
Gender on College Achievement. Journal of Human Resources, 44(2), 479–494. 
http://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.44.2.479 
71 Horn, L., Kojaku, L. K., & Carroll, C. D. (2001). High school academic curriculum and 
the persistence path through college: Persistence and transfer behavior of undergraduates 






72 Horvath, J., Beaudin, B. Q., & Wright, S. P. (1992). Persisting in the Introductory 
Economics Course: An Exploration of Gender Differences. The Journal of Economic 
Education, 23(2), 101–108. http://doi.org/10.2307/1183251 
73 Huang, G., Taddese, N., & Walter, E. (2000). Entry and Persistence of Women and 
Minorities in College Science and Engineering Education. Education Statistics Quarterly, 
2(3), 59–60. 
74 Huguet, P., & Régner, I. (2007). Stereotype threat among schoolgirls in quasi-ordinary 
classroom circumstances. Journal of Educational Psychology, 99(3), 545–560. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.99.3.545 
75 Hurtado, S., Eagan, K., & Chang, M. (2010). Degrees of success: Bachelor‘s degree 
completion rates among initial stem majors. Higher Education Research Institute at UCLA, 
January. 
76 Ireson, J., & Hallam, S. (2009). Academic self-concepts in adolescence: Relations with 






77 Jacobs, J. A. (1995). Gender and Academic Specialties: Trends among Recipients of 
College Degrees in the 1980s. Sociology of Education, 68(2), 81–98. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2112776 
78 Jensen, E. J., & Owen, A. L. (2001). Pedagogy, Gender, and Interest in Economics. The 
Journal of Economic Education, 32(4), 323–343. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00220480109596112 
79 Joensen, J. S., & Nielsen, H. S. (2009). Is there a Causal Effect of High School Math on 
Labor Market Outcomes? Journal of Human Resources, 44(1). Retrieved from 
https://ideas.repec.org/a/uwp/jhriss/v44y2009i1p171-198.html 
80 Johnson, V. E. (2003). Grade Inflation: A Crisis in College Education. Springer Science & 
Business Media. 
81 Joy, L. (2003). Salaries of Recent Male and Female College Graduates: Educational and 
Labor Market Effects. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56(4), 606–621. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/3590959 
82 Jussim, L., & Eccles, J. S. (1992). Teacher expectations: II. Construction and reflection of 
student achievement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(6), 947–961. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.6.947 
83 Kleinfeld, J. (2009). No Map to Manhood: Male and Female Mindsets Behind the College 
Gender Gap. Gender Issues, 26(3-4), 171–182. http://doi.org/10.1007/s12147-009-9083-y 
84 Kokkelenberg, E. C., & Sinha, E. (2010). Who succeeds in STEM studies? An analysis of 
Binghamton University undergraduate students. Economics of Education Review, 29(6), 
935–946. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2010.06.016 
85 Landivar, L. C. (2013). Disparities in STEM employment by sex, race, and Hispanic 
origin. Education Review, 29(6), 911–922. 
86 Langdon, D., McKittrick, G., Beede, D., Khan, B., & Doms, M. (2011). STEM: Good Jobs 
Now and for the Future. ESA Issue Brief #03-11. US Department of Commerce. Retrieved 
from http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED522129 
87 Lee, J. D. (1998). Which Kids Can ―Become‖ Scientists? Effects of Gender, Self-
Concepts, and Perceptions of Scientists. Social Psychology Quarterly, 61(3), 199–219. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2787108 
88 LeFevre, J.-A., Kulak, A. G., & Heymans, S. L. (1992). Factors influencing the selection 
of university majors varying in mathematical content. Canadian Journal of Behavioural 
Science/Revue Canadienne Des Sciences Du Comportement, 24(3), 276–289. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0078742 
89 Lyle, D. S. (2007). Estimating and Interpreting Peer and Role Model Effects from 
Randomly Assigned Social Groups at West Point. Review of Economics and Statistics, 
89(2), 289–299. http://doi.org/10.1162/rest.89.2.289 
90 Main, J. B., & Ost, B. (2014). The Impact of Letter Grades on Student Effort, Course 
Selection, and Major Choice: A Regression-Discontinuity Analysis. The Journal of 
Economic Education, 45(1), 1–10. 
91 Marsh, H. W. (1990). Causal ordering of academic self-concept and academic 
achievement: A multiwave, longitudinal panel analysis. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 82(4), 646–656. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.82.4.646 
92 Marsh, H. W., Craven, R., & Debus, R. (1998). Structure, Stability, and Development of 
Young Children‘s Self-Concepts: A Multicohort–Multioccasion Study. Child 





93 Marsh, H. W., & Craven, R. G. (2006). Reciprocal Effects of Self-Concept and 
Performance From a Multidimensional Perspective: Beyond Seductive Pleasure and 
Unidimensional Perspectives. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1(2), 133–163. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00010.x 
94 Marsh, H. W., & Martin, A. J. (2011). Academic self-concept and academic achievement: 
Relations and causal ordering. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 81(1), 59–77. 
http://doi.org/10.1348/000709910X503501 
95 Marsh, H. W., Trautwein, U., Lüdtke, O., Köller, O., & Baumert, J. (2005). Academic self-
concept, interest, grades, and standardized test scores: reciprocal effects models of causal 
ordering. Child Development, 76(2), 397–416. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2005.00853.x 
96 Marsh, H. W., & Yeung, A. S. (1997). Coursework Selection: Relations to Academic Self-
Concept and Achievement. American Educational Research Journal, 34(4), 691–720. 
http://doi.org/10.3102/00028312034004691 
97 Moreno, S. E., & Muller, C. (1999). Success and Diversity: The Transition through First-
Year Calculus in the University. American Journal of Education, 108(1), 30–57. 
98 Murnane, R. J., Willett, J. B., Duhaldeborde, Y., & Tyler, J. H. (2000). How important are 
the cognitive skills of teenagers in predicting subsequent earnings? Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, 19(4), 547–568. http://doi.org/10.1002/1520-
6688(200023)19:4<547::AID-PAM2>3.0.CO;2-# 
99 Murtaugh, P. A., Burns, L. D., & Schuster, J. (1999). PREDICTING THE RETENTION 
OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. Research in Higher Education, 40(3), 355–371. 
http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018755201899 
100 Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2005). Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men 
Compete Too Much? (Working Paper No. 11474). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w11474 
101 Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2010). Explaining the Gender Gap in Math Test Scores: 
The Role of Competition. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(2), 129–144. 
102 Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2011). Gender and Competition. Annual Review of 
Economics, 3(1), 601–630. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-111809-125122 
103 Niederle, M., & Yestrumskas, A. H. (2008). Gender differences in seeking challenges: The 
role of institutions. National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13922 
104 Nora, A., Cabrera, A., Hagedorn, L. S., & Pascarella, E. (1996). Differential impacts of 
academic and social experiences on college-related behavioral outcomes across different 
ethnic and gender groups at four-year institutions. Research in Higher Education, 37(4), 
427–451. http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01730109 
105 NSF. (2011). Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Universities: 2011. Retrieved November 25, 
2014, from http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/sed/digest/2011/nsf13301.pdf 
106 NSF. (2013). Women, Minorities, and Persons with Disabilities in Science and 
Engineering: 2013 Digest - nsf13304_digest.pdf. Retrieved November 27, 2014, from 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/wmpd/2013/pdf/nsf13304_digest.pdf 
107 Ost, B. (2010). Differences in Persistence Patterns Between Life and Physical Science 






108 Owen, A. L. (2008, October). Grades, gender, and encouragement: A regression 
discontinuity analysis [MPRA Paper]. Retrieved November 26, 2014, from 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11586/ 
109 Pajares, F., & Kranzler, J. (1995). Self-Efficacy Beliefs and General Mental Ability in 
Mathematical Problem-Solving. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 20(4), 426–443. 
http://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1995.1029 
110 Powell, L. (1990). Factors Associated with the Underrepresentation of African Americans 
in Mathematics and Science. The Journal of Negro Education, 59(3), 292–298. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2295564 
111 Price, C. R. (2010). Do women shy away from competition? Do men compete too much?: 
A (failed) replication. Work. Pap., Univ. South. Indiana. Retrieved from 
http://web.usi.edu/crprice/nvreplication_submit_revise1.pdf 
112 Price, J. (2010). The effect of instructor race and gender on student persistence in STEM 
fields. Economics of Education Review, 29(6), 901–910. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2010.07.009 
113 Rakow, S. J., & Bermudez, A. B. (1993). Science is ―Ciencia‖: Meeting the needs of 
hispanic American students. Science Education, 77(6), 669–683. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/sce.3730770610 
114 Rask, K. (2010). Attrition in STEM fields at a liberal arts college: The importance of 
grades and pre-collegiate preferences. Economics of Education Review, 29(6), 892–900. 
115 Rask, K. N., & Bailey, E. M. (2002). Are Faculty Role Models? Evidence from Major 
Choice in an Undergraduate Institution. The Journal of Economic Education, 33(2), 99–
124. http://doi.org/10.1080/00220480209596461 
116 Rask, K., & Tiefenthaler, J. (2008). The role of grade sensitivity in explaining the gender 
imbalance in undergraduate economics. Economics of Education Review, 27(6), 676–687. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2007.09.010 
117 Reason, R. D. (2009). Student variables that predict retention: Recent research and new 




118 Riegle-Crumb, C., & King, B. (2010). Questioning a White Male Advantage in STEM 
Examining Disparities in College Major by Gender and Race/Ethnicity. Educational 
Researcher, 39(9), 656–664. http://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X10391657 
119 Riegle-Crumb, C., King, B., Grodsky, E., & Muller, C. (2012). The More Things Change, 
the More They Stay the Same? Prior Achievement Fails to Explain Gender Inequality in 
Entry Into STEM College Majors Over Time. American Educational Research Journal, 
49(6), 1048–1073. http://doi.org/10.3102/0002831211435229 
120 Robb, R. E., & Robb, A. L. (1999). Gender and the Study of Economics: The Role of 
Gender of the Instructor. The Journal of Economic Education, 30(1), 3–19. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00220489909595933 
121 Robst, J., Keil, J., & Russo, D. (1998). The effect of gender composition of faculty on 






122 Rojstaczer, S., & Healy, C. (2010, March 4). Grading in American Colleges and 
Universities. Retrieved November 26, 2014, from 
http://www.gradeinflation.com/tcr2010grading.pdf 
123 Roksa, J. (2005). Double Disadvantage or Blessing in Disguise? Understanding the 
Relationship Between College Major and Employment Sector. Sociology of Education, 
78(3), 207–232. http://doi.org/10.1177/003804070507800302 
124 Roland G. Fryer, J., & Levitt, S. D. (2009). An Empirical Analysis of the Gender Gap in 
Mathematics (Working Paper No. 15430). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w15430 
125 Rothstein, D. S. (1994). Do Female Faculty Influence Female Students‘ Educational and 
Labor Market Attainments. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48, 515. 
126 Sabot, R., & Wakeman-Linn, J. (1991). Grade Inflation and Course Choice. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 159–170. 
127 Sacerdote, B. (2001). Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth 
Roommates. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 681–704. 
http://doi.org/10.1162/00335530151144131 
128 Schwab, K., Sala-i-Martin, X., & Greenhill, R. (2011). The global competitiveness report 
2011-2012. Citeseer. 
129 Sekaquaptewa, D., & Thompson, M. (2003). Solo status, stereotype threat, and 
performance expectancies: Their effects on women‘s performance. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 39(1), 68–74. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-
1031(02)00508-5 
130 Seymour, E., & Hewitt, N. M. (1997). Talking about leaving: Why undergraduates leave 
the sciences (Vol. 12). Westview Press Boulder, CO. 
131 Shannon, J. L. (1979). High School Grades--How Fair Are Plus and Minus Suffixes? 
Education, 100(2), 153–57. 
132 Shauman, K. A. (2006). Occupational sex segregation and the earnings of occupations: 
What causes the link among college-educated workers? Social Science Research, 35(3), 
577–619. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2004.12.001 
133 Shaw, E. J., & Barbuti, S. (2010). Patterns of Persistence in Intended College Major with a 
Focus on STEM Majors. NACADA Journal, 30(2), 19–34. http://doi.org/10.12930/0271-
9517-30.2.19 
134 Simpkins, S. D., Davis-Kean, P. E., & Eccles, J. S. (2006). Math and science motivation: A 
longitudinal examination of the links between choices and beliefs. Developmental 
Psychology, 42(1), 70–83. http://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.42.1.70 
135 Simpson, J. C. (2001). Segregated by Subject: Racial Differences in the Factors 
Influencing Academic Major between European Americans, Asian Americans, and 
African, Hispanic, and Native Americans. The Journal of Higher Education, 72(1), 63–
100. http://doi.org/10.2307/2649134 
136 Skaalvik, E. M., & Hagtvet, K. A. (1990). Academic achievement and self-concept: An 
analysis of causal predominance in a developmental perspective. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 58(2), 292–307. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.2.292 
137 Sondgeroth, M. S., & Stough, L. M. (1992). Factors Influencing the Persistence of Ethnic 






138 Spencer, S. J., Steele, C. M., & Quinn, D. M. (1999). Stereotype Threat and Women‘s 
Math Performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35(1), 4–28. 
http://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1998.1373 
139 Stange, K. M. (2013). Differential Pricing in Undergraduate Education: Effects on Degree 
Production by Field (Working Paper No. 19183). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w19183 
140 Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and 
performance. American Psychologist, 52(6), 613–629. http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-
066X.52.6.613 
141 Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance 
of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(5), 797–811. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.69.5.797 
142 Steele, J. R., & Ambady, N. (2006). ―Math is Hard!‖ The effect of gender priming on 
women‘s attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(4), 428–436. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.06.003 
143 Stinebrickner, T. R., & Stinebrickner, R. (2009). Learning about Academic Ability and the 
College Drop-out Decision (Working Paper No. 14810). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w14810 
144 Stinebrickner, T. R., & Stinebrickner, R. (2011). Math or Science? Using Longitudinal 
Expectations Data to Examine the Process of Choosing a College Major (Working Paper 
No. 16869). National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16869 
145 Strenta, A. C., Elliott, R., Adair, R., Matier, M., & Scott, J. (1994). Choosing and leaving 
science in highly selective institutions. Research in Higher Education, 35(5), 513–547. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/BF02497086 
146 Thomas, G. E. (1985). College Major and Career Inequality: Implications for Black 
Students. The Journal of Negro Education, 54(4), 537–547. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2294714 
147 Turner, S. E., & Bowen, W. G. (1998). Choice of Major: The Changing (Unchanging) 
Gender Gap. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 52, 289. 
148 Tyson, W., Lee, R., Borman, K. M., & Hanson, M. A. (2007). Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Pathways: High School Science and Math 
Coursework and Postsecondary Degree Attainment. Journal of Education for Students 
Placed at Risk (JESPAR), 12(3), 243–270. http://doi.org/10.1080/10824660701601266 
149 Ülkü-Steiner, B., Kurtz-Costes, B., & Ryan, C. (2000). Doctoral student experiences in 
gender-balanced and male-dominated graduate programs. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 92(2), 296–307. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.92.2.296 
150 Valentine, J. C., DuBois, D. L., & Cooper, H. (2004). The Relation Between Self-Beliefs 
and Academic Achievement: A Meta-Analytic Review. Educational Psychologist, 39(2), 
111–133. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15326985ep3902_3 
151 Walker, C. L., & Rakow, S. J. (1985). The Status of Hispanic American Students in 
Science: Attitudes. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 7(3), 225–245. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/07399863850073002 
152 Weinberger, C. J. (1999). Mathematical College Majors and the Gender Gap in Wages. 






153 Weinberger, C. J. (2001). Is Teaching More Girls More Math the Key to Higher Wages? 
Squaring Up: Policy Strategies to Raise Women’s Incomes in the US, Edited by Mary C. 
King. Forthcoming June. Retrieved from http://www-
siepr.stanford.edu/conferences/gender05/math_girls.pdf 
154 Weinberger, C. J. (2005). Is the science and engineering workforce drawn from the far 
upper tail of the math ability distribution. Unpublished Paper. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/~sewp/events/2005.01.14/Bios+Links/Weinberger-Present-Upper-
Tail05.pdf 
155 Wigfield, A., & Karpathian, M. (1991). Who Am I and What Can I Do? Children‘s Self-
Concepts and Motivation in Achievement Situations. Educational Psychologist, 26(3-4), 
233–261. http://doi.org/10.1080/00461520.1991.9653134 
156 Wozniak, D., Harbaugh, W. T., & Mayr, U. (2009, August). The Menstrual Cycle and 
Performance Feedback Alter Gender Differences in Competitive Choices [MPRA Paper]. 
Retrieved November 26, 2014, from http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31374/ 
157 Wylie, R. C. (1979). The Self-concept: Theory and research on selected topics. U of 
Nebraska Press. 
158 Xie, Y., & Shauman, K. A. (2003). Women in science: Career processes and outcomes 
(Vol. 26). Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://personal.psc.isr.umich.edu/yuxie-web/files/women/women-2001/cover.pdf 
159 Zafar, B. (2013). College Major Choice and the Gender Gap. Journal of Human 
Resources, 48(3), 545–595. 
160 Zhang, L., & Thomas, S. L. (2005). Investments in Human Capital: Sources of Variation in 
the Return to College Quality. In J. C. Smart (Ed.), Higher Education: Handbook of 
Theory and Research (pp. 241–306). Springer Netherlands. Retrieved from 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/1-4020-3279-X_5 
161 Zimmerman, D. J. (2003). Peer Effects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural 












A potential channel for influencing the composition of STEM graduates is college grades. This 
study utilize Florida‘s Education Data Warehouse to conduct a reweighted Oaxaca 
decomposition of racial and gender differences in STEM attrition, with a particular focus on how 
STEM- intending students respond to college grades in introductory courses. The Oaxaca 
decomposition enables me to estimate what proportion of these gaps can be explained by 
differences in observable predictors (and if so, which ones are most important) and what 
proportion appears attributable to differing ‗returns‘ to these predictors (or, unexplained factors). 
The decomposition results show that gender differences in leaving STEM by switching into non-
STEM are mainly explained by differences in the unexplained component of the gap, particularly 
by non-STEM college factors such as grades and credits attempted in lower-division courses. In 
contrast, gender differences in leaving STEM by dropping out of college are negative and mostly 
explained by compositional differences associated with STEM and non-STEM college factors. 
By comparison with STEM attrition gaps between racial minorities and non-racial minorities, 
educational returns are not as significant and important as compositional differences. Racial 
minorities mainly attrite by dropping out of college towards graduation, and they differentially 
leave STEM due to their lower high school preparation in STEM and consequently lower grades 




Despite the efforts of researchers, policymakers and administrators over the last few 
decades, the number of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) graduates 
and professionals in the United States remains low. STEM workers account for just 6 percent of 
the U.S. workforce. According to the 2011 American Community Survey (ACS), there were 
7.2 million STEM workers aged 25 to 64 (and half of STEM workers worked in computer 
occupations). While STEM entrance rates are not significantly different from non-STEM fields, 





fields attracted proportionally more students (28 percent) than did many non-STEM fields.
 1
 Yet, 
among bachelor‘s degree students entering STEM fields between 2003 and 2009, 48 percent had 
left these fields by Spring 2009 (Chen, 2013). 
One focus area for increasing STEM fields has been to reduce disparities in STEM 
employment and to increase the number of college graduates in STEM by gender and race. 
Historically, women, Blacks, and Hispanics (hereafter called STEM minorities) have been 
underrepresented in STEM employment. Because most STEM workers have a science or 
engineering college degree, underrepresentation among science and engineering majors could 
contribute to the underrepresentation of minorities in STEM employment. Even though women 
hold nearly half of the workforce in the U.S., they make up less than 25 percent of STEM jobs, 
as well as a disproportionally low number of STEM degrees (Beede et al., 2011). This has been 
the case throughout the past decade, even as college- educated women have increased their share 
of the overall workforce. In fact, the most recent decades show less growth in STEM 
employment among younger women (Landivar, 2013). Similarly, Blacks and Hispanics have 
been consistently underrepresented in STEM employment. In 2011, 11 percent of the workforce 
was Black, while 6 percent of STEM workers were Black (up from 2 percent in 1970). The 
Hispanic share of the workforce has increased significantly from 3 percent in 1970 to 15 percent 
in 2011; however, Hispanics were 7 percent of the STEM workforce in 2011 (Landivar, 2013). 
The disparities in STEM employment are somewhat similar to those in STEM education. 
Nonetheless, the patterns that explain these disparities between women and men and racial 
minorities and non-minorities are different. For women, the lower likelihood of graduating with 
a STEM major is explained by a disproportional entrance into STEM fields upon initial 
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enrollment as well as a lower likelihood to remain in STEM majors. In contrast, for racial 
minorities, the absolute STEM graduation gap is mainly explained by lower STEM persistence 
rates.  
Studies have frequently found that STEM minorities leave STEM fields at higher rates 
than their counterparts (Anderson & Kim, 2006; Hill et al., 2010; Griffith, 2010; Huang, 
Taddese, & Walter, 2000; Kokkelenberg & Sinha, 2010; Shaw & Barbuti, 2010). The persistence 
rate of women in STEM is less than that of men and proportionally more women than men left 
STEM fields by mostly switching to a non-STEM major (32 percent vs. 26 percent) (Chen, 
2013).
 2
 The gap in STEM attrition rates between racial minorities and non-minorities is 
alarming. One-third of White students and 42 percent of Asian-American students who started 
college as intended STEM majors graduated with STEM degrees by the end of five years, 
compared to 22 percent of Latino students, 18 percent of Black students, and 20 percent of 
Native American (Hurtado et al., 2010). 
There are several reasons to be concerned about disparities in STEM education. The 
choice of math and science classes is a good predictor of college attendance and completion 
(Goldin et al., 2006), performance in mathematics also predicts future earnings (Grogger & Eide, 
1995; Brown & Corcoran, 1996; Weinberger, 1999; Weinberger, 2001; Murnane, Willett, 
Duhaldeborde, & Tyler, 2000; Altonji & Blank, 1999; Bertrand, Goldin, & Katz, 2010; Joensen 
& Nielsen, 2009), and the STEM education gap partly accounts for the wage gap between STEM 
minorities and non-minorities.  
Research has shown that gender differences in entry into science careers explain a 
substantial portion of the gender pay differential among college graduates (Brown & Corcoran, 
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1996; Weinberger, 1999) and that the low representation of women in such careers may reduce 
aggregate productivity (Weinberger, 1999). Graduates who major in female-dominated earn 
substantially lower incomes than do graduates who major in male-dominated fields (Roksa, 
2005; Grubb, 1993; Brown & Corcoran, 1996). Other studies have indicated that anywhere from 
15 percent to 45 percent of the gender wage gap can be attributed to gender differences in 
selection of major (Gerber & Cheung, 2008; Daymont & Andrisani, 1984; Brown & Corcoran, 
1996; Joy, 2003; Shauman, 2006; Bobbitt-Zeher, 2007). Researchers have also shown a similar 
relationship between race and major selection, which also tends to generate a wage gap (Thomas, 
1985; Powell, 1990; Eide, 1997).  
Furthermore, and despite the prevalent gender disparity, STEM jobs are also more 
inclusive than non-STEM jobs, having a gender wage gap that is smaller in STEM jobs than in 
non-STEM jobs. In 2009, the gender wage gap for STEM jobs was 14 percent whereas that for 
non-STEM jobs was 21 percent. Women with STEM jobs earned 33 percent more than 
comparable women in non-STEM jobs – considerably higher than the STEM premium for men. 
Similarly, women STEM degree holders earn 9 percent more than women with other degrees, 
regardless of their job (Beede et al., 2011).  
This study is focused on those who declare a STEM field upon initial enrollment so as to 
determine the causes and consequences of STEM attrition gaps while in college, controlling for 
student preparation and experiences in high school. I will focus on those who declare initial 
interest in STEM because individual preferences greatly influence initial major intention and 
higher education policies cannot be drawn upon that.  
Research on major choice more broadly has found that absolute and relative performance 





Additionally, there is some evidence that STEM minorities respond more strongly to grade 
incentives than do non-minorities (Rask & Tiefenthaler, 2008). However, prior literature has not 
directly examined how differential ‗returns‘ to the same college grades may influence gaps in 
STEM attrition. 
The main goal of this study is to identify the relative importance of pre-college and 
college factors by gender and race. These include demographics, STEM and non-STEM high 
school factors, STEM and non-STEM college grades, and STEM and non-STEM college credits. 
I hypothesize that differential ‗returns‘ to grades may play an important role, particularly because 
in many universities STEM majors have more rigorous grading standards than non-STEM 
disciplines. A discrepancy between grades in STEM and non-STEM courses not only may 
discourage students from majoring in STEM fields but also sends incorrect signals to students 
about their relative abilities in different fields. While the research on the role of grades in STEM 
attrition has produced conflicting results, the existing literature has not directly addressed the 
differential effect of both STEM and non-STEM grades, and has focused more on the gender gap 
rather than racial gaps. Moreover, the samples used in prior research have been from single and 
selective institutions with mostly high ability students, and thus have questionable relevance to 
STEM policy more broadly.  
This study relies on two theoretical approaches, Akerlof and Kranton‘s (2000) and Ertac 
(2011) and Mobius et al (2011).  Akerlof and Kranton (2000) model how individual‘s social 
identity differentially affects choices by influencing effort and performance. Students maximize 
their utility of persisting in STEM based on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary payoffs. The latter 
one is measured in terms of identity, and based on the prescriptions of gender and race identities 





given that the STEM environment is stereotyped in favor of non-STEM minorities. Therefore, 
differences in non-pecuniary identity payoffs may differentially affect the decision of leaving 
STEM. Other economists have presented theoretical models to explain the effect of information 
on beliefs and self-perceptions of ability (Ertac, 2011; Azmat & Iriberri, 2010), wherein in 
educational settings performance feedback information could be provided by college grades. 
Mobius et al. (2011) find evidence of greater conservatism in women than in men, concluding 
that men tend to update beliefs too little in response of new information.  
Using a Oaxaca reweighted decomposition and the Florida Department of Education 
database, I found that gender differences in leaving STEM by switching into non-STEM are 
mainly explained by differences in the unexplained component of the gap, particularly by non-
STEM college factors such as grades and credits attempted in lower-division courses. In contrast, 
gender differences in leaving STEM by dropping out of college are negative and mostly 
explained by compositional differences associated with STEM and non-STEM college factors. 
By comparison with STEM attrition gaps between racial minorities and non-racial minorities, the 
unexplained component of the gap is not as significant and important as compositional 
differences. Racial minorities mainly attrite by dropping out of college towards graduation, and 
they differentially leave STEM due to their lower high school preparation in STEM and 
consequently lower grades in lower-division STEM courses during their first two years of 
enrollment. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. 
Section 3 presents prior literature about the effect or the importance of grades in influencing 
major choices. Section 4 introduces the data and presents some descriptive statistics about gender 





empirical specification and explains the reweighted decomposition methodology. Section 6 
presents the decomposition results and their interpretation. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  
Conceptual Framework 
 Influential economists have incorporated social psychology theories into economic 
models of behavior. Some economists have been particularly interested in modeling how 
stereotype threat and individual‘s social identity differentially affect choices by influencing both 
student effort (and career choice) and performance (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Dee, 2009; 
Humlum et al., 2012). This theory is relevant because STEM fields are stereotyped, male 
dominated and competitive, and this institutional environment is comparatively more adverse for 
STEM minorities than non-minorities. Therefore, differences in non-pecuniary identity payoffs 
may differentially affect the decision of leaving STEM.  
 Other economists have presented theoretical models to explain the effect of information 
on beliefs and self-perceptions of ability (Ertac, 2011; Azmat & Iriberri, 2010), wherein in 
educational settings performance feedback information could be provided by college grades. 
This theory together with the theory of gender differences in updating beliefs by Mobius et al. 
(2010) might explain why STEM minorities differentially attrite because they have more 
pessimistic beliefs about their own ability.  
 Akerlof and Kranton (2000) incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an 
economic model of behavior. In the utility function, identity is associated with different social 
categories that establish how people should behave or make economic decisions. In their view, 
for instance, gender categories are associated with different ideal physical attributes and 
prescribed behaviors that affirm one‘s self-image or identity. Violating these prescriptions 





when her attributes and actions (and those of others) enhance her self-image or match the ideal of 
her category, and as she belongs to social categories with high status. Social categories are 
associated with the prescribed or ideal characteristics and behavior, and individuals see 
themselves as belonging to a specific category and are by others considered to be in that 
category. For instance, men have a high status in STEM because these fields are manly and 
stereotyped, whereas women have a lower status in STEM because they are supposed to choose a 
girly major like non-STEM fields. In this environment women might feel misplaced and men 
might contribute to making them feel like that. Thus, women who intend to major in STEM have 
already deviated from the ideals of their category and start off with an identity disutility, which 
might increase as they receive ego-relevant information such as grades.  
 Ertac (2011) develops a model to emphasize the importance of self-perception as a 
determinant of behavior in many settings characterized by imperfect self-knowledge. For 
instance, in educational settings, as the author asserts, students are often unsure about their 
likelihood to succeed in a course or field of study, and tend to develop an academic self-concept 
over time. In the presence of imperfect self-knowledge, individuals tend to learn their ability by 
updating their beliefs based on previous successes and failures. The main feature of his model, 
which was adapted by Azmat and Iriberri (2010), is the assumption that students use both own 
performance feedback information and social comparison information, measured as one‘s 
performance in comparison to others‘ performance, to learn about their own ability.  
 Latest research had documented differences in processing information by demographic 
type. As Ertac (2011) suggests, self-confident subjects exhibit self-serving tendencies as they 
process information more optimistically than they should. In other words, when they receive 





should in a self-relevant context. In his experiment, he found evidence that men and women 
process information differently when they both perform a task perceived highly difficult. Women 
commit significantly more pessimistic deviations from Bayesian benchmarks than men in 
response to positive feedback, suggesting that pessimistic beliefs are more persistent in women. 
Mobius et al. (2011) also find evidence of greater conservatism in women than in men, 
concluding that men tend to update beliefs too little in response of new information. They also 
find that men are significantly less conservative than women. 
This framework helps to understand how grades may differentially affect STEM attrition 
gaps. Men (and non-racial minorities) are able to maximize both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
pay-offs at the same time, while women (and racial-minorities) in STEM face a different trade-
off in their maximization problem. In fact, women already start with a self-identity disutility. For 
a woman and a man, who have both the same preferences and level of ability, and they both 
obtain the same grades, the maximization problem is different. For a woman the maximization 
problem is more complicated. If she decides to persist in STEM, she will still bear the cost 
derived from the mismatch of her choice with the gender prescribed major, non-STEM major. 
Whereas, for a man there is no conflict between his gender prescription and what he should 
choose to maximize his pecuniary and non-pecuniary return to persist in STEM.  
Women are more sensitive to grades and perceive them as a measure of their own ability, 
particularly when they are in a stereotyped and male-oriented environment, and the cost of her 
gender prescription is high. Women tend to overestimate negative signals and interpret them as 
negative stereotypes: women are not as good as men in math and science, and STEM work is 
better suited to men. They would be more conservative when receiving a good grade, assigning 





options because their main academic goal is to obtain good grades, attain a degree and finish 
college.
3
 Women may be switching out of STEM fields not necessarily because they 
disproportionally have changed their minds or are irrational, but because they want to pursue 
something they perceived they can excel at by choosing a major that matches their prescribed 
social category.  
In contrast, men would assign higher probabilities to the optimistic state than women, 
which means that revisions of their beliefs about their STEM abilities to form a self-identity, and 
to choose according to the expected economic return, would be smaller than those of women‘s. 
As a result, those who have an overoptimistic and wrong perception of their actual ability may 
persist longer in STEM, despite obtaining low grades, due to the fact that men are more 
committed than women to a career in a male-stereotyped field, which yields higher monetary 
returns.  
Based on the theory of identity explanation and assuming that STEM minorities and non-
minorities have similar expectations about the monetary returns of educational choices, then I 
would expect negatively stereotyped students to switch into a less stereotyped major at a higher 
rate than non-stereotyped students. For instance, a woman in STEM has a trade-off between 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary pay-offs and would leave STEM because she learns to value the 
non-pecuniary pay-off more than the pecuniary pay-off. A man in STEM does not face a trade-
off and he maximizes both pecuniary and non-pecuniary pay-offs by persisting in STEM. Also, I 
should observe STEM minorities to be relatively more responsive than non-minorities to non-
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STEM college grades. Similarly, non-minority students should be more responsive to STEM 
college grades than STEM minorities when pursuing a non-STEM degree.  
Prior Literature 
The importance of grades in determining course and major choices has been documented 
extensively. In this literature grades are classified into absolute and relative grades, where 
relative grades measure relative performance in introductory STEM courses relative to other 
non-STEM courses.  
Grades and grading policies influence course and major choices. Fournier & Sass (2000) 
found that instructors‘ grading policies influenced students‘ subsequent curriculum choices.  
Johnson (2003) analyzes data from an experiment conducted at Duke University during the 
academic year 1998–99 and showed that students tend to choose courses offered by leniently 
grading instructors. Using data from Williams College, Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991) 
estimate how students respond to letter grades and examine how differential grade inflation 
across disciplines might distort major choice decisions. The authors find that controlling for 
performance in other subjects, receiving an A instead of a B in an introductory course increases 
the likelihood of taking a second course by approximately 10-20 percent for economics and 
English. In fact, Sabot and Wakeman-Linn show that if economics were graded as leniently as 
English at Williams College, enrollment in higher-level economics courses would rise by 11.9 





departments would increase persistence in STEM majors, which have with higher grading 
standards, by 2-4 percent.
4
 
Lower absolute grades have been linked to major attrition in general (DeBerard, 
Spielmans, & Julka, 2004; Murtaugh, Burns, & Schuster, 1999; Nora, Cabrera, Hagedorn, & 
Pascarella, 1996; Reason, 2009) and in STEM specifically (Campbell Jr, 1993; Strenta, Elliott, 
Adair, Matier, & Scott, 1994); Ost, 2010; Crisp et al., 2009; K. Rask, 2010).  Many studies have 
focused on the role that performance in introductory economics classes play in the decision to 
become an economics major and have concluded that students who perform better in economics-
principles classes are more likely to major in economics (Horvath, Beaudin, & Wright, 1992; 
Dynan & Rouse, 1997; Chizmar, 2000). Rask (2010) finds that letter grades are important in 
predicting persistence in STEM fields such that a one letter grade change increases the 
probability of persisting by approximately five percentage points. He found that absolute grades 
are one of the largest and most persistent factors in the attrition of undergraduates from STEM 
departments.  Strenta et al. (1994) examines the determinants of majoring and persisting in 
natural science and engineering at four highly selective institutions and similarly finds that letter 
grades are strongly correlated with declaring and remaining in these science majors.  
There is also literature concerned of the relative performance of college students in 
introductory courses as a determinant of undergraduate major choice (Sabot & Wakeman-Linn, 
1991; Horvath et al., 1992; Dynan & Rouse, 1997; Robb & Robb, 1999; Chizmar, 2000; Jensen 
& Owen, 2001; K. Rask, 2010; K. N. Rask & Bailey, 2002; Ost, 2010; Seymour & Hewitt, 1997; 
Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2011; K. Rask & Tiefenthaler, 2008).  Relative grades as a 
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measure of relative course performance are indicative of relative strengths even though grading 
standards are not consistent across disciplines, and STEM majors are among the lowest grading 
departments. Ost (2010) suggests that in fact students are pushed away of their STEM intended 
major by their high grades in non-science courses.  
Most of the aforementioned studies are small-scale, although these results have been 
replicated using a nationally representative dataset, BPS 2004/09. STEM leavers tend to earn 
lower grades in STEM courses during the first year than did their counterparts who persisted in 
STEM fields through 2009. In addition to this, among bachelor‘s degree students who entered 
STEM fields in the first year, about one-fourth of STEM leavers earned STEM grades that were 
lower than their non-STEM grades by at least one grade point; in contrast, 11 percent of STEM 
persisters had STEM grades that averaged at least one grade point below their non-STEM GPA 
(Chen, 2013).   
Prior research has examined the more specific issue of how grades in introductory 
courses may affect women and men differently in their decision to choose STEM as an initial 
major, to persist after declaring STEM upon enrollment or to major in STEM. A small number of 
studies are mainly focused on the gender gap in STEM persistence or attrition and all are limited 
analyses of a particular university with mixed results.  
To my knowledge, K. Rask (2010) and Ost (2010) are the only two studies that have 
examined the influence of absolute and relative grades on STEM major and course choice. Yet, 
none of these studies directly addressed how differential ‗returns‘ to the same college grades may 
influence gaps in STEM persistence.  
Using administrative records of a small northeastern liberal arts college, K. Rask (2010) 





course, and a second to a third and found that grades received in a course are important 
determinants of whether a student takes another course in the major. To predict the probability of 
majoring in STEM, he used the grade associated to each specific STEM department
5
 and the 
GPA received during the same semester outside of the introductory course as his main 
covariates. However, it is not clear whether or not he included other STEM grades in his measure 
of relative grades instead of combining STEM grades from all STEM departments to measure 
STEM absolute grades.  For instance, students who intend to major in computer science may 
take courses in the math department, and if the author included math grades as a relative grade 
for these students then this may understate the importance of relative grades in non-STEM 
departments. K. Rask (2010) finds mixed and inconsistent results for relative grades across 
departments and gender. Men appear to be more sensitive than women to the grades received in 
their STEM courses both in terms of statistical significance and magnitudes. He also finds that 
the intended major or pre-collegiate preferences is also a primary factor in the decision to pursue 
courses in a STEM department, and that while men appear to be more sensitive to grades than 
women, preferences have a stronger influence on women than men.  
Ost (2010) utilized a probability model with fixed effects and data from a single 
institution
6
 to examine patterns of STEM persistence. STEM persistence was measured as the 
probability of choosing one‘s field through the fourth year, restricted to those who intend to 
major in the physical or life sciences. Ost‘s measure of relative grades is each student‘s overall 
GPA in first year courses. He found that the gender gap in persistence is solely driven by a 
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gender gap in the physical sciences. The raw STEM persistence gap is nearly 10 percentage 
points and this gap drops to just 2.7 percentage points when controlling for major field 
performance and outside option performance and course fixed effects. Similarly, but focusing 
only on the economics major, K. Rask & Tiefenthaler (2008) suggest that this sensitivity 
differential in the effect of grades explains part of the gender imbalance in economics in higher 
level courses since women with equal performance to men leave economics at a higher rate. 
Results from estimation of a series of selection models of the decision to take more economics 
courses indicate that women are more responsive to the relative grade received in the second 
semester of economics than are men. Dynan & Rouse (1997) find similar results and assert that 
an important part of the reason that women are less likely to major in economics is that they have 
more aptitude for other subjects, or at least perceive that they do.  
Even after controlling for performance, unobserved factors that influence both major 
choice and course grades might bias impact estimates given that students may put more effort 
into their intended major‘s introductory courses, and we would expect to see students with the 
highest performance also to be the most likely to graduate. Owen (2008) and Main and Ost 
(2014) address this concern by providing the most compelling causal analysis of the effect grades 
in major choice and course performance; however, their results are contradictory. Owen (2008) 
finds that changing from a B to an A increases the probability of majoring in economics by 15 to 
20 percentage points among women while having no statistically significant impact for men. In 
contrast, Main & Ost (2014) using a larger sample and considering a different institution and six 
disciplines grouped into economics, engineering and physical science and life science, find 
insignificant and inconclusive effects of grades earned on major in course subject and credit 





There are several possible reasons that explain why Owen (2010) and Main and Ost 
(2014) results differ, despite the fact that both studies used a different but highly selective 
research university located in the Northeastern United States and a regression discontinuity 
approach. The institution Owen (2010) analyzed gives grades without plusses and minuses, 
thereby making sharper discontinuities. However, Owen extends her analysis to a liberal arts 
college that uses a plus/minus grading system and finds large effects.
7
 Meanwhile, Main and Ost 
(2014) used an institution that makes median grade reports public to the student body, and 
therefore these students are well informed about average grades across disciplines, which may 
affect course choices understating the effect of grades. Given that science and economic courses 
have a reputation of giving relatively low grades, only the students who are least responsive to 
course grades would elect to enroll in such a course. Hence, initial course enrollment may be 
driving major and course choices.  
The racial differences in STEM attrition rates are also a widespread concern, especially 
because the literature suggests that racial minorities are even more likely to choose a STEM field 
than their counterparts. Student response to grades may also explain racial imbalances in certain 
majors even though only a handful of studies have examined this relationship.  Based on data of 
a large elite research university, Ost (2010) finds that conditional on high school performance 
and preparation, black and Hispanic students are more likely than white students to pursue 
physical or life science majors.  Similarly, Arcidiacono et al. (2012) examines racial differences 
in GPA and major choice at a private university, and find that even though conditional on gender 
black students have stronger initial preferences regarding to whether to major in the more strictly 
graded fields than whites, they are less likely to graduate in one of these majors due to their 
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academic background. Differences in variance of grades across time as well as differences in 
grading practices across courses or departments dissuade blacks from majoring in natural 
sciences, engineering and economics.  
While the research on the role of grades in STEM attrition has produced conflicting 
results, the existing literature has not directly addressed the differential effect of both absolute 
and relative grades, and has been more focused on the gender gap rather than racial gaps. 
Moreover, the samples used in prior research have been from single and selective institutions 




This paper uses data from the Florida Department of Education‘s K-20 Education Data 
Warehouse (K-20 EDW), an integrated longitudinal dataset that covers all public school students 
in the state of Florida. Florida‘s student data-tracking system is very comprehensive and allows 
me to control for demographic characteristics (including if the student qualified for free lunch) 
and measures of pre-college ability and major preference such as units and grades in high school 
math and science courses, units and grades in high school English and social science courses, 
SAT/ACT scores, and degree and major intentions at entry. This administrative data also include 
college characteristics such as term-by-term college enrollment (credits attempted/completed, 
term and cumulative GPA, and major), transcript and degree information for all post-secondary 
students at public institutions in Florida. The data were supplied to the author by the Florida 
Department of Education.  
The benefit of using this information is that it had detailed information pertaining to the 





semester and year and evaluate how gender and race differentials evolve during college.  This 
data also allow me to identify students pursuing STEM fields who take STEM and non-STEM 
courses in college so as to explore how college experiences might differentially affect the STEM 
attrition gap. STEM majors are classified using the 2011 NCES list
8
 which in turn used a U.S. 
immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) list of designated STEM degree programs.
 9
 STEM 
instructional programs were then classified into six STEM fields: computer and information 
sciences; engineering and engineering technologies; biological and biometrical sciences; 
mathematics and statistics; physical sciences; and science technologies. See Appendix Table A 
for a detailed list of the Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) codes used in the six 
STEM fields. Non-STEM majors include all fields that are not STEM fields as well as general 
studies, undeclared or unknown majors.  Finally, STEM courses were identified using Jacobson 
and Mokher (2009) classification of courses by field of concentration. See Appendix Table B for 
the list of courses used to differentiate STEM from non-STEM courses.  
My sample is restricted to high school graduates who entered a 4-year public institution 
straight from high school for the first time in 2000 and 2003. These students were tracked 
forward to 2012 although the last term enrolled for most of these students is Fall 2005 and Fall 
2007, respectively. For these students, I have complete high school and college transcript 
records. Across these two cohorts I have about 47,515 observations, of which almost 20 percent 
are STEM entrants (n=9,194). STEM entrants are students who intend to major in STEM upon 
initial enrollment in college. STEM intention is identified when a student declares her major in 
her first semester of enrollment in a 4-year public institution. Proportionally, more men than 




 ICE‘s list includes the instructional programs of interest to the analysis (mathematics, 





women intend to major in STEM (29.2 percent vs. 12.5 percent), whereas non-racial minorities 
and minorities are proportionally similar in their initial STEM major intentions (19.1 percent vs. 
19.6 percent). I further limit the sample to students who in May of their high school completion 
year were less than 21 years old, which is the baseline sample used for the descriptive analysis. 
These filters yield a sample of 9,173 student cases, of which 5,669 are men and 3,504 are 
women, and 6,340 are non-racial minorities while 2,833 are racial minorities. For the Oaxaca 
analysis, the sample is further limited to those observations for which I have complete data 
(n=6,886). 
This dataset does not include students pursuing a BA degree in a private institution or 
outside the State of Florida. I did not count on the National Student Clearinghouse that tracks 
college attendance outside the state of Florida as well as any private college enrollment in 
Florida.  
Descriptive Statistics  
In this section I focus on the baseline sample, which is limited to STEM entrants.
10
 
Descriptive statistics on background characteristics and outcomes for the two cohorts of STEM 
entrants are provided in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2. The means of core variables by gender and 
racial minority status are reported separately in Table 1.1 and 1.2, respectively.  I report the 
means and standard errors of the variables, as well as the differences between men and women 
(and racial minorities and non-racial minorities) averages. These tables indicate that women and 
racial minorities are quite different from their peers.  
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Demographic characteristics are presented first. They show that the sample is composed 
of 61.5 percent white men versus 51.9 percent white women. There are more black women than 
black men (20.1 percent vs. 11.4 percent), and the proportion of women eligible for free lunch is 
also higher than that of men (10.4 percent vs. 7 percent). This composition is aligned to what is 
reported in Table 1.2. 45.5 percent of racial minorities (non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics) are 
women and 35 percent are non-racial minorities (Whites, Asian and Pacific Islander and other 
race). Also, the proportion of racial minorities who qualified for free lunch is significantly higher 
than that of non-racial minorities, 20 percent vs. 3.2 percent.  
Among pre-college characteristics, variables were divided into those related to STEM 
and non-STEM fields so as to compare initial academic advantages or disadvantages between 
minorities and non-minorities who entered into STEM in college. As shown in Table 1.1, while 
women have a clear advantage in high school grade point averages (GPAs), men score 
significantly higher on the SAT (particularly in math). In contrast, racial minorities have a clear 
disadvantage in pre-college characteristics. Table 1.2 shows that non-racial minorities have 
higher GPAs, credits attempted and SAT scores than racial minorities. Math and reading SAT 
scores differential between non-racial minorities and racial minorities is 73.2 points in math and 
56.1 points in reading. In fact, more than 50 percent of racial minorities score below 540 on the 
SAT math and reading. This is not compensated by high school GPAs, which means that women 
interested in STEM are relatively better academically prepared than racial minorities. 
Panel C of Table 1.1 and 1.2 reports college characteristics and outcomes. Most college 
academic characteristics are focused on lower-division courses, which are mainly suitable for 
freshmen and sophomores, given that these courses are those that students are expected to 





prerequisites for upper-division courses. Even though women have higher GPAs in both lower-
division STEM and non-STEM courses, men are academically relatively better in STEM than in 
non-STEM courses The proportion of men who have a higher GPA in lower-division STEM 
courses than in non-STEM courses is 23 percent, while that for women is 19 percent. The 
difference between GPAs in STEM and non-STEM courses is negative and larger for women. 
Women also attempt more credits in lower-division STEM and non-STEM courses than men, 
with a differential of more than 1 course taken in STEM.  
A more complete picture of the distribution of academic achievement is presented in 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Figure 1.1 displays histograms overlaid with a kernel density of GPA in 
lower-division STEM and non-STEM courses for women and men. These histograms show that 
women have higher GPAs than men in the range of 3 to 4 points, and particularly in non-STEM 
courses. It is worth highlighting the difference in the shape of the distribution for STEM and 
non-STEM courses. Both women and men earn higher grades in non-STEM courses with GPAs 
concentrated above 2 points, whereas the distribution of GPAs in STEM courses is more normal 
and equally distributed above and below 2 points. Figure 1.2 reports the evolution of total GPA 
earned in STEM and non-STEM courses per semester. This Figure not only confirms that 
women earn higher GPAs, but also that this mainly occurs for lower-division STEM courses and 
during their first two years of enrollment.  
While women earn higher high school and college grades than men in STEM and non-
STEM courses, racial minorities have significantly lower grades than non-racial minorities. As 
reported in Panel C of Table 1.2, the gap between the proportions of non-racial minorities and 
racial minorities with a GPA of 3 to 4 in lower-division STEM and non-STEM courses is more 





earn relatively better grades in non-STEM than in STEM courses. These patterns are also 
observed in Figure 1.3. Racial minorities only earn higher grades when their GPAs are below 2 
for STEM and 3 points for non-STEM courses. Figure 1.4 shows the changes in total GPAs 
during college. Racial minorities have systematically lower grades than non-racial minorities 
although the gap in non-STEM courses gets smaller after the second year of enrollment. Finally, 
racial minorities attempt almost 2 credits less than non-racial minorities in lower-division STEM 
courses. Yet, on average there are no significant differences in the amount of credits attempted in 
lower-division non-STEM courses.  
My outcome variable of interest is the probability of leaving STEM fields. STEM leavers 
are a subgroup of those who initially intended to major in STEM and leave STEM fields either 
by switching their major to a non-STEM field or by dropping out of college without earning a 
bachelor‘s degree. STEM leavers were identified at two points in time: (i) at the end of their 
second year of enrollment when most undergraduates formally declare their major; and (ii) at the 
year when they earn their bachelor‘s degree, which it mostly is in their sixth year.  Thus, my 
outcomes consists of STEM entrants who (1) were enrolled in a non-STEM major by the end of 
their second year of enrollment; (2) were enrolled in a non-STEM major at college graduation 
when they earn their first BA; (3) were not enrolled in college by the end of their second year; 
(4) were not enrolled and had not attained a BA by the year/semester of their last enrollment.  
Descriptive statistics of these and other college completion variables are reported in Panel 
D of Table 1.1 and 1.2. Proportionally more women than men left STEM fields by switching to a 
non-STEM field by the end of their sophomore year (15 percent vs. 10 percent) or towards 
graduation (22 percent vs. 32 percent). In contrast, more men than women left STEM fields by 





STEM attrition gap between women and men is about 6 percentage points.  Racial minorities, in 
contrast, leave STEM fields towards graduation by dropping out of college, with an overall 
STEM attrition gap of 14 percentage points. This partly explains why proportionally more racial 
minorities than non-racial minorities did not earn a BA (40 percent vs. 29 percent). Figures 1.5 
and 1.6 show the proportions of STEM switchers and dropouts over time per semester. 
Empirical Methodology 
A. Linear Probability Model 
In this study of gender and race gaps in STEM attrition, I seek to identify how pre-
college and college factors might differentially affect the probability of leaving STEM among 
those who declare a STEM field upon initial enrollment. I am particularly interested in how 
STEM and non-STEM grades in lower-division courses help to account for gender and race 
differentials in STEM attrition. For each gender and race category, I estimate the following 
STEM attrition equation, 
 
where              has been previously defined in three ways to attrite: (i) students who 
choose STEM as their intended major upon first enrollment and leave STEM by switching to a 
non-STEM major; (ii) students who choose STEM as their intended major and leave STEM by 
dropping out of college, and (iii) students who leave STEM either by switching into non-STEM 
or dropping out of college. STEM attrition outcomes will be predicted at two points in time, two 
years after first enrollment and towards college graduation. Persisting students will not leave 
STEM until they graduate.  
         is a vector of variables of STEM high school factors such as  SAT scores in math, 





            is a vector of SAT scores in reading, HS credits attempted in social science and 
English;        is a vector of variables capturing STEM cumulative GPA and STEM credits 
attempted in lower-division courses during the first two years of college;           is a 
vector of non-STEM cumulative GPA and credits attempted in lower-division courses during the 
first two years of college;     is a vector of demographic characteristics, such as race or gender 
depending on the probability model, age in May of HS completion and eligibility for free lunch 
in grade 12.  These vectors of covariates contain dummy variables for each of the variables that 
are included.   
I first use a linear probability model to estimate the above equation before applying a 
detailed decomposition methodology.  
B. Reweighted Decomposition Methodology 
A detailed decomposition methods help to identify which particular factors and ‗returns‘ 
of the aggregate decomposition are quantitative and relatively more important and which are not. 
Thus, the raw STEM attrition gap can be decomposed as the sum the composition effect linked 
to the differences in covariates between women and men (and racial minorities and non-
minorities), and the portion that is attributable to gender and race differences in the ‗returns‘ to 
these characteristics (also called the ―unexplained‖ part).  In this context, this decomposition is 
useful because this study seeks to understand how much of the gender and race gaps in STEM 
attrition is explained by differences in ‗returns‘ to college grades.  
I apply an Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition and follow the approach of Fortin at al. 
(2011) to analyze the impact gender and racial differences in the response functions. This 





The classic OB methodology is based on the construction of a counterfactual state of 
world. Under this standard approach, the first step is to estimate the probability of persisting 
STEM major as a function of different female and male characteristics. 
(1)  
(2)  
where the dependent variable is the probability of leaving STEM fields, assuming that this 
probability can be modeled as a linear (in the parameters) function of characteristics (X) that is 
different for women (Female=1) and men (Female=0), and under the zero conditional mean 
assumption,   
In the second step, I use the coefficients from these regressions to construct alternative 
counterfactuals: for example, using the coefficients from the women‘ regression, I can plug in 
the average characteristics of the male population to predict: what would women‘ likelihood of 
leaving STEM be if they had the same observable characteristics (high school grades, test scores, 
family background, etc.) as men? A disadvantage of the classic methodology is that it may not 
provide consistent estimates of the composition and response effects when the conditional mean 
is a non-linear function. Therefore, I will follow a newer decomposition methodology developed 
by Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011), which utilizes the same basic idea as a classic OB 
decomposition, but uses a more sophisticated reweighting strategy to construct a counterfactual 
that more precisely isolate ‗returns‘. This counterfactual uses the coefficients linked to STEM 
attrition outcomes of women, but the characteristics of the sample of women reweighted to be 
like men.  
To do this, I reweight the sample of women so that the distribution of their characteristics 





 (3)  
The counterfactual coefficient  and the counterfactual mean  and the estimated as, 
 
 
where . In a world with 
homogeneous college grades in which women and men (and racial minorities and non-
minorities) share the same characteristics or the same distribution of grades, their differences in 
the respond to grades would reflect true underlying differences in the conditional expectation, . 
However, I am expecting women and racial minorities to be more sensitive to grades when 
sharing the same grade distribution, and therefore to respond differently than men and non-racial 
minorities. In this case, the weighted and non-weighted estimates of  would be different since 
OLS minimizes specification errors over two different samples.   
Using the counterfactual coefficients  estimated on the sample of women reweighted 
to look like men, the difference ( ) reflects the true gender gap in the unexplained 
component of the gap. The reweighted decomposition uses the predicted STEM attrition rates, 
 from the reweighted sample as counterfactuals to obtain the overall STEM 







 corresponds to the education respond effect and to the composition effect. I rely 
on the assumption of common support and ignorability, that is, conditioning of observables, 
unobservables are assumed to be the same across gender and race.  
 As in Fortin at al. (2011), the composition and response effect can be further divided into, 
 
 (6)     
where  is a pure composition effect and  corresponds to the difference in the 
composition effects estimated by reweighting and by using classic OB decomposition. If the 
model was linear, this specification error would be zero. The response effect is reduced  
when the reweighting error, , goes to zero in large samples. Both the reweighting and 
specification errors are checked to be equal or close to zero, so as to double check that the 
reweighting factor  is consistently estimated and the model is well specified.  
It is important to note the main limitations to decomposition methods. First, a 
decomposition method follows a partial equilibrium, which means that we cannot observe if 
women (and racial minorities) would persist or not in STEM if there were no stereotypes 
associated to STEM fields, for instance. Second, ‗returns‘ to grades or the unexplained 
component of an Oaxaca decomposition cannot be interpreted as a treatment effect unless the 







  Third, the reweighting method is not straightforwardly extended to the case of the 
detailed decomposition, unless covariates are binary variables.   
Empirical Results 
A. Determinants of STEM Attrition  
Table 1.3 and 1.4 display the estimated coefficients from a linear probability model 
(LPM) (equation [1] above) of the explanatory variables listed in Table 1.1 and 1.2. These tables 
are useful to show which of explanatory variables are more significant and how the unexplained 
component of the gap differs by gender and race for each of my outcomes of interest. To 
illustrate the impact of controlling for college factors, I present the estimated coefficients from 
two models. Model 1 includes demographics and pre-college factors, while Model 2 also 
controls for college factors such as grades and credits attempted in lower-division courses during 
the first two years of enrollment. Results from Model 1 will be reported in the Appendix. The 
dependent variables are equal to 100 if the student left STEM, and 0 otherwise, so that the 
coefficients indicate the added probability of leaving STEM associated with the explanatory 
variables.  
Even though demographic characteristics are mostly insignificant after controlling for 
college factors, patterns of STEM attrition are different by gender and racial minority status. 
While women are more likely to attrite by switching into a non-STEM field, racial minorities 
mainly attrite by dropping out of college. Qualifying for free lunch as a measure of socio-
economic status does not significantly explain STEM attrition, nonetheless it is positively 
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associated with dropping out of college and negatively associated to leaving STEM by switching 
into non-STEM fields.  
As shown in Table 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, the explanatory power of pre-college factors is 
significantly reduced when controlling for college grades and credits attempted, yet SAT reading 
scores are still positive and significant when explaining the probability of leaving STEM by 
switching into non-STEM fields, and particularly for women and racial minorities. HS GPAs 
explain better STEM attrition by dropping out of college than by switching into non-STEM, 
especially for women. Higher HS GPAs in English and math are negatively associated with the 
likelihood of leaving STEM by dropping out of college in year 2 and towards graduation.  
Getting high grades and attempting more credits in lower-division STEM courses is 
significantly negatively associated with switching into a non-STEM field either in year 2 or 
towards graduation, especially for women and racial minorities. In contrast, grades and credits 
attempted in non-STEM courses are positively associated with switching into non-STEM. 
College factors in general and irrespective of the type of course taken are negatively associated 
with leaving STEM by dropping out of college. Note that for both gender and racial differences, 
the coefficients of college factors are larger when predicting long-term attrition outcomes.   
It is worth noting that it is much easier to predict the likelihood of leaving STEM by 
dropping out of college by both gender and racial minority status than it is for leaving STEM by 
switching into non-STEM: the r-squared statistics were in the 0.326-0.377 range and 0.107-0.173 
range, respectively.  
B. Decomposition Results 
Table 1.5 and 1.6 present the decomposition results for each STEM attrition outcome by 





including college factors can be found in Appendix Tables A3-A6. Columns 1 to 3 show results 
for STEM attrition gaps towards graduation, and columns 4 to 6 for STEM attrition in year 2.  
Going through row 1 of Table 1.5 shows that the female/male difference in the likelihood 
of STEM attrition vary depending on how students attrite. While the gap in the likelihood of 
leaving STEM by switching into non-STEM fields is positive, more men than women leave 
STEM by dropping out of college. Also, these raw gaps are larger at graduation.  
For all STEM attrition outcomes, STEM and non-STEM college grades and credits 
attempted are the most important characteristics that explained compositional differences 
between women and men. For the likelihood of leaving STEM by switching into non-STEM at 
graduation, gender differences in non-STEM grades and credits attempted in lower-division 
courses account for 2.75 out of 3.18 percentage points of the ―explained‖ by gender differences 
in characteristics. If women earn the same grades as men in STEM lower-division courses, the 
likelihood of women leaving STEM by switching into non-STEM fields would be higher. STEM 
grades work in advantage of women by reducing the percentage of women leaving STEM. 
Conversely, if women earn as high grades in non-STEM courses as men, then women would 
switch into non-STEM fields at an even higher rate. This is consistent with my hypothesis 
pertaining how absolute and relative abilities differentially explain STEM attrition gaps, 
particularly when women perceive that they are better at non-STEM fields and end up switching 
out of STEM.  
The likelihood of leaving STEM by dropping out of college and in year 2 is similarly 
mainly explained by STEM and non-STEM grades and credits attempted. Gender differences in 





attrition gap towards graduation, respectively. These factors are also the most important ones 
when students attrite in year 2.  
Even though compositional differences partly explain the gaps in the likelihood of 
switching into non-STEM fields, the ―unexplained‖ part associated with gender differences in 
the unexplained component of the gap is the most important. The effects of gender differences in 
the unexplained component of the gap is presented in the bottom panels of Table 1.5. Note that 
the interpretation of these differences depend on the omitted category in each factor. Earning 
higher grades and attempting higher number of credits in non-STEM lower-division courses, by 
comparison with having failing grades and attempting few credits in non-STEM courses, 
increase STEM attrition gaps by benefiting more men than women, particularly in year 2 when 
these differences are not only large, but significant. This is consistent with the coefficients of 
non-STEM grades found in the LPM that were larger for women than for men. Therefore, 
women are more vulnerable and responsive to non-STEM grades than men, and this in turn 
differentially affect their likelihood of switching into non-STEM fields by increasing the 
percentage of girls STEM attrition. 
As shown in Table 1.6, the STEM attrition gap between racial minorities and non-racial 
minorities is only positive and significant when students drop out of college towards graduation, 
while it is in favor of racial minorities when a higher percentage of non-racial minorities switch 
into non-STEM in year 2. Interestingly these gaps are mainly explained by compositional racial 
differences in pre-college and college characteristics. The main factor that accounts for the 
differences in leaving STEM by dropping out of college towards graduation is STEM college 
factors. The part explained by STEM college grades and credits attempted is 6.57 out of 9.84. 





9.84 percentage points of the ―explained‖ by racial-minority status differences in characteristics.  
Both of these factors work to the disadvantage of racial minorities and increase the percentage of 
racial minorities leaving STEM by dropping out of college.  
Column 4 of Table 1.6 shows that the most important factor associated with this 
switching into non-STEM in year 2 are non-STEM high school factors. Non-racial minorities are 
better prepared for college in non-STEM high school characteristics, and this increases their 
likelihood of switching into non-STEM during their second year of college enrollment. 
Conclusion  
The decomposition results show that gender differences in leaving STEM by switching 
into non-STEM are mainly explained by differences in the unexplained component of the gap, 
particularly by non-STEM college factors such as grades and credits attempted in lower-division 
courses. In contrast, gender differences in leaving STEM by dropping out of college are negative 
and mostly explained by compositional differences associated with STEM and non-STEM 
college factors. By comparison with STEM attrition gaps between racial minorities and non-
racial minorities, the unexplained component of the gap is not as significant and important as 
compositional differences. Racial minorities mainly attrite by dropping out of college towards 
graduation, and they differentially leave STEM due to their lower high school preparation in 
STEM and consequently lower grades in lower-division STEM courses during their first two 
years of enrollment. 
While my results for women are consistent with the theory of identity and stereotyped 
threat in the sense that women switch into a less stereotyped major at a higher rate than non-
stereotyped students, racial minorities do not follow this attrition pattern.  It seems that racial 





choice. From the policy perspective these results suggest that institutional policies aimed at 
making STEM a more ―favorable‖ environment for women might reduce their non-pecuniary 
cost of staying in STEM. These policies could include only-girls education or having female 
instructors. For racial minorities college readiness policies aimed to prepare students for college 
and careers in STEM could support minorities who are interested in STEM to graduate.  
Results also indicate that women are relatively more responsive than men to non-STEM 
college grades, which is consistent with prior literature and theory. Women are more sensitive to 
grades and perceive them as a measure of their ability. The importance of women‘s response to 
non-STEM grades in explaining the gap suggests that the relative grades they receive in non-
STEM courses may be discouraging women from persisting in STEM. Rigorous grading 
standards and a potential grading gap between STEM and non-STEM departments due to grade 
inflation may exacerbate the importance of grades on STEM major choice. Therefore, grading 
policies oriented to reduce grade differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses might 
deter women from leaving STEM.  
In the case of racial-minority students in STEM, even though they do not respond to 
grades as women do, they are affected by the low grades earned in their introductory STEM 
courses. Racial minorities perform relatively worse than non-minorities and that is how they end 
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Table 1.1.1: Descriptive Statistics for Women and Men 
 
 
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: (*) (**) (***) indicate statistically significant gender difference at 10%, 5% and 1%. LD stands 
for lower-division courses. Sample size for men is 5,669 and 3,504 for women. 







   
A. Demographics     
White Non-Hispanic 0.616 0.519 0.097 *** 
Black Non-Hispanic 0.114 0.201 -0.087 *** 
Hispanic 0.160 0.164 -0.004  
Asian  0.090 0.092 -0.003  
Other 0.021 0.023 -0.003  
Qualified for Free Lunch in Grade 12 0.071 0.105 -0.034 *** 
Age in May of HS completion year 18.208 18.132 0.076 *** 
   15 to less than 17 0.005 0.007 -0.002  
   17 to less than 19 0.962 0.974 -0.012 *** 
   19 years old 0.025 0.013 0.011 *** 
B. Pre-College Characteristics     
Highest SAT Math Score    611.315 565.786 45.529 *** 
   690 and over 0.204 0.100 0.104 *** 
   540 to less than 690 0.562 0.486 0.076 *** 
   Less than 540 0.233 0.414 -0.180 *** 
HS credits attempted-math 4.072 3.937 0.135 *** 
   7 and over 0.056 0.046 0.010 ** 
   4 to less than 7 0.640 0.599 0.041 *** 
   Less than 4 0.304 0.355 -0.051 *** 
HS credits attempted-science 4.040 4.088 -0.048  
   7 and over 0.064 0.074 -0.009 * 
   4 to less than 7 0.587 0.573 0.014  
   Less than 4 0.348 0.353 -0.004  
HS GPA-math 2.974 3.013 -0.039 ** 
   4 0.106 0.118 -0.012 * 
   3.7 to less than 4 0.084 0.086 -0.002  
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.174 0.187 -0.012  
   3 to less than 3.3 0.203 0.197 0.006  
   2.7 to less than 3 0.112 0.099 0.013 * 
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.147 0.148 -0.001  
   2 to less than 2.3 0.095 0.090 0.005  
   1.7 to less than 2 0.023 0.031 -0.008 ** 
   0 to less than 1.7 0.055 0.043 0.012 *** 
HS GPA-science 3.148 3.202 -0.054 *** 
   4 0.123 0.138 -0.016 ** 
   3.7 to less than 4 0.101 0.112 -0.012 * 
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.215 0.246 -0.032 *** 
   3 to less than 3.3 0.244 0.217 0.027 *** 
   2.7 to less than 3 0.101 0.092 0.009  
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.129 0.118 0.011  
   2 to less than 2.3 0.057 0.043 0.014 *** 
   1.7 to less than 2 0.010 0.010 0.000  
   0 to less than 1.7 0.022 0.023 -0.001  
Highest SAT Reading Score  568.229 553.182 15.047 *** 
   690 and over 0.086 0.065 0.021 *** 
   540 to less than 690 0.554 0.502 0.052 *** 
   Less than 540 0.360 0.433 -0.073 *** 
HS credits attempted-social science 3.421 3.411 0.011  
   7 and over 0.024 0.026 -0.002  
   4 to less than 7 0.311 0.306 0.005  
   Less than 4 0.665 0.668 -0.003  
HS credits attempted-reading 4.000 4.029 -0.029  
   7 and over 0.043 0.050 -0.007  
   4 to less than 7 0.751 0.735 0.016 * 
   Less than 4 0.206 0.215 -0.009  
HS GPA-social science 3.239 3.305 -0.066 *** 
   4 0.134 0.174 -0.040 *** 
   3.7 to less than 4 0.118 0.137 -0.020 *** 
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.267 0.258 0.009  
   3 to less than 3.3 0.222 0.208 0.014  


















C. College Characteristics      
First 2yrs STEM GPA in LD courses 2.124 2.186 -0.062 *** 
   4 0.027 0.024 0.003  
   3.7 to less than 4 0.052 0.054 -0.002  
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.082 0.084 -0.002  
   3 to less than 3.3 0.081 0.102 -0.021 *** 
   2.7 to less than 3 0.080 0.080 -0.001  
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.128 0.131 -0.003  
   2 to less than 2.3 0.111 0.121 -0.010  
   1.7 to less than 2 0.096 0.090 0.006  
   0 to less than 1.7 0.343 0.313 0.030 *** 
First 2yrs Non-STEM GPA in LD courses 2.625 2.809 -0.185 *** 
   4 0.048 0.069 -0.021 *** 
   3.7 to less than 4 0.068 0.099 -0.031 *** 
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.160 0.194 -0.034 *** 
   3 to less than 3.3 0.151 0.162 -0.011  
   2.7 to less than 3 0.119 0.110 0.009  
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.141 0.123 0.018 ** 
   2 to less than 2.3 0.090 0.071 0.018 *** 
   1.7 to less than 2 0.058 0.047 0.011 ** 
   0 to less than 1.7 0.165 0.124 0.041 *** 
STEM credits attempted from LD courses 19.761 20.880 -1.119 *** 
   7 and over 0.048 0.061 -0.013 *** 
   4 to less than 7 0.378 0.427 -0.049 *** 
   Less than 4 0.574 0.512 0.062 *** 
Non-STEM credits attempted from LD courses 19.271 19.597 -0.326  
   7 and over 0.074 0.086 -0.012 ** 
   4 to less than 7 0.447 0.457 -0.009  
   Less than 4 0.479 0.457 0.022 ** 
Switched major to a non-STEM field in year 2 0.105 0.151 -0.046 *** 
Left PSE without a degree in year 2 0.100 0.103 -0.003  
Left STEM fields in year 2 0.205 0.254 -0.049 *** 
STEM at graduation  0.669 0.541 0.128 *** 
Switched major to a non-STEM field 0.217 0.321 -0.104 *** 
Left PSE without a degree 0.345 0.302 0.044 *** 
Left STEM fields 0.562 0.622 -0.060 *** 
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: (*) (**) (***) indicate statistically significant gender difference at 10%, 5% and 1%. LD stands 









Table 1.2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Racial Minorities and Non-Minorities 
 
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: (*) (**) (***) indicate statistically significant racial minority difference at 10%, 5% and 1%. 











A. Demographics        
Female  0.351 0.452 -0.102 *** 
Qualified for Free Lunch in Grade 12 0.032 0.200 -0.168 *** 
Age in May of HS completion year 18.199 18.135 0.064 *** 
   15 to less than 17 0.004 0.008 -0.004 ** 
   17 to less than 19 0.968 0.963 0.006  
   19 years old 0.019 0.024 -0.006 * 
B. High School Characteristics        
Highest SAT Math Score  616.415 543.248 73.167 *** 
   690 and over 0.210 0.062 0.148 *** 
   540 to less than 690 0.590 0.403 0.187 *** 
   Less than 540 0.200 0.535 -0.335 *** 
HS credits attempted-math 4.058 3.939 0.119 *** 
   7 and over 0.061 0.032 0.029 *** 
   4 to less than 7 0.623 0.627 -0.004  
   Less than 4 0.316 0.341 -0.025 ** 
HS credits attempted-science 4.153 3.850 0.304 *** 
   7 and over 0.080 0.042 0.038 *** 
   4 to less than 7 0.591 0.562 0.030 *** 
   Less than 4 0.329 0.397 -0.068 *** 
HS GPA-math 3.079 2.790 0.289 *** 
   4 0.134 0.057 0.077 *** 
   3.7 to less than 4 0.099 0.054 0.045 *** 
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.198 0.136 0.062 *** 
   3 to less than 3.3 0.203 0.195 0.008  
   2.7 to less than 3 0.102 0.118 -0.016 ** 
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.124 0.199 -0.074 *** 
   2 to less than 2.3 0.074 0.134 -0.060 *** 
   1.7 to less than 2 0.020 0.041 -0.021 *** 
   0 to less than 1.7 0.044 0.065 -0.021 *** 
HS GPA-science 3.244 3.000 0.244 *** 
   4 0.152 0.079 0.073 *** 
   3.7 to less than 4 0.127 0.058 0.068 *** 
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.241 0.195 0.046 *** 
   3 to less than 3.3 0.226 0.250 -0.025 ** 
   2.7 to less than 3 0.092 0.109 -0.016 ** 
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.097 0.188 -0.091 *** 
   2 to less than 2.3 0.035 0.087 -0.052 *** 
   1.7 to less than 2 0.008 0.015 -0.007 *** 
   0 to less than 1.7 0.023 0.020 0.003  
Highest SAT Reading Score  579.425 523.321 56.104 *** 
   690 and over 0.099 0.029 0.071 *** 
   540 to less than 690 0.592 0.400 0.192 *** 
   Less than 540 0.309 0.572 -0.263 *** 
HS credits attempted-social science 3.441 3.366 0.074 *** 
   7 and over 0.028 0.017 0.011 *** 
   4 to less than 7 0.320 0.285 0.035 *** 
   Less than 4 0.652 0.698 -0.046 *** 
HS credits attempted-reading 4.011 4.011 0.000  
   7 and over 0.055 0.027 0.028 *** 
   4 to less than 7 0.733 0.770 -0.036 *** 
   Less than 4 0.212 0.203 0.008  
HS GPA-social science 3.325 3.130 0.195 *** 
   4 0.181 0.080 0.100 *** 
   3.7 to less than 4 0.139 0.094 0.045 *** 
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.271 0.247 0.024 ** 
   3 to less than 3.3 0.206 0.239 -0.033 *** 
   2.7 to less than 3 0.073 0.112 -0.039 *** 
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.076 0.151 -0.074 *** 
   2 to less than 2.3 0.029 0.055 -0.025 *** 
   1.7 to less than 2 0.005 0.010 -0.006 *** 
   0 to less than 1.7 0.020 0.011 0.008 *** 
HS GPA-English 3.192 3.017 0.174 *** 
   4 0.118 0.058 0.060 *** 














in Means   
C. College Characteristics        
First 2yrs STEM GPA in LD courses 2.253 1.904 0.349 *** 
   4 0.031 0.016 0.015 *** 
   3.7 to less than 4 0.061 0.033 0.028 *** 
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.093 0.057 0.036 *** 
   3 to less than 3.3 0.097 0.072 0.024 *** 
   2.7 to less than 3 0.087 0.064 0.023 *** 
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.135 0.115 0.020 *** 
   2 to less than 2.3 0.112 0.123 -0.011  
   1.7 to less than 2 0.092 0.096 -0.004  
   0 to less than 1.7 0.292 0.424 -0.132 *** 
First 2yrs Non-STEM GPA in LD courses 2.773 2.514 0.259 *** 
   4 0.067 0.032 0.035 *** 
   3.7 to less than 4 0.088 0.061 0.027 *** 
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.186 0.142 0.044 *** 
   3 to less than 3.3 0.160 0.145 0.015 * 
   2.7 to less than 3 0.115 0.116 0.000  
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.129 0.148 -0.019 ** 
   2 to less than 2.3 0.078 0.094 -0.016 ** 
   1.7 to less than 2 0.045 0.072 -0.027 *** 
   0 to less than 1.7 0.132 0.190 -0.059 *** 
STEM credits attempted from LD courses 20.759 18.911 1.847 *** 
   7 and over 0.051 0.056 -0.005  
   4 to less than 7 0.422 0.342 0.080 *** 
   Less than 4 0.527 0.602 -0.075 *** 
Non-STEM credits attempted from LD courses 19.293 19.628 -0.335  
   7 and over 0.075 0.087 -0.011 * 
   4 to less than 7 0.442 0.471 -0.029 ** 
   Less than 4 0.483 0.443 0.040 *** 
Switched major to a non-STEM field in year 2 0.129 0.109 0.020 *** 
Left PSE without a degree in year 2 0.102 0.098 0.004  
Left STEM fields in year 2 0.231 0.208 0.024 ** 
STEM at graduation  0.649 0.536 0.112 *** 
Switched major to a non-STEM field 0.248 0.276 -0.029 *** 
Left PSE without a degree 0.295 0.404 -0.109 *** 
Left STEM fields 0.543 0.681 -0.138 *** 
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: (*) (**) (***) indicate statistically significant racial minority difference at 10%, 5% and 1%.  






Table 1.3.1: Coefficients Linear Probability Model- STEM Attrition towards Graduation 
 
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Black Non-Hispanic 5.42 (2.62)     0.49 (2.12)     (2.63)     -2.33 1.14       -2.11 2.79       (2.54)     1.63 (2.29)     
Hispanic -0.89 (2.59)     4.07 (1.70)     2.86       -2.31 1.43       -1.70 1.97       (2.52)     5.50 (1.84)     
Asian -0.12 (3.13)     2.54 (2.08)     4.44       -2.78 (1.98)     -2.08 4.32       (3.04)     0.56 (2.26)     
Other -7.05 (5.76)     -0.69 (4.08)     (0.01)     -5.12 0.07       -4.07 (7.07)     (5.59)     -0.62 (4.42)     Qualified for Free Lunch 
in Grade 12 -3.64 (3.14)     -3.07 (2.44)     4.37       -2.79 4.73       -2.43 0.73       (3.05)     1.66 (2.64)     
   15 to less than 17 2.56 (14.51)   -1.10 (9.43)     (1.78)     -12.91 3.41       -9.42 0.78       (14.09)   2.31 (10.23)   
   17 to less than 19 1.14 (6.88)     1.94 (3.72)     3.87       -6.12 2.87       -3.71 5.01       (6.68)     4.81 (4.03)     
Age Squared 0.02 (0.07)     0.01 (0.05)     0.05       -0.06 0.06       -0.05 0.06       (0.07)     0.07 (0.05)     
   690 and over -8.94 (3.81)     -1.28 (2.24)     (0.72)     -3.39 (8.80)     -2.24 (9.67)     (3.70)     -10.08 (2.43)     
   540 to less than 690 -1.40 (2.29)     -0.45 (1.65)     (0.13)     -2.04 (5.73)     -1.65 (1.54)     (2.23)     -6.18 (1.79)     
   7 and over -10.83 (6.25)     -1.73 (4.04)     (7.09)     -5.56 (4.31)     -4.04 (17.92)   (6.07)     -6.04 (4.39)     
   4 to less than 7 -2.50 (2.35)     0.62 (1.70)     (4.27)     -2.09 (2.74)     -1.70 (6.77)     (2.28)     -2.12 (1.84)     
   7 and over 2.94 (4.40)     0.08 (3.31)     1.29       -3.91 1.96       -3.31 4.23       (4.27)     2.04 (3.59)     
   4 to less than 7 -3.64 (2.32)     1.88 (1.55)     5.87       -2.07 1.41       -1.55 2.23       (2.26)     3.29 (1.68)     
   4 9.02 (6.99)     -6.20 (4.13)     (10.94)   -6.22 (0.68)     -4.12 (1.92)     (6.79)     -6.88 (4.48)     
   3.7 to less than 4 8.32 (6.89)     -5.84 (4.02)     (7.43)     -6.13 (2.62)     -4.01 0.89       (6.69)     -8.46 (4.36)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 15.87 (6.32)     0.45 (3.58)     (11.34)   -5.62 (0.61)     -3.58 4.53       (6.14)     -0.16 (3.89)     
   3 to less than 3.3 13.22 (6.14)     -1.57 (3.44)     (11.13)   -5.46 (1.75)     -3.44 2.09       (5.96)     -3.32 (3.74)     
   2.7 to less than 3 15.32 (6.33)     2.63 (3.58)     (7.65)     -5.64 (3.13)     -3.57 7.67       (6.15)     -0.50 (3.88)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 14.07 (6.03)     -1.70 (3.38)     (11.28)   -5.36 (2.86)     -3.37 2.79       (5.85)     -4.56 (3.66)     
   2 to less than 2.3 13.18 (6.25)     -1.63 (3.53)     (2.37)     -5.56 (1.36)     -3.53 10.81     (6.07)     -2.99 (3.83)     
   1.7 to less than 2 13.19 (7.20)     -2.31 (4.79)     (6.91)     -6.40 (3.00)     -4.78 6.29       (6.99)     -5.31 (5.20)     
   4 -2.46 (9.61)     -3.94 (6.28)     4.83       -8.55 (0.36)     -6.27 2.37       (9.34)     -4.29 (6.81)     
   3.7 to less than 4 -1.80 (9.54)     -2.33 (6.23)     0.42       -8.49 (0.24)     -6.22 (1.38)     (9.26)     -2.57 (6.76)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 -7.14 (9.22)     -2.73 (5.95)     3.32       -8.21 0.90       -5.95 (3.82)     (8.96)     -1.83 (6.46)     
   3 to less than 3.3 -5.45 (9.10)     -2.52 (5.84)     4.36       -8.10 (0.19)     -5.83 (1.10)     (8.84)     -2.72 (6.33)     
   2.7 to less than 3 -7.91 (9.32)     -5.95 (5.95)     8.58       -8.30 1.07       -5.94 0.68       (9.05)     -4.88 (6.46)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -10.60 (9.08)     -4.90 (5.78)     9.24       -8.07 3.41       -5.77 (1.35)     (8.81)     -1.49 (6.27)     
   2 to less than 2.3 -13.30 (9.67)     -1.63 (6.01)     14.57     -8.60 1.22       -6.00 1.28       (9.39)     -0.41 (6.52)     
   1.7 to less than 2 3.11 (12.34)   -6.50 (7.75)     1.59       -10.98 9.06       -7.74 4.70       (11.98)   2.56 (8.41)     
   690 and over 14.28 (4.19)     8.38 (2.48)     (5.12)     -3.73 (4.10)     -2.47 9.17       (4.07)     4.28 (2.69)     
   540 to less than 690 6.69 (2.11)     3.16 (1.41)     (5.97)     -1.88 (1.03)     -1.41 0.72       (2.05)     2.13 (1.53)     
   7 and over 1.11 (6.43)     -3.28 (4.50)     (6.97)     -5.72 1.42       -4.49 (5.86)     (6.25)     -1.86 (4.88)     
   4 to less than 7 3.84 (2.00)     0.70 (1.33)     (2.30)     -1.78 1.96       -1.33 1.54       (1.94)     2.66 (1.44)     
   7 and over 6.27 (6.46)     1.90 (5.02)     7.33       -5.75 2.77       -5.01 13.61     (6.27)     4.67 (5.44)     
   4 to less than 7 3.27 (2.76)     -1.63 (1.97)     1.87       -2.45 (0.13)     -1.96 5.13       (2.68)     -1.76 (2.13)     
   4 -14.27 (11.87)   7.83 (7.54)     10.26     -10.56 (2.40)     -7.53 (4.00)     (11.53)   5.43 (8.18)     
   3.7 to less than 4 -13.07 (11.78)   8.77 (7.43)     10.98     -10.48 (3.59)     -7.42 (2.09)     (11.44)   5.17 (8.06)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 -16.75 (11.57)   8.05 (7.26)     11.56     -10.29 (3.37)     -7.25 (5.19)     (11.24)   4.68 (7.88)     
   3 to less than 3.3 -16.31 (11.48)   8.12 (7.23)     12.87     -10.22 (3.54)     -7.22 (3.45)     (11.15)   4.58 (7.85)     
   2.7 to less than 3 -16.67 (11.65)   5.10 (7.34)     7.50       -10.36 (1.04)     -7.33 (9.17)     (11.31)   4.06 (7.96)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -17.91 (11.51)   3.37 (7.23)     12.11     -10.24 (4.06)     -7.22 (5.80)     (11.17)   -0.69 (7.85)     
   2 to less than 2.3 -13.63 (11.85)   4.96 (7.39)     11.06     -10.55 5.80       -7.38 (2.57)     (11.51)   10.77 (8.01)     
   1.7 to less than 2 7.72 (16.76)   1.22 (10.02)   7.88       -14.91 7.26       -10.01 15.60     (16.28)   8.48 (10.87)   
   4 0.36 (11.53)   0.24 (6.85)     (10.73)   -10.25 (5.68)     -6.84 (10.37)   (11.19)   -5.43 (7.43)     
   3.7 to less than 4 -2.26 (11.42)   -1.92 (6.67)     (10.53)   -10.16 (3.31)     -6.66 (12.79)   (11.10)   -5.23 (7.23)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 2.05 (11.23)   -3.34 (6.39)     (10.73)   -9.99 (5.31)     -6.38 (8.69)     (10.91)   -8.64 (6.93)     
   3 to less than 3.3 0.44 (11.13)   -6.37 (6.29)     (10.10)   -9.90 (3.73)     -6.28 (9.66)     (10.81)   -10.09 (6.82)     
   2.7 to less than 3 -2.64 (11.33)   -1.34 (6.34)     (9.47)     -10.08 (4.14)     -6.33 (12.11)   (11.00)   -5.47 (6.87)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 1.15 (11.33)   -6.11 (6.24)     (12.18)   -10.08 (1.58)     -6.23 (11.03)   (11.01)   -7.68 (6.77)     
   2 to less than 2.3 -1.41 (11.52)   -7.31 (6.27)     (9.35)     -10.25 (4.02)     -6.26 (10.77)   (11.19)   -11.33 (6.80)     
   1.7 to less than 2 -2.62 (14.94)   -4.18 (7.84)     7.92       -13.29 4.32       -7.82 5.30       (14.51)   0.14 (8.50)     
HS credits attempted-social science (Base: <4)
HS credits attempted-english
HS gpa-social science (Base: 0 to <1.7)
HS gpa-english  (Base: 0 to <1.7)
HS credits attempted-science (Base: <4)
HS gpa-math (Base: 0 to < 1.7)
HS gpa-science (Base: 0 to < 1.7)
Non-STEM HS Factors:
Highest SAT Reading Score (Base: < 540)
Demographics:
Age in May of HS completion year (Base: 19 years old)
STEM HS Factors:
Highest SAT Math Score (Base: <540)
HS credits attempted-math (Base: <4)
Switching into Non-STEM Leaving STEM & College Total Leaving STEM 









Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
 
  
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
   4 -4.69 (6.43)     -9.32 (4.11)     (29.85)   -5.72 (23.26)   -4.10 (34.53)   (6.25)     -32.58 (4.46)     
   3.7 to less than 4 -22.93 (4.80)     -15.88 (3.22)     (23.11)   -4.27 (28.42)   -3.21 (46.03)   (4.67)     -44.30 (3.49)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 -21.71 (4.04)     -11.27 (2.68)     (21.26)   -3.60 (28.83)   -2.67 (42.97)   (3.92)     -40.10 (2.91)     
   3 to less than 3.3 -20.58 (3.63)     -10.90 (2.51)     (23.32)   -3.23 (24.99)   -2.51 (43.90)   (3.53)     -35.89 (2.73)     
   2.7 to less than 3 -17.21 (3.75)     -10.69 (2.51)     (20.28)   -3.34 (24.47)   -2.50 (37.49)   (3.64)     -35.16 (2.72)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -7.47 (3.20)     -5.27 (2.10)     (16.90)   -2.85 (23.52)   -2.10 (24.36)   (3.11)     -28.79 (2.28)     
   2 to less than 2.3 -4.55 (3.15)     -3.56 (2.13)     (12.15)   -2.80 (16.75)   -2.13 (16.70)   (3.06)     -20.31 (2.31)     
   1.7 to less than 2 5.76 (3.40)     4.69 (2.21)     (11.55)   -3.03 (16.12)   -2.21 (5.79)     (3.31)     -11.44 (2.40)     
STEM credits attempted from lower-division courses (Base: <4)
   7 and over -10.97 (3.76)     -10.18 (2.67)     (22.61)   -3.34 (15.33)   -2.67 (33.58)   (3.65)     -25.51 (2.90)     
   4 to less than 7 -5.61 (2.04)     -8.94 (1.32)     (13.06)   -1.82 (8.34)     -1.31 (18.67)   (1.98)     -17.28 (1.43)     
   4 35.57 (4.87)     25.37 (3.64)     (32.49)   -4.33 (46.61)   -3.63 3.08       (4.73)     -21.24 (3.94)     
   3.7 to less than 4 26.70 (4.32)     21.07 (3.12)     (28.64)   -3.85 (43.19)   -3.12 (1.94)     (4.20)     -22.12 (3.39)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 33.38 (3.64)     19.37 (2.48)     (33.13)   -3.24 (40.87)   -2.48 0.25       (3.54)     -21.50 (2.69)     
   3 to less than 3.3 30.83 (3.65)     22.55 (2.38)     (30.19)   -3.24 (39.05)   -2.38 0.64       (3.54)     -16.50 (2.58)     
   2.7 to less than 3 28.88 (3.89)     23.81 (2.45)     (27.76)   -3.46 (37.55)   -2.45 1.12       (3.78)     -13.73 (2.66)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 25.85 (3.70)     18.53 (2.29)     (22.48)   -3.29 (31.35)   -2.28 3.37       (3.59)     -12.82 (2.48)     
   2 to less than 2.3 19.01 (4.23)     13.71 (2.48)     (22.89)   -3.77 (22.78)   -2.48 (3.87)     (4.11)     -9.08 (2.69)     
   1.7 to less than 2 8.91 (4.89)     11.56 (2.86)     (6.60)     -4.35 (12.91)   -2.85 2.32       (4.75)     -1.34 (3.10)     
   7 and over 44.45 (3.95)     40.35 (2.73)     (27.26)   -3.51 (21.75)   -2.73 17.18     (3.84)     18.60 (2.96)     
   4 to less than 7 17.62 (1.85)     16.05 (1.25)     (10.72)   -1.64 (11.47)   -1.24 6.91       (1.79)     4.58 (1.35)     
Constant 4.76 (27.39)   -4.65 (18.14)   66.92     -24.37 80.22     -18.11 71.68     (26.60)   75.58 (19.67)   
R-squared 0.18 0.16 0.32 0.38 0.31 0.34
N 2513 4373 2513 4373 2513 4373
Total Leaving STEM Leaving STEM & CollegeSwitching into Non-STEM
STEM College Factors: 
STEM gpa first two years lower-division courses (Base: 0 to <1.7)
Non-STEM College Factors: 
Non-STEM gpa first two years lower-division courses (Base 0 to <1.7)
Non-STEM credits attempted from lower-division courses  (Base: <4)





Table 1.3.2: Coefficients Linear Probability Model- STEM Attrition in year 2 
 
   Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Black Non-Hispanic -3.16 (2.04)    -3.33 (1.60)     -3.96 (1.57)    -4.12 (1.42)    -7.12 (2.41)    -7.45 (2.03)    
Hispanic -3.88 (2.02)    0.45 (1.29)     -4.11 (1.55)    -2.90 (1.14)    -7.99 (2.38)    -2.44 (1.63)    
Asian -1.73 (2.44)    -1.56 (1.58)     -3.69 (1.87)    -3.80 (1.39)    -5.42 (2.87)    -5.36 (2.00)    
Other -5.79 (4.49)    -2.95 (3.09)     -2.30 (3.45)    3.57 (2.73)    -8.09 (5.29)    0.62 (3.91)    Qualified for Free Lunch 
in Grade 12 -3.92 (2.45)    -1.94 (1.85)     -1.54 (1.88)    -2.52 (1.63)    -5.45 (2.89)    -4.46 (2.34)    
   15 to less than 17 3.00 (11.32)  7.06 (7.14)     0.58 (8.69)    -8.41 (6.32)    3.58 (13.33)  -1.36 (9.05)    
   17 to less than 19 -1.71 (5.37)    2.64 (2.82)     -2.98 (4.12)    -0.42 (2.49)    -4.69 (6.32)    2.22 (3.57)    
Age Squared 0.00 (0.05)    0.01 (0.04)     0.01 (0.04)    0.01 (0.03)    0.01 (0.06)    0.02 (0.04)    
   690 and over -3.17 (2.98)    -1.78 (1.70)     0.47 (2.28)    -0.67 (1.50)    -2.70 (3.50)    -2.45 (2.15)    
   540 to less than 690 -0.34 (1.79)    -0.50 (1.25)     -0.04 (1.37)    1.00 (1.11)    -0.38 (2.11)    0.50 (1.59)    
   7 and over -8.93 (4.87)    -2.52 (3.06)     5.06 (3.74)    3.19 (2.71)    -3.86 (5.74)    0.66 (3.88)    
   4 to less than 7 -0.35 (1.83)    -0.58 (1.29)     0.15 (1.41)    1.51 (1.14)    -0.20 (2.16)    0.93 (1.63)    
   7 and over 1.45 (3.43)    1.51 (2.51)     -2.93 (2.64)    -0.06 (2.22)    -1.48 (4.04)    1.45 (3.18)    
   4 to less than 7 -0.07 (1.81)    2.45 (1.17)     0.55 (1.39)    -0.34 (1.04)    0.48 (2.13)    2.11 (1.49)    
   4 -2.25 (5.45)    1.12 (3.13)     5.31 (4.19)    0.16 (2.77)    3.06 (6.42)    1.28 (3.96)    
   3.7 to less than 4 -0.78 (5.38)    -0.98 (3.04)     9.68 (4.13)    -0.39 (2.69)    8.90 (6.33)    -1.37 (3.85)    
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.81 (4.93)    3.22 (2.71)     8.22 (3.79)    1.44 (2.40)    9.03 (5.81)    4.66 (3.44)    
   3 to less than 3.3 -0.25 (4.79)    5.23 (2.61)     11.57 (3.67)    -0.25 (2.31)    11.32 (5.64)    4.98 (3.31)    
   2.7 to less than 3 0.40 (4.94)    4.79 (2.71)     5.62 (3.79)    -1.30 (2.40)    6.02 (5.82)    3.49 (3.44)    
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -0.19 (4.70)    1.34 (2.56)     7.76 (3.61)    -1.34 (2.26)    7.57 (5.54)    0.00 (3.24)    
   2 to less than 2.3 -0.24 (4.88)    0.65 (2.68)     9.25 (3.74)    -1.22 (2.37)    9.01 (5.75)    -0.57 (3.39)    
   1.7 to less than 2 -1.92 (5.61)    0.75 (3.63)     7.66 (4.31)    -5.27 (3.21)    5.75 (6.61)    -4.53 (4.60)    
   4 3.84 (7.50)    -1.09 (4.76)     -3.64 (5.76)    -2.10 (4.21)    0.20 (8.83)    -3.19 (6.03)    
   3.7 to less than 4 2.77 (7.44)    -0.72 (4.72)     -3.28 (5.71)    -1.22 (4.17)    -0.50 (8.76)    -1.94 (5.98)    
   3.3 to less than 3.7 1.55 (7.20)    -1.06 (4.51)     -3.54 (5.52)    -0.16 (3.99)    -1.99 (8.48)    -1.22 (5.72)    
   3 to less than 3.3 1.31 (7.10)    -3.06 (4.42)     -1.77 (5.45)    0.62 (3.91)    -0.46 (8.36)    -2.44 (5.60)    
   2.7 to less than 3 1.33 (7.27)    -2.65 (4.51)     -3.27 (5.58)    -0.14 (3.99)    -1.94 (8.57)    -2.78 (5.71)    
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.00 (7.08)    -1.58 (4.38)     -0.70 (5.43)    -0.21 (3.87)    -0.70 (8.34)    -1.78 (5.55)    
   2 to less than 2.3 1.48 (7.54)    -3.41 (4.55)     0.95 (5.79)    0.22 (4.02)    2.43 (8.88)    -3.19 (5.77)    
   1.7 to less than 2 -8.86 (9.63)    -4.94 (5.87)     16.05 (7.39)    5.84 (5.19)    7.20 (11.34)  0.89 (7.44)    
   690 and over 8.69 (3.27)    1.97 (1.88)     -3.17 (2.51)    -5.87 (1.66)    5.53 (3.85)    -3.91 (2.38)    
   540 to less than 690 6.05 (1.65)    0.98 (1.07)     -1.82 (1.26)    -1.04 (0.94)    4.23 (1.94)    -0.06 (1.35)    
   7 and over 2.75 (5.02)    -3.11 (3.41)     0.59 (3.85)    -0.32 (3.01)    3.34 (5.91)    -3.43 (4.32)    
   4 to less than 7 4.11 (1.56)    -0.21 (1.01)     -0.45 (1.20)    0.20 (0.89)    3.66 (1.84)    -0.01 (1.27)    
   7 and over 3.28 (5.04)    5.47 (3.80)     -5.09 (3.87)    -1.99 (3.36)    -1.81 (5.94)    3.48 (4.81)    
   4 to less than 7 -1.23 (2.15)    0.07 (1.49)     -0.60 (1.65)    -1.58 (1.32)    -1.83 (2.53)    -1.51 (1.89)    
   4 -7.22 (9.26)    -7.19 (5.71)     7.36 (7.11)    7.79 (5.05)    0.14 (10.91)  0.60 (7.23)    
   3.7 to less than 4 -9.18 (9.19)    -6.61 (5.63)     6.30 (7.06)    5.52 (4.98)    -2.89 (10.83)  -1.09 (7.13)    
   3.3 to less than 3.7 -6.55 (9.03)    -8.86 (5.50)     9.65 (6.93)    7.34 (4.86)    3.11 (10.63)  -1.53 (6.97)    
   3 to less than 3.3 -11.03 (8.96)    -9.02 (5.48)     9.84 (6.88)    7.33 (4.84)    -1.19 (10.55)  -1.69 (6.94)    
   2.7 to less than 3 -12.09 (9.09)    -7.83 (5.56)     7.53 (6.97)    7.47 (4.92)    -4.56 (10.70)  -0.36 (7.04)    
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -7.11 (8.98)    -9.08 (5.48)     9.44 (6.89)    4.26 (4.84)    2.33 (10.57)  -4.82 (6.94)    
   2 to less than 2.3 -12.84 (9.25)    -6.56 (5.60)     6.31 (7.10)    7.24 (4.95)    -6.53 (10.89)  0.68 (7.09)    
   1.7 to less than 2 -5.52 (13.07)  -9.48 (7.59)     3.73 (10.04)  4.91 (6.71)    -1.79 (15.40)  -4.57 (9.62)    
   4 3.25 (8.99)    4.39 (5.19)     -22.24 (6.90)    2.36 (4.59)    -18.98 (10.59)  6.75 (6.57)    
   3.7 to less than 4 4.26 (8.91)    7.61 (5.05)     -20.85 (6.84)    2.66 (4.46)    -16.60 (10.50)  10.26 (6.40)    
   3.3 to less than 3.7 4.88 (8.76)    6.31 (4.84)     -22.25 (6.72)    0.79 (4.28)    -17.38 (10.32)  7.10 (6.13)    
   3 to less than 3.3 4.31 (8.68)    5.07 (4.76)     -20.42 (6.66)    0.30 (4.21)    -16.11 (10.23)  5.37 (6.03)    
   2.7 to less than 3 2.96 (8.84)    6.68 (4.80)     -24.00 (6.78)    3.41 (4.24)    -21.04 (10.41)  10.09 (6.08)    
   2.3 to less than 2.7 2.91 (8.84)    3.13 (4.73)     -23.98 (6.79)    1.42 (4.18)    -21.07 (10.42)  4.55 (5.99)    
   2 to less than 2.3 0.10 (8.99)    3.00 (4.75)     -21.40 (6.90)    -0.36 (4.20)    -21.30 (10.58)  2.64 (6.01)    
   1.7 to less than 2 15.06 (11.65)  9.48 (5.94)     -29.95 (8.94)    2.92 (5.25)    -14.89 (13.72)  12.40 (7.52)    
Demographics:
STEM HS Factors:
HS gpa-math (Base: 0 to < 1.7)
HS credits attempted-science (Base: <4)
HS credits attempted-math (Base: <4)
Highest SAT Math Score (Base: <540)
Age in May of HS completion year (Base: 19 years old)
HS credits attempted-english
HS credits attempted-social science (Base: <4)
Highest SAT Reading Score (Base: < 540)
Non-STEM HS Factors:
HS gpa-science (Base: 0 to < 1.7)
HS gpa-english  (Base: 0 to <1.7)
HS gpa-social science (Base: 0 to <1.7)
Switching into Non-STEM Leaving STEM & College Total Leaving STEM 










Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
 
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
   4 -9.96 (5.02)    -7.58 (3.11)     -15.55 (3.85)    -8.14 (2.75)    -25.51 (5.91)    -15.72 (3.94)    
   3.7 to less than 4 -8.73 (3.75)    -7.52 (2.44)     -2.34 (2.88)    -10.42 (2.15)    -11.07 (4.41)    -17.94 (3.09)    
   3.3 to less than 3.7 -11.63 (3.15)    -6.72 (2.03)     -4.82 (2.42)    -9.89 (1.79)    -16.45 (3.71)    -16.61 (2.57)    
   3 to less than 3.3 -8.63 (2.84)    -5.25 (1.90)     -5.00 (2.18)    -8.69 (1.68)    -13.62 (3.34)    -13.94 (2.41)    
   2.7 to less than 3 -8.73 (2.93)    -5.54 (1.90)     -3.78 (2.25)    -8.06 (1.68)    -12.51 (3.45)    -13.60 (2.40)    
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -5.07 (2.50)    -1.81 (1.59)     -5.49 (1.92)    -7.09 (1.41)    -10.56 (2.94)    -8.90 (2.02)    
   2 to less than 2.3 -1.21 (2.46)    -2.94 (1.61)     -3.69 (1.89)    -7.26 (1.43)    -4.90 (2.89)    -10.20 (2.05)    
   1.7 to less than 2 0.34 (2.66)    -0.51 (1.68)     -7.33 (2.04)    -7.87 (1.48)    -6.99 (3.13)    -8.38 (2.12)    
STEM credits attempted from lower-division courses (Base: <4)
   7 and over -9.94 (2.93)    -7.76 (2.03)     -21.00 (2.25)    -14.26 (1.79)    -30.94 (3.45)    -22.02 (2.57)    
   4 to less than 7 -9.60 (1.59)    -8.03 (1.00)     -17.48 (1.22)    -12.49 (0.88)    -27.08 (1.88)    -20.52 (1.26)    
   4 12.98 (3.80)    7.55 (2.75)     -20.41 (2.91)    -25.26 (2.44)    -7.42 (4.47)    -17.71 (3.49)    
   3.7 to less than 4 10.98 (3.37)    9.88 (2.37)     -17.78 (2.59)    -24.37 (2.09)    -6.79 (3.97)    -14.50 (3.00)    
   3.3 to less than 3.7 11.78 (2.84)    6.46 (1.88)     -17.54 (2.18)    -23.60 (1.66)    -5.75 (3.35)    -17.15 (2.38)    
   3 to less than 3.3 10.58 (2.84)    4.74 (1.80)     -20.26 (2.18)    -22.89 (1.59)    -9.68 (3.35)    -18.14 (2.28)    
   2.7 to less than 3 6.13 (3.03)    6.41 (1.86)     -17.98 (2.33)    -23.51 (1.64)    -11.85 (3.57)    -17.10 (2.35)    
   2.3 to less than 2.7 9.22 (2.88)    4.96 (1.73)     -20.40 (2.21)    -22.71 (1.53)    -11.19 (3.40)    -17.75 (2.19)    
   2 to less than 2.3 4.84 (3.30)    4.26 (1.88)     -11.31 (2.54)    -21.88 (1.66)    -6.47 (3.89)    -17.62 (2.38)    
   1.7 to less than 2 4.82 (3.82)    5.66 (2.16)     -14.77 (2.93)    -22.44 (1.91)    -9.95 (4.50)    -16.78 (2.74)    
   7 and over 26.66 (3.08)    28.75 (2.07)     -25.16 (2.37)    -23.17 (1.83)    1.51 (3.63)    5.58 (2.62)    
   4 to less than 7 10.85 (1.44)    7.88 (0.94)     -15.92 (1.11)    -15.41 (0.83)    -5.07 (1.70)    -7.52 (1.19)    
Constant 10.92 (21.37)  0.85 (13.74)   59.86 (16.40)  42.56 (12.15)  70.78 (25.17)  43.41 (17.41)  
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.32 0.19 0.20
N 2513 4373 2513 4373 2513 4373
STEM College Factors: 
Non-STEM College Factors: 
Switching into Non-STEM Leaving STEM & College Total Leaving STEM 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Non-STEM gpa first two years lower-division courses (Base 0 to <1.7)
STEM gpa first two years lower-division courses (Base: 0 to <1.7)





Table 1.4.1: Coefficients Linear Probability Model- STEM Attrition towards Graduation 
 
 
           Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
  
 
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Female 8.20 (1.94)     9.07 (1.29)     -2.04 (1.87)     -0.52 (1.22)     6.17 (1.88)     8.55 (1.37)     
Qualified for Free Lunch in Grade 12-2.55 (2.37)     -2.31 (3.47)     2.98 (2.28)     6.26 (3.29)     0.43 (2.29)     3.95 (3.71)     
   15 to less than 17 13.65 (12.71)   -10.22 (10.49)   -13.78 (12.23)   12.22 (9.95)     -0.13 (12.29)   2.00 (11.19)   
   17 to less than 19 5.83 (6.05)     -0.30 (3.96)     -1.91 (5.82)     5.08 (3.76)     3.93 (5.85)     4.78 (4.23)     
Age Squared 0.01 (0.07)     0.00 (0.05)     0.05 (0.07)     0.05 (0.04)     0.06 (0.07)     0.05 (0.05)     
   690 and over -7.35 (4.50)     -3.07 (2.22)     -2.67 (4.33)     -7.04 (2.10)     -10.02 (4.35)     -10.10 (2.36)     
   540 to less than 690 -1.96 (2.28)     -1.18 (1.66)     -0.43 (2.19)     -4.47 (1.58)     -2.39 (2.20)     -5.65 (1.77)     
   7 and over -6.55 (7.06)     -4.45 (3.92)     7.34 (6.79)     -9.91 (3.72)     0.79 (6.82)     -14.36 (4.18)     
   4 to less than 7 0.59 (2.50)     -1.47 (1.67)     -4.58 (2.40)     -3.27 (1.58)     -3.99 (2.41)     -4.74 (1.78)     
   7 and over 1.05 (5.62)     2.69 (3.01)     -7.92 (5.41)     3.51 (2.86)     -6.87 (5.43)     6.20 (3.21)     
   4 to less than 7 -2.71 (2.25)     1.57 (1.59)     2.45 (2.17)     3.01 (1.51)     -0.26 (2.18)     4.57 (1.70)     
   4 6.81 (6.84)     -5.94 (4.47)     -7.99 (6.58)     -1.21 (4.24)     -1.18 (6.61)     -7.15 (4.77)     
   3.7 to less than 4 3.79 (6.26)     -5.35 (4.43)     -5.65 (6.03)     -2.19 (4.20)     -1.86 (6.05)     -7.54 (4.72)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 9.28 (5.28)     1.44 (4.08)     -10.11 (5.08)     -1.41 (3.87)     -0.83 (5.10)     0.02 (4.35)     
   3 to less than 3.3 6.04 (4.86)     -0.34 (3.98)     -9.42 (4.68)     -2.22 (3.78)     -3.38 (4.70)     -2.56 (4.25)     
   2.7 to less than 3 10.60 (5.04)     2.60 (4.13)     -8.53 (4.85)     -2.27 (3.92)     2.07 (4.87)     0.33 (4.41)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 6.99 (4.64)     -0.36 (3.96)     -8.18 (4.46)     -3.70 (3.76)     -1.19 (4.48)     -4.06 (4.23)     
   2 to less than 2.3 6.95 (4.80)     -0.45 (4.15)     -6.10 (4.62)     1.40 (3.93)     0.85 (4.64)     0.95 (4.43)     
   1.7 to less than 2 -0.42 (5.99)     4.49 (5.36)     -5.31 (5.77)     -3.19 (5.09)     -5.72 (5.79)     1.31 (5.72)     
   4 -6.90 (8.62)     3.52 (7.18)     5.03 (8.29)     -4.19 (6.81)     -1.87 (8.33)     -0.67 (7.66)     
   3.7 to less than 4 -6.41 (8.70)     4.54 (7.13)     -2.69 (8.37)     -4.09 (6.76)     -9.10 (8.41)     0.46 (7.61)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 -10.45 (7.82)     2.74 (6.95)     5.39 (7.53)     -3.33 (6.59)     -5.06 (7.56)     -0.59 (7.42)     
   3 to less than 3.3 -8.89 (7.60)     3.29 (6.86)     4.24 (7.32)     -3.41 (6.51)     -4.65 (7.35)     -0.12 (7.33)     
   2.7 to less than 3 -17.86 (7.87)     2.57 (6.96)     13.14 (7.58)     -4.13 (6.60)     -4.72 (7.61)     -1.57 (7.42)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -13.33 (7.51)     0.23 (6.81)     9.78 (7.23)     -0.68 (6.46)     -3.54 (7.26)     -0.45 (7.27)     
   2 to less than 2.3 -11.33 (7.73)     2.44 (7.24)     10.12 (7.44)     -0.51 (6.87)     -1.20 (7.47)     1.93 (7.73)     
   1.7 to less than 2 -6.05 (10.25)   3.06 (8.95)     9.13 (9.87)     -1.22 (8.49)     3.07 (9.91)     1.84 (9.55)     
   690 and over 17.92 (6.12)     9.29 (2.35)     -7.19 (5.89)     -4.34 (2.23)     10.73 (5.92)     4.95 (2.50)     
   540 to less than 690 6.38 (2.14)     3.89 (1.41)     -5.21 (2.05)     -2.46 (1.34)     1.17 (2.06)     1.43 (1.51)     
   7 and over 11.53 (8.87)     -3.24 (4.07)     -16.06 (8.54)     0.77 (3.86)     -4.53 (8.57)     -2.47 (4.34)     
   4 to less than 7 2.99 (2.13)     1.70 (1.31)     0.99 (2.05)     0.31 (1.24)     3.98 (2.06)     2.01 (1.40)     
   7 and over -1.91 (8.30)     2.27 (4.52)     0.69 (7.99)     7.66 (4.29)     -1.22 (8.02)     9.93 (4.82)     
   4 to less than 7 0.81 (2.95)     0.07 (1.93)     1.64 (2.84)     1.10 (1.83)     2.45 (2.85)     1.17 (2.06)     
   4 -3.79 (11.47)   3.46 (8.13)     0.74 (11.04)   0.81 (7.71)     -3.05 (11.08)   4.27 (8.68)     
   3.7 to less than 4 -5.91 (11.15)   5.37 (8.07)     6.04 (10.73)   -0.50 (7.65)     0.13 (10.77)   4.87 (8.61)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 0.37 (10.78)   0.67 (7.94)     5.03 (10.37)   -0.06 (7.53)     5.40 (10.42)   0.61 (8.47)     
   3 to less than 3.3 0.04 (10.69)   1.35 (7.91)     4.33 (10.29)   1.14 (7.50)     4.37 (10.34)   2.49 (8.44)     
   2.7 to less than 3 -1.16 (10.81)   -1.56 (8.04)     3.55 (10.41)   1.24 (7.62)     2.40 (10.45)   -0.32 (8.58)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -2.75 (10.64)   -3.31 (7.95)     5.55 (10.24)   -1.27 (7.54)     2.80 (10.29)   -4.58 (8.48)     
   2 to less than 2.3 1.90 (10.93)   -2.73 (8.11)     4.51 (10.52)   11.06 (7.69)     6.41 (10.56)   8.32 (8.65)     
   1.7 to less than 2 22.42 (14.03)   -11.69 (11.59)   2.33 (13.51)   13.17 (10.99)   24.74 (13.57)   1.48 (12.36)   
   4 11.07 (9.83)     -6.93 (7.99)     -1.98 (9.46)     -4.82 (7.58)     9.09 (9.51)     -11.76 (8.52)     
   3.7 to less than 4 7.60 (9.36)     -9.38 (7.90)     -5.72 (9.01)     -3.14 (7.49)     1.88 (9.05)     -12.52 (8.43)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 7.12 (8.82)     -6.96 (7.74)     -3.92 (8.49)     -5.15 (7.34)     3.20 (8.52)     -12.12 (8.26)     
   3 to less than 3.3 6.51 (8.64)     -10.28 (7.67)     -6.84 (8.31)     -2.37 (7.27)     -0.33 (8.35)     -12.65 (8.18)     
   2.7 to less than 3 7.42 (8.69)     -7.11 (7.76)     -8.51 (8.36)     -1.76 (7.36)     -1.09 (8.40)     -8.87 (8.28)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 5.69 (8.58)     -9.50 (7.66)     -6.45 (8.26)     -1.35 (7.26)     -0.76 (8.29)     -10.85 (8.17)     
   2 to less than 2.3 3.16 (8.59)     -10.70 (7.81)     -12.67 (8.27)     1.36 (7.41)     -9.51 (8.30)     -9.35 (8.34)     
   1.7 to less than 2 -3.52 (11.61)   -2.02 (9.17)     3.67 (11.17)   6.50 (8.70)     0.16 (11.22)   4.48 (9.79)     
Non-MinorityRacial Minority Non-Minority Racial Minority Non-Minority Racial Minority
Demographics:
Switching into Non-STEM Leaving STEM & College Total Leaving STEM 
STEM HS Factors:
Non-STEM HS Factors:
Age in May of HS completion year (Base: 19 years old)
Highest SAT Math Score (Base: <540)
HS credits attempted-math (Base: <4)
HS credits attempted-science (Base: <4)
HS gpa-math (Base: 0 to < 1.7)
HS gpa-science (Base: 0 to < 1.7)
Highest SAT Reading Score (Base: < 540)
HS credits attempted-social science (Base: <4)
HS credits attempted-english
HS gpa-social science (Base: 0 to <1.7)









Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
   4 -16.83 (8.13)     -7.02 (3.87)     -27.70 (7.82)     -26.23 (3.67)     -44.53 (7.86)     -33.25 (4.13)     
   3.7 to less than 4 -20.09 (6.04)     -19.01 (3.01)     -19.88 (5.81)     -28.12 (2.86)     -39.96 (5.84)     -47.13 (3.21)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 -14.37 (4.70)     -15.89 (2.56)     -22.03 (4.52)     -28.10 (2.43)     -36.40 (4.54)     -43.99 (2.73)     
   3 to less than 3.3 -11.55 (4.12)     -16.33 (2.40)     -25.21 (3.97)     -25.44 (2.27)     -36.40 (4.54)     -43.99 (2.73)     
   2.7 to less than 3 -8.61 (4.18)     -14.77 (2.42)     -20.56 (4.03)     -24.82 (2.30)     -36.76 (3.98)     -41.77 (2.56)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -2.57 (3.34)     -7.27 (2.09)     -18.97 (3.21)     -22.37 (1.98)     -29.17 (4.04)     -39.59 (2.59)     
   2 to less than 2.3 -0.87 (3.24)     -5.45 (2.13)     -15.98 (3.12)     -14.41 (2.02)     -21.54 (3.22)     -29.63 (2.23)     
   1.7 to less than 2 9.43 (3.45)     3.24 (2.24)     -14.07 (3.32)     -14.85 (2.13)     -16.85 (3.13)     -19.85 (2.28)     
   7 and over -14.52 (3.94)     -9.60 (2.62)     -23.79 (3.79)     -15.52 (2.48)     -0.50 (3.95)     -0.01 (3.40)     
   4 to less than 7 -7.98 (2.20)     -7.43 (1.29)     -11.18 (2.12)     -9.52 (1.22)     -19.15 (2.13)     -16.96 (1.38)     
   4 33.96 (6.40)     28.59 (3.29)     -51.59 (6.16)     -37.52 (3.12)     -4.64 (3.33)     -11.60 (2.39)     
   3.7 to less than 4 21.77 (5.12)     22.97 (2.94)     -39.73 (4.92)     -35.62 (2.79)     -17.63 (6.19)     -8.93 (3.51)     
   3.3 to less than 3.7 21.81 (3.87)     26.21 (2.45)     -42.84 (3.72)     -35.97 (2.32)     -17.96 (4.94)     -12.65 (3.14)     
   3 to less than 3.3 27.73 (3.71)     24.97 (2.39)     -39.29 (3.57)     -34.38 (2.27)     -21.04 (3.74)     -9.76 (2.61)     
   2.7 to less than 3 22.70 (3.78)     26.87 (2.52)     -37.69 (3.63)     -32.80 (2.39)     -11.56 (3.59)     -9.41 (2.55)     
   2.3 to less than 2.7 19.40 (3.45)     21.90 (2.39)     -26.02 (3.32)     -29.65 (2.27)     -14.99 (3.65)     -5.93 (2.69)     
   2 to less than 2.3 16.54 (3.78)     14.83 (2.66)     -22.08 (3.64)     -22.56 (2.53)     -6.62 (3.33)     -7.75 (2.55)     
   1.7 to less than 2 7.77 (4.09)     13.11 (3.19)     -8.26 (3.94)     -13.12 (3.02)     -5.54 (3.66)     -7.73 (2.84)     
   7 and over 40.31 (4.34)     42.12 (2.64)     -29.49 (4.18)     -21.76 (2.50)     10.82 (4.20)     20.36 (2.81)     
   4 to less than 7 16.22 (1.99)     16.64 (1.22)     -12.89 (1.92)     -10.71 (1.16)     3.33 (1.92)     5.93 (1.30)     
Constant -11.51 (28.75)   3.33 (18.11)   84.21 (27.67)   74.81 (17.18)   72.70 (27.79)   78.14 (19.32)   
R-Squared 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.33 0.35 0.31
N 2,016     4,870     2,016     4,870     2,016     4,870     
Racial Minority Non-Minority Non-MinorityRacial Minority Non-Minority Racial Minority
Switching into Non-STEM Leaving STEM & College Total Leaving STEM 
STEM credits attempted from lower-division courses (Base: <4)
Non-STEM gpa first two years lower-division courses (Base 0 to <1.7)
Non-STEM credits attempted from lower-division courses  (Base: <4)
STEM College Factors: 
Non-STEM College Factors: 





Table 1.4.2: Coefficients Linear Probability Model- STEM Attrition in year 2  
 
 




B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Female 1.58 (1.37)      5.17 (1.02)      3.28 (1.23)      3.35 (0.83)      4.86 (1.77)      8.52 (1.23)      
Qualified for Free Lunch in Grade 12-2.21 (1.67)      -3.82 (2.74)      -1.65 (1.50)      -2.56 (2.23)      -3.86 (2.15)      -6.38 (3.31)      
Age in May of HS completion year (Base: 19 years old)
   15 to less than 17 2.43 (8.97)      4.53 (8.28)      -17.35 (8.05)      1.48 (6.74)      -14.92 (11.56)    6.01 (10.00)    
   17 to less than 19 -0.24 (4.27)      1.87 (3.13)      -10.37 (3.83)      3.79 (2.55)      -10.60 (5.50)      5.66 (3.78)      
Age Squared -0.05 (0.05)      0.04 (0.04)      -0.06 (0.04)      0.04 (0.03)      -0.11 (0.06)      0.08 (0.04)      
   690 and over -2.35 (3.18)      -3.19 (1.75)      -0.57 (2.85)      -0.21 (1.42)      -2.91 (4.09)      -3.40 (2.11)      
   540 to less than 690 0.85 (1.61)      -1.80 (1.31)      -0.01 (1.44)      0.78 (1.07)      0.84 (2.07)      -1.02 (1.58)      
   7 and over -8.84 (4.98)      -3.57 (3.09)      7.69 (4.47)      1.89 (2.52)      -1.16 (6.42)      -1.68 (3.74)      
   4 to less than 7 -0.34 (1.76)      -0.85 (1.32)      1.74 (1.58)      -0.01 (1.07)      1.40 (2.27)      -0.86 (1.59)      
   7 and over 2.28 (3.97)      1.83 (2.38)      -0.89 (3.56)      -2.29 (1.93)      1.40 (5.11)      -0.46 (2.87)      
   4 to less than 7 0.38 (1.59)      2.08 (1.26)      -0.52 (1.43)      0.17 (1.02)      -0.15 (2.05)      2.24 (1.52)      
   4 3.42 (4.83)      0.75 (3.53)      -0.77 (4.33)      3.47 (2.87)      2.66 (6.22)      4.21 (4.27)      
   3.7 to less than 4 1.23 (4.42)      -0.01 (3.50)      -3.85 (3.96)      5.82 (2.84)      -2.62 (5.69)      5.81 (4.22)      
   3.3 to less than 3.7 1.02 (3.72)      3.85 (3.22)      -2.44 (3.34)      6.16 (2.62)      -1.41 (4.80)      10.01 (3.89)      
   3 to less than 3.3 1.63 (3.43)      4.75 (3.15)      -1.63 (3.08)      6.29 (2.56)      -1.98 (4.42)      11.04 (3.80)      
   2.7 to less than 3 1.36 (3.56)      4.66 (3.26)      -3.34 (3.19)      3.32 (2.65)      -2.11 (4.58)      7.98 (3.94)      
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.55 (3.28)      1.29 (3.13)      -2.66 (2.94)      3.97 (2.54)      -3.73 (4.22)      5.26 (3.78)      
   2 to less than 2.3 -0.97 (3.39)      1.58 (3.28)      -2.77 (3.04)      4.88 (2.66)      0.33 (4.37)      6.46 (3.96)      
   1.7 to less than 2 0.66 (4.23)      -1.49 (4.23)      -0.34 (3.79)      -1.20 (3.44)      0.00 (5.45)      -2.69 (5.11)      
   4 2.08 (6.08)      -0.24 (5.67)      2.43 (5.45)      -7.39 (4.61)      4.51 (7.84)      -7.63 (6.85)      
   3.7 to less than 4 6.06 (6.14)      -1.04 (5.63)      1.82 (5.51)      -6.30 (4.58)      7.88 (7.91)      -7.34 (6.80)      
   3.3 to less than 3.7 1.27 (5.52)      -1.10 (5.49)      3.21 (4.95)      -6.11 (4.46)      4.47 (7.11)      -7.21 (6.63)      
   3 to less than 3.3 -0.07 (5.37)      -2.22 (5.42)      2.90 (4.81)      -4.68 (4.41)      2.12 (6.92)      -6.90 (6.55)      
   2.7 to less than 3 -3.39 (5.56)      0.07 (5.49)      5.51 (4.98)      -7.49 (4.47)      3.59 (7.16)      -7.41 (6.63)      
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -2.58 (5.30)      0.52 (5.38)      6.17 (4.75)      -6.81 (4.38)      3.37 (6.83)      -6.30 (6.50)      
   2 to less than 2.3 -1.58 (5.46)      -1.19 (5.72)      4.96 (4.89)      -3.48 (4.65)      3.78 (7.03)      -4.67 (6.91)      
   1.7 to less than 2 -9.07 (7.24)      -4.02 (7.07)      12.84 (6.49)      2.54 (5.75)      0.00 (9.32)      -1.48 (8.54)      
   690 and over 13.89 (4.32)      3.40 (1.85)      0.37 (3.88)      -6.61 (1.51)      14.26 (5.57)      -3.21 (2.24)      
   540 to less than 690 3.98 (1.51)      2.75 (1.12)      1.73 (1.35)      -2.79 (0.91)      5.70 (1.94)      -0.04 (1.35)      
   7 and over -1.29 (6.26)      -0.69 (3.21)      -2.87 (5.61)      0.23 (2.61)      -4.16 (8.07)      -0.45 (3.88)      
   4 to less than 7 0.24 (1.51)      1.85 (1.03)      1.09 (1.35)      -0.89 (0.84)      1.33 (1.94)      0.95 (1.25)      
   7 and over 14.06 (5.86)      1.78 (3.57)      -11.91 (5.25)      1.74 (2.90)      2.15 (7.55)      3.52 (4.31)      
   4 to less than 7 0.85 (2.08)      -0.71 (1.52)      -4.43 (1.87)      0.49 (1.24)      -3.59 (2.68)      -0.21 (1.84)      
   4 -10.80 (8.10)      -2.85 (6.42)      -3.59 (7.26)      12.57 (5.22)      -14.39 (10.43)    9.72 (7.75)      
   3.7 to less than 4 -15.33 (7.87)      -2.74 (6.37)      -2.59 (7.05)      10.38 (5.18)      -17.92 (10.14)    7.65 (7.69)      
   3.3 to less than 3.7 -12.58 (7.61)      -4.28 (6.27)      -2.41 (6.82)      13.26 (5.10)      -14.98 (9.80)      8.98 (7.57)      
   3 to less than 3.3 -12.12 (7.55)      -6.68 (6.25)      -1.63 (6.77)      13.23 (5.08)      -13.74 (9.73)      6.56 (7.54)      
   2.7 to less than 3 -13.03 (7.63)      -6.10 (6.35)      0.04 (6.84)      11.20 (5.16)      -12.99 (9.83)      5.11 (7.67)      
   2.3 to less than 2.7 -11.62 (7.52)      -4.99 (6.28)      -3.07 (6.74)      9.78 (5.11)      -14.69 (9.68)      4.79 (7.58)      
   2 to less than 2.3 -15.56 (7.71)      -3.68 (6.40)      -6.23 (6.92)      15.23 (5.21)      -21.79 (9.94)      11.55 (7.73)      
   1.7 to less than 2 -12.54 (9.91)      -3.81 (9.15)      -21.95 (8.88)      25.84 (7.44)      -34.49 (12.76)    22.04 (11.05)    
   4 11.19 (6.94)      -1.31 (6.31)      -2.61 (6.22)      -7.44 (5.13)      8.58 (8.94)      -8.75 (7.62)      
   3.7 to less than 4 12.90 (6.61)      0.62 (6.24)      2.04 (5.92)      -7.72 (5.07)      14.93 (8.51)      -7.10 (7.53)      
   3.3 to less than 3.7 10.01 (6.22)      1.38 (6.11)      -0.32 (5.58)      -9.12 (4.97)      9.69 (8.02)      -7.75 (7.38)      
   3 to less than 3.3 7.41 (6.10)      0.85 (6.05)      -0.02 (5.47)      -8.83 (4.92)      7.38 (7.86)      -7.99 (7.31)      
   2.7 to less than 3 8.14 (6.14)      1.95 (6.13)      -0.44 (5.50)      -6.77 (4.98)      7.70 (7.90)      -4.83 (7.40)      
   2.3 to less than 2.7 6.78 (6.06)      -1.63 (6.05)      -4.16 (5.43)      -7.31 (4.92)      2.62 (7.80)      -8.93 (7.30)      
   2 to less than 2.3 10.05 (6.07)      -5.13 (6.17)      -4.54 (5.44)      -7.86 (5.02)      5.51 (7.81)      -12.99 (7.45)      
   1.7 to less than 2 17.31 (8.20)      4.18 (7.24)      -4.61 (7.35)      -6.91 (5.89)      12.70 (10.56)    -2.73 (8.75)      
Switching into Non-STEM Leaving STEM & College Total Leaving STEM 
Demographics:
Racial Minority Non-Minority Racial Minority Non-Minority Racial Minority Non-Minority
STEM HS Factors:
Non-STEM HS Factors:
Highest SAT Math Score (Base: <540)
HS credits attempted-math (Base: <4)
HS credits attempted-science (Base: <4)
HS gpa-math (Base: 0 to < 1.7)
HS gpa-science (Base: 0 to < 1.7)
Highest SAT Reading Score (Base: < 540)
HS credits attempted-social science (Base: <4)
HS credits attempted-english
HS gpa-social science (Base: 0 to <1.7)





Table 1.4.2: Coefficients Linear Probability Model- STEM Attrition in year 2 (continued) 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
  
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
   4 -17.02 (5.74)      -7.47 (3.05)      -8.62 (5.14)      -12.16 (2.48)      -25.65 (7.39)      -19.63 (3.69)      
   3.7 to less than 4 -9.84 (4.26)      -8.03 (2.38)      -1.63 (3.82)      -9.37 (1.93)      -11.47 (5.49)      -17.40 (2.87)      
   3.3 to less than 3.7 -10.06 (3.32)      -8.34 (2.02)      -5.56 (2.97)      -9.55 (1.65)      -15.62 (4.27)      -17.89 (2.44)      
   3 to less than 3.3 -6.17 (2.91)      -7.09 (1.89)      -3.99 (2.61)      -9.27 (1.54)      -10.16 (3.75)      -16.37 (2.29)      
   2.7 to less than 3 -4.02 (2.95)      -7.80 (1.91)      -6.35 (2.65)      -7.54 (1.56)      -10.37 (3.80)      -15.33 (2.31)      
   2.3 to less than 2.7 0.62 (2.36)      -4.33 (1.65)      -3.58 (2.11)      -8.00 (1.34)      -2.96 (3.03)      -12.33 (2.00)      
   2 to less than 2.3 -1.99 (2.29)      -2.47 (1.69)      -3.16 (2.05)      -7.15 (1.37)      -5.16 (2.95)      -9.63 (2.04)      
   1.7 to less than 2 -0.85 (2.43)      0.14 (1.77)      -6.57 (2.18)      -8.08 (1.44)      -7.42 (3.13)      -7.93 (2.14)      
   7 and over -9.88 (2.78)      -8.45 (2.07)      -14.50 (2.49)      -18.39 (1.68)      -24.38 (3.58)      -26.84 (2.49)      
   4 to less than 7 -8.12 (1.55)      -8.58 (1.02)      -10.94 (1.39)      -15.48 (0.83)      -19.06 (2.00)      -24.06 (1.23)      
   4 10.25 (4.52)      9.99 (2.60)      -30.53 (4.05)      -22.38 (2.11)      -20.29 (5.82)      -12.38 (3.14)      
   3.7 to less than 4 6.76 (3.61)      11.00 (2.32)      -24.13 (3.24)      -21.58 (1.89)      -17.37 (4.65)      -10.59 (2.80)      
   3.3 to less than 3.7 7.88 (2.73)      8.92 (1.93)      -21.20 (2.45)      -22.16 (1.57)      -13.33 (3.52)      -13.24 (2.33)      
   3 to less than 3.3 6.46 (2.62)      7.14 (1.89)      -21.91 (2.35)      -22.56 (1.54)      -15.45 (3.37)      -15.43 (2.28)      
   2.7 to less than 3 4.85 (2.67)      6.97 (1.99)      -20.93 (2.39)      -22.28 (1.62)      -16.08 (3.43)      -15.31 (2.41)      
   2.3 to less than 2.7 8.10 (2.44)      5.30 (1.89)      -21.77 (2.18)      -22.59 (1.54)      -13.67 (3.14)      -17.29 (2.28)      
   2 to less than 2.3 2.85 (2.67)      5.02 (2.10)      -16.96 (2.39)      -19.94 (1.71)      -14.11 (3.44)      -14.92 (2.54)      
   1.7 to less than 2 3.91 (2.89)      6.41 (2.52)      -19.16 (2.59)      -21.18 (2.05)      -15.25 (3.72)      -14.76 (3.04)      
   7 and over 27.09 (3.07)      28.06 (2.08)      -21.26 (2.75)      -25.19 (1.69)      5.83 (3.95)      2.87 (2.51)      
   4 to less than 7 7.33 (1.40)      9.63 (0.96)      -14.19 (1.26)      -16.43 (0.78)      -6.86 (1.81)      -6.80 (1.16)      
Constant 21.61 (20.30)    -8.29 (14.30)    75.48 (18.19)    34.22 (11.63)    97.08 (26.14)    25.93 (17.27)    
R-Squared 0.11 0.11 0.28 0.33 0.17 0.21
N 2,016    4,870    2,016    4,870    2,016    4,870    
Non-Minority Racial Minority Non-Minority Racial Minority Non-Minority
Non-STEM gpa first two years lower-division courses (Base 0 to <1.7)
Non-STEM credits attempted from lower-division courses  (Base: <4)
Switching into Non-STEM Leaving STEM & College Total Leaving STEM 
Racial Minority
STEM College Factors: 
Non-STEM College Factors: 
STEM gpa first two years lower-division courses (Base: 0 to <1.7)





Table 1.5.1: Detailed Decomposition Results -Percentage of Female/Male Differences for 
STEM Attrition towards Graduation 
 








       
Total Differential  10.178 (1.119)*** -4.747 (1.158)*** 5.432 (1.246)*** 
       
Composition Effects:       
Total Explained  3.179 (0.886)*** -4.706 (0.965)*** -1.527 (1.021) 
Demographics 0.278 (0.238) -0.031 (0.214) 0.247 (0.230) 
STEM HS Factors 1.624 (0.577)*** -0.224 (0.519) 1.400 (0.570)** 
Non-STEM HS Factors -0.145 (0.560) 0.079 (0.488) -0.066 (0.537) 
STEM College Factors -1.331 (0.360)*** -2.042 (0.424)*** -3.373 (0.694)*** 
Non-STEM College Factors 2.752 (0.558)*** -2.487 (0.461)*** 0.265 (0.317) 
Specification Error 1.09  -1.43  -0.34  
       
Unexplained Component:       
Total Unexplained 6.33 (1.009)*** 1.14 (0.982) 7.47 (1.039)*** 
Demographics -0.60 (5.963) -0.07 (5.779) -0.67 (6.123) 
STEM HS Factors -10.05 (10.419) 17.97 (10.118)* 7.92 (10.738) 
Non-STEM HS Factors -2.51 (11.906) -1.83 (11.565) -4.34 (12.277) 
STEM College Factors -0.05 (1.985) -1.42 (1.928) -1.47 (2.046) 
Non-STEM College Factors 2.50 (2.794) 11.55 (2.715)*** 14.05 (2.882)*** 
Constant  17.03 (10.636) -25.06 (10.320)** -8.03 (10.946) 
Reweighting Error -0.42  0.26  -0.17  
N 6,886   6,886   6,886   
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis. Reweighted decomposition 












Table 1.5.2: Detailed Decomposition Results -Percentage of Female/Male Differences for 
STEM Attrition in year 2 
 








       
Total Differential  4.072 (0.834)*** 0.119 (0.764) 4.191 (1.057)*** 
       
Composition Effects:       
Total Explained  0.268 (0.628) -3.623 (0.651)*** -3.355 (0.833)*** 
Demographics -0.428 (0.190)** -0.409 (0.150)*** -0.837 (0.243)*** 
STEM HS Factors 0.526 (0.437) -0.147 (0.345) 0.379 (0.517) 
Non-STEM HS Factors -0.005 (0.440) -0.054 (0.335) -0.059 (0.512) 
STEM College Factors -1.088 (0.252)*** -1.579 (0.304)*** -2.668 (0.503)*** 
Non-STEM College 
Characteristics 1.263 (0.327)*** -1.433 (0.371)*** -0.170 (0.299) 
Specification Error 0.34  -0.42  -0.08  
       
Unexplained Component:       
Total Unexplained 3.89 (0.791)*** 4.02 (0.698)*** 7.91 (0.988)*** 
Demographics -7.05 (4.705) -3.91 (4.102) -10.95 (5.838)* 
STEM HS Factors -9.06 (8.200) 5.00 (7.154) -4.07 (10.188) 
Non-STEM HS Factors 4.12 (9.367) -23.32 (8.174)*** -19.21 (11.640)* 
STEM College Factors -0.94 (1.562) -2.15 (1.363) -3.09 (1.940) 
Non-STEM College Factors 4.72 (2.199)** 3.74 (1.919)* 8.45 (2.732)*** 
Constant  12.11 (8.379) 24.66 (7.308)*** 36.77 (10.405)*** 
Reweighting Error -0.42  0.14  -0.28  
N 6,886   6,886   6,886   
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis. Reweighted decomposition 








Table 1.6.1: Detailed Decomposition Results -Percentage of Racial-Minorities/Non-
Minorities Differences for STEM Attrition towards Graduation 
 








       
Total Differential  1.822 (1.164) 10.783 (1.277)*** 13.658 (1.293)*** 
       
Composition Effects:       
Total Explained  -0.544 (1.103) 9.841 (1.301)*** 9.297 (1.283)*** 
Demographics 0.442 (0.461) 0.268 (0.429) 0.711 (0.438) 
STEM HS Factors 0.700 (1.111) 2.072 (1.076)* 2.771 (1.077)** 
Non-STEM HS Factors -2.819 (0.984)*** 1.460 (0.940) -1.359 (0.952) 
STEM College Factors 0.071 (0.538) 6.565 (0.829)*** 6.636 (0.766)*** 
Non-STEM College Factors 1.062 (0.411)*** -0.524 (0.353) 0.538 (0.414) 
Specification Error -0.12  -0.12  0.81  
       
Unexplained Component:       
Total Unexplained 2.792 (1.066)*** 0.550 (0.962) 3.342 (1.080)*** 
Demographics 6.464 (7.214) -7.837 (6.486) -1.373 (7.280) 
STEM HS Factors -0.455 (11.324) -6.049 (10.289) -6.504 (11.553) 
Non-STEM HS Factors 7.507 (12.139) 11.398 (11.040) 18.906 (12.398) 
STEM College Factors 2.103 (3.239) -1.4 (2.924) 0.703 (3.282) 
Non-STEM College Factors -0.105 (1.772) -0.754 (1.598) -0.858 (1.794) 
Constant  -12.723 (11.335) 5.192 (10.216) -7.531 (11.467) 
Reweighting Error -0.305  0.516  0.211  
N 6,886   6,886   6,886   
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis. Reweighted decomposition 







Table 1.6.2: Detailed Decomposition Results -Percentage of Racial-Minorities/Non-
Minorities Differences for STEM Attrition in year 2 
 








       
Total Differential  -2.150 (0.820)*** -0.536 (0.800) -2.686 (1.079)** 
       
Composition Effects:       
Total Explained  -2.760 (0.742)*** 1.655 (0.767)** -1.105 (1.002) 
Demographics -0.207 (0.314) 0.131 (0.287) -0.075 (0.411) 
STEM HS Factors -1.002 (0.785) 0.366 (0.701) -0.636 (1.005) 
Non-STEM HS Factors -2.860 (0.702)*** -0.444 (0.624) -3.304 (0.901)*** 
STEM College Factors 0.685 (0.336)** 2.108 (0.407)*** 2.793 (0.502)*** 
Non-STEM College Factors 0.624 (0.276)** -0.506 (0.308)* 0.118 (0.377) 
Specification Error 0.77  0.60  1.36  
       
Unexplained Component:       
Total Unexplained -0.102 (0.819) -3.116 (0.625)*** -3.217 (0.995)*** 
Demographics -2.164 (5.532) -15.173 (4.182)*** -17.337 (6.693)*** 
STEM HS Factors -5.536 (8.733) 7.451 (6.703) 1.915 (10.562) 
Non-STEM HS Factors 9.215 (9.367) -6.11 (7.201) 3.105 (11.328) 
STEM College Factors 3.005 (2.488) -0.192 (1.892) 2.812 (3.010) 
Non-STEM College Factors 0.334 (1.361) 6.673 (1.035)*** 7.007 (1.648)*** 
Constant  -4.955 (8.704) 4.236 (6.603) -0.719 (10.528) 
Reweighting Error -0.055  0.327  0.272  
N 6,886   6,886   6,886   
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis. Reweighted decomposition 























Table A1. List of STEM fields and associated 2000 CIP codes 
 
CIP code CIP title  
11.0101 Computer and Information Sciences, General.  
11.0102 Artificial Intelligence and Robotics.  
11.0103 Information Technology.  
11.0201 Computer Programming/Programmer, General.  
11.0202 Computer Programming, Specific Applications.  
                  
11.0203 Computer Programming, Vendor/Product Certification.  
11.0301 Data Processing and Data Processing Technology/Technician.  
11.0401 Information Science/Studies.  
11.0501 Computer Systems Analysis/Analyst.  
11.0701 Computer Science.  
11.0801 Web Page, Digital/Multimedia and Information Resources Design.  
11.0802 Data Modeling/Warehousing and Database Administration.  
11.0803 Computer Graphics.  
11.0901 Computer Systems Networking and Telecommunications.  
11.1001 System Administration/Administrator.  
11.1002 System, Networking, and LAN/WAN Management/Manager.  
11.1003 Computer and Information Systems Security.  
11.1004 Web/Multimedia Management and Webmaster.  
14.0101 Engineering, General.  
14.0201 Aerospace, Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering.  
14.0301 Agricultural/Biological Engineering and Bioengineering.  
14.0401 Architectural Engineering.  
14.0501 Biomedical/Medical Engineering.  
14.0601 Ceramic Sciences and Engineering.  
14.0701 Chemical Engineering  
14.0801 Civil Engineering, General.  
14.0802 Geotechnical Engineering.  
14.0803 Structural Engineering.  
14.0804 Transportation and Highway Engineering.  
14.0805 Water Resources Engineering.  
14.0901 Computer Engineering, General.  
14.0902 Computer Hardware Engineering.  
14.0903 Computer Software Engineering.  
14.1001 Electrical, Electronics and Communications Engineering.  
14.1101 Engineering Mechanics.  
14.1201 Engineering Physics.  





CIP code CIP title  
14.1401 Environmental/Environmental Health Engineering.  
14.1801 Materials Engineering.  
14.1901 Mechanical Engineering.  
14.2001 Metallurgical Engineering.  
14.2101 Mining and Mineral Engineering.  
14.2201 Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering.  
14.2301 Nuclear Engineering.  
14.2401 Ocean Engineering.  
14.2501 Petroleum Engineering.  
14.2701 Systems Engineering.  
14.2801 Textile Sciences and Engineering.  
14.3101 Materials Science.  
14.3201 Polymer/Plastics Engineering.  
14.3301 Construction Engineering.  
14.3401 Forest Engineering.  
14.3501 Industrial Engineering.  
14.3601 Manufacturing Engineering.  
14.3701 Operations Research.  
14.3801 Surveying Engineering.  
14.3901 Geological/Geophysical Engineering.  
15 Engineering Technology, General.  
15.0101 Architectural Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0201 Civil Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0303 Electrical, Electronic and Communications Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0304 Laser and Optical Technology/Technician.  
15.0305 Telecommunications Technology/Technician.  
15.0401 Biomedical Technology/Technician.  
15.0403 Electromechanical Technology/Electromechanical Engineering Technology.  
15.0404 Instrumentation Technology/Technician.  
15.0405 Robotics Technology/Technician.  
15.0501 
Heating, Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Technology/Technician 
(ACH/ACR/ACHR/HRAC/HVAC/AC Technology).  
15.0503 Energy Management and Systems Technology/Technician.  
15.0505 Solar Energy Technology/Technician.  
15.0506 
Water Quality and Wastewater Treatment Management and Recycling 
Technology/Technician.  
15.0507 Environmental Engineering Technology/Environmental Technology.  
15.0508 Hazardous Materials Management and Waste Technology/Technician.  
15.0607 Plastics Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0611 Metallurgical Technology/Technician.  
15.0612 Industrial Technology/Technician.  





CIP code CIP title  
15.0701 Occupational Safety and Health Technology/Technician.  
15.0702 Quality Control Technology/Technician.  
15.0703 Industrial Safety Technology/Technician.  
15.0704 Hazardous Materials Information Systems Technology/Technician.  
15.0801 Aeronautical/Aerospace Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0803 Automotive Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0805 Mechanical Engineering/Mechanical Technology/Technician.  
15.0901 Mining Technology/Technician.  
15.0903 Petroleum Technology/Technician.  
15.1001 Construction Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.1102 Surveying Technology/Surveying.  
15.1103 Hydraulics and Fluid Power Technology/Technician.  
15.1201 Computer Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.1202 Computer Technology/Computer Systems Technology.  
15.1203 Computer Hardware Technology/Technician.  
15.1204 Computer Software Technology/Technician.  
15.1301 Drafting and Design Technology/Technician, General.  
15.1302 CAD/CADD Drafting and/or Design Technology/Technician.  
15.1303 Architectural Drafting and Architectural CAD/CADD.  
15.1304 Civil Drafting and Civil Engineering CAD/CADD.  
15.1305 Electrical/Electronics Drafting and Electrical/Electronics CAD/CADD.  
15.1306 Mechanical Drafting and Mechanical Drafting CAD/CADD.  
15.1401 Nuclear Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.1501 Engineering/Industrial Management.  
26.0101 Biology/Biological Sciences, General.  
26.0102 Biomedical Sciences, General.  
26.0202 Biochemistry.  
26.0203 Biophysics.  
26.0204 Molecular Biology.  
26.0205 Molecular Biochemistry.  
26.0206 Molecular Biophysics.  
26.0207 Structural Biology.  
26.0208 Photobiology.  
26.0209 Radiation Biology/Radiobiology.  
26.021 Biochemistry/Biophysics and Molecular Biology.  
26.0301 Botany/Plant Biology.  
26.0305 Plant Pathology/Phytopathology.  
26.0307 Plant Physiology.  
26.0308 Plant Molecular Biology.  
26.0401 Cell/Cellular Biology and Histology.  
26.0403 Anatomy.  





CIP code CIP title  
26.0405 Neuroanatomy.  
26.0406 Cell/Cellular and Molecular Biology.  
26.0407 Cell Biology and Anatomy.  
26.0502 Microbiology, General.  
26.0503 Medical Microbiology and Bacteriology.  
26.0504 Virology.  
26.0505 Parasitology.  
26.0506 Mycology.  
26.0507 Immunology.  
26.0701 Zoology/Animal Biology.  
26.0702 Entomology.  
26.0707 Animal Physiology.  
26.0708 Animal Behavior and Ethology.  
26.0709 Wildlife Biology.  
26.0801 Genetics, General.  
26.0802 Molecular Genetics.  
26.0803 Microbial and Eukaryotic Genetics.  
26.0804 Animal Genetics.  
26.0805 Plant Genetics.  
26.0806 Human/Medical Genetics.  
26.0901 Physiology, General.  
26.0902 Molecular Physiology.  
26.0903 Cell Physiology.  
26.0904 Endocrinology.  
26.0905 Reproductive Biology.  
26.0906 Neurobiology and Neurophysiology.  
26.0907 Cardiovascular Science.  
26.0908 Exercise Physiology.  
26.0909 Vision Science/Physiological Optics.  
26.091 Pathology/Experimental Pathology.  
26.0911 Oncology and Cancer Biology.  
26.1001 Pharmacology.  
26.1002 Molecular Pharmacology.  
26.1003 Neuropharmacology.  
26.1004 Toxicology.  
26.1005 Molecular Toxicology.  
26.1006 Environmental Toxicology.  
26.1007 Pharmacology and Toxicology.  
26.1101 Biometry/Biometrics.  
26.1102 Biostatistics.  
26.1103 Bioinformatics.  





CIP code CIP title  
26.1301 Ecology.  
26.1302 Marine Biology and Biological Oceanography.  
26.1303 Evolutionary Biology.  
26.1304 Aquatic Biology/Limnology.  
26.1305 Environmental Biology.  
26.1306 Population Biology.  
26.1307 Conservation Biology.  
26.1308 Systematic Biology/Biological Systematics.  
26.1309 Epidemiology.  
27.0101 Mathematics, General.  
27.0102 Algebra and Number Theory.  
27.0103 Analysis and Functional Analysis.  
27.0104 Geometry/Geometric Analysis.  
27.0105 Topology and Foundations.  
27.0301 Applied Mathematics.  
27.0303 Computational Mathematics.  
27.0501 Statistics, General.  
27.0502 Mathematical Statistics and Probability.  
52.1304 Actuarial Science.  
40.0101 Physical Sciences.  
40.0201 Astronomy.  
40.0202 Astrophysics.  
40.0203 Planetary Astronomy and Science.  
40.0401 Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology, General.  
40.0402 Atmospheric Chemistry and Climatology.  
40.0403 Atmospheric Physics and Dynamics.  
40.0404 Meteorology.  
40.0501 Chemistry, General.  
40.0502 Analytical Chemistry.  
40.0503 Inorganic Chemistry.  
40.0504 Organic Chemistry.  
40.0506 Physical and Theoretical Chemistry.  
40.0507 Polymer Chemistry.  
40.0508 Chemical Physics.  
40.0601 Geology/Earth Science, General.  
40.0602 Geochemistry.  
40.0603 Geophysics and Seismology.  
40.0604 Paleontology.  
40.0605 Hydrology and Water Resources Science.  
40.0606 Geochemistry and Petrology.  
40.0607 Oceanography, Chemical and Physical.  





CIP code CIP title  
40.0802 Atomic/Molecular Physics.  
40.0804 Elementary Particle Physics.  
40.0805 Plasma and High-Temperature Physics.  
40.0806 Nuclear Physics.  
40.0807 Optics/Optical Sciences.  
40.0808 Solid State and Low-Temperature Physics.  
40.0809 Acoustics.  
40.081 Theoretical and Mathematical Physics.  
29.0101 Military Technologies.  
41.0101 Biology Technician/Biotechnology Laboratory Technician.  
41.0204 Industrial Radiologic Technology/Technician.  
41.0205 Nuclear/Nuclear Power Technology/Technician.  
41.0301 Chemical Technology/Technician.  
51.1401 Medical Scientist (MS, PhD)  
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, STEM Designated 
Degree Programs, retrieved April 30, 2010, from http://www.ice.gov/sevis/stemlist.htm. 
NOTE: The Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) codes corresponding to science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields were selected based on a U.S. Immigration and Customs 







Table A2. List of STEM courses  
 
  STEM 
1 Aeronautical Science 
2 Biochemistry 
3 Biological Science 
4 Biomedical Engineering 
5 Chemical/Nuclear Engineering 
6 Chemistry 
7 Civil/Environmental Engineering 
8 Computer Math/Materials Engineering 
9 Computer Science and Computing Technologies 
10 Digital Media 
11 Electrical Engineering 
12 Electrical-Electronic Technology 
13 Engineering Technologies 
14 Engineering: General/Support 
15 Environmental Studies 
16 Geology 
17 Industrial Engineering 
18 Interdisciplinary Science/Natural Science 
19 Mathematics 
20 Mathematics Education 
21 Mechanical Engineering 
22 Meteorology 
23 Oceanography/Ocean Engineering 
24 Office Systems Technology 
25 Physics 
26 Science Education 
27 Statistics   







Table A3: Detailed Decomposition Results -Percentage of Female/Male Differences for 
STEM Attrition towards Graduation 
 








       
Total Differential  10.178 (1.117)*** -4.747 (1.158)*** 5.432 (1.245)*** 
       
Composition Effects:       
Total Explained  2.662 (0.753)*** -1.412 (0.820)* 1.249 (0.879) 
Demographics 0.138 (0.258) -0.272 (0.234) -0.134 (0.252) 
STEM HS Factors 1.959 (0.630)*** 0.582 (0.641) 2.541 (0.747)*** 
Non-STEM HS Factors 0.565 (0.585) -1.722 (0.562)*** -1.157 (0.583)** 
Specification Error 14.02  -2.31  11.72  
       
Unexplained 
Component:       
Total Unexplained -6.203 (1.077)*** -1.181 (1.116) -7.384 (1.163)*** 
Demographics 0.29 (6.344) -4.64 (6.543) -4.35 (6.840) 
STEM HS Factors -9.33 (11.080) 16.53 (11.468) 7.21 (12.001) 
Non-STEM HS Factors -3.31 (12.716) 5.18 (13.168) 1.87 (13.782) 
Constant  -18.547 (10.955)* 15.891 (11.328) -2.655 (11.851) 
Reweighting Error -0.30  0.16  -0.15  
N 6,886   6,886   6,886   
 
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis. Reweighted decomposition 





Table A4: Detailed Decomposition Results -Percentage of Female/Male Differences for 
STEM Attrition in year 2 
 




Leaving STEM & 
College 
Total Leaving STEM  
       
Total Differential  4.072 (0.832)*** 0.119 (0.763) 4.191 (1.055)*** 
       
Composition Effects:       
Total Explained  0.523 (0.560) -1.363 (0.517)*** -0.840 (0.712) 
Demographics -0.547 (0.202)*** -0.663 (0.179)*** -1.210 (0.278)*** 
STEM HS Factors 0.814 (0.461)* 0.176 (0.413) 0.990 (0.590)* 
Non-STEM HS Factors 0.256 (0.443) -0.875 (0.389)** -0.620 (0.536) 
Specification Error 7.54  5.18  12.71  
       
Unexplained 
Component:       
Total Unexplained -3.736 (0.820)*** -3.940 (0.818)*** -7.676 (1.067)*** 
Demographics -8.03 (4.851)* -5.90 (4.813) -13.93 (6.280)** 
STEM HS Factors -8.98 (8.454) 6.03 (8.390) -2.95 (10.962) 
Non-STEM HS Factors 3.91 (9.700) -23.94 (9.627)** -20.04 (12.579) 
Constant  -16.839 (8.364)** -27.758 (8.300)*** -44.597 (10.839)*** 
Reweighting Error -0.25  0.25  -0.01  
N 6,886   6,886   6,886   
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis. Reweighted decomposition 








Table A5:  Detailed Decomposition Results -Percentage of Racial-Minorities/Non-
Minorities Differences for STEM Attrition towards Graduation 
 








       
Total Differential  1.822 (1.161) 10.957 (1.277)*** 12.780 (1.292)*** 
       
Composition Effects:       
Total Explained  0.852 (1.035) 10.360 (1.201)*** 11.212 (1.178)*** 
Demographics 0.393 (0.491) -0.290 (0.507) 0.102 (0.490) 
STEM HS Factors 3.235 (1.114)*** 7.344 (1.232)*** 10.579 (1.242)*** 
Non-STEM HS Factors -2.776 (1.035)*** 3.306 (1.100)*** 0.531 (1.076) 
Specification Error 3.45  1.50  4.96  
       
Unexplained Component:       
Total Unexplained -2.397 (1.143)** -1.065 (1.123) -3.462 (1.233)*** 
Demographics 11.49 (7.762) -10.51 (7.607) 0.98 (8.346) 
STEM HS Factors 11.41 (12.121) -9.16 (11.927) 2.26 (13.114) 
Non-STEM HS Factors 12.87 (12.964) 13.49 (12.763) 26.36 (14.038)* 
Constant  33.370 (11.823)*** -7.239 (11.597) 26.131 (12.728)** 
Reweighting Error -0.09  0.16  0.07  
N 6,886   6,886   6,886   
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis. Reweighted decomposition 








Table A6:  Detailed Decomposition Results -Percentage of Racial-Minorities/Non-
Minorities Differences for STEM Attrition in year 2 
 








       
Total Differential  -2.150 (0.818)*** -0.536 (0.800) -2.686 (1.077)** 
       
Composition Effects:       
Total Explained  -1.949 (0.703)*** 2.042 (0.704)*** 0.093 (0.936) 
Demographics -0.279 (0.325) -0.212 (0.323) -0.491 (0.436) 
STEM HS Factors 0.966 (0.758) 2.284 (0.756)*** 3.250 (1.015)*** 
Non-STEM HS Factors -2.635 (0.717)*** -0.031 (0.698) -2.666 (0.947)*** 
Specification Error -0.42  -5.47  -5.89  
       
Unexplained Component:       
Total Unexplained 0.173 (0.855) 2.826 (0.718)*** 2.999 (1.057)*** 
Demographics 1.56 (5.774) -16.31 (4.820)*** -14.75 (7.122)** 
STEM HS Factors 0.49 (9.066) 4.75 (7.726) 5.24 (11.238) 
Non-STEM HS Factors 12.71 (9.703) -8.22 (8.292) 4.49 (12.037) 
Constant  14.930 (8.805)* -16.954 (7.380)** -2.024 (10.871) 
Reweighting Error 0.05  0.07  0.12  
N 6,886   6,886   6,886   
Note: Dependent variable is set to 100 if the student leave STEM and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis. Reweighted decomposition 









Essay 3: Does Plus/Minus Grading Matter? The Effect of a 
Grading Policy on STEM Attrition 
 
Abstract 
In this study, I examine the effect of changing the grading scale from whole-letter grades to 
plus/minus grades on STEM graduation/major choice. I use administrative data from the Florida 
Department of Education that combines students‘ pre-college characteristics with students‘ 
enrollment and transcript records. I rely on a difference in differences framework that compares 
STEM graduation/major choice rates during the early 2000s versus the late 1990s for students 
whose grading differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses were reduced versus 
students whose grades were not differentially affected. I find significant effects of changing the 
grading scale on reducing grading differentials and improving STEM graduation/major choice. 
These results represent the first direct, quasi-experimental evidence regarding the effect of 
changing the grading scale. 
 
Introduction  
A college degree is not a homogenous investment across fields of study (Arcidiacono, 2004; 
Zhang & Thomas, 2005). STEM degree holders enjoy higher earnings (Langdon, McKittrick, 
Beede, Khan, & Doms, 2011), and are more likely to be employed. STEM workers earn 26 
percent higher salaries than non-STEM, regardless of whether they work in STEM or non-STEM 
occupations. Those with a bachelor‘s degree only working in a STEM job earned more than $35 
per hour, nearly $8 more per hour on average than those with non-STEM jobs in 2010.
1
 While 
the unemployment rate for STEM workers rose by less than 1 percentage point during the 
recession, the unemployment rate for non-STEM workers rose by almost 5 percentage points. In 
fact, STEM occupations face better job prospects and are projected to grow by 17 percent from 
2008 to 2018, compared to 9.8 percent growth for non-STEM occupations (Beede et al., 2011).  
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It is worth noting that the earnings premium for having a STEM job or a STEM degree is quite similar, at 





Even though STEM degrees yield greater labor market returns, the number of STEM 
graduates and professionals remains low. STEM workers account for just 6 percent of the U.S. 
workforce. According to the 2011 American Community Survey (ACS), there were 7.2 million 
STEM workers aged 25 to 64 (and half of STEM workers worked in computer occupations), and 
nearly 70 percent of them had at least a bachelor‘s degree, while 30 percent of STEM workers 
had less than a bachelor‘s degree. While STEM entrance rates are not significantly different from 
non-STEM fields, STEM attrition rates are stark. Among 2003-2004 beginning bachelor‘s 
degree students, STEM fields attracted proportionally more students (28 percent) than did many 
non-STEM fields.
2
 Yet, among bachelor‘s degree students entering STEM fields between 2003 
and 2009, 48 percent had left these fields by Spring 2009 (Chen, 2013).  
Moreover, there are disparities in STEM education by gender and race. Studies have 
frequently found that women and racial minorities (hereafter called STEM minorities) leave 
STEM fields at higher rates than their counterparts (Anderson & Kim, 2006; Hill et al., 2010; 
Griffith, 2010; Huang, Taddese, & Walter, 2000; Kokkelenberg & Sinha, 2010; Shaw & Barbuti, 
2010). The persistence rate of women in STEM is less than that of men, and proportionally more 
females than males left STEM fields by mostly switching to a non-STEM major (32 percent vs. 
26 percent) (Chen, 2013).
 3
 Similarly, the gap in STEM attrition rates between racial minorities 
and non-minorities is alarming. One-third of White students and 42 percent of Asian-American 
students who started college as intended STEM majors graduated with STEM degrees by the end 
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 Based on the major fields reported by beginning postsecondary students (BPS), the non-STEM fields 
examined in the NCES (2014) study include social/behavioral sciences, humanities, education, and health sciences. 
3
 It is worth noting that proportionally more males than females left STEM fields by dropping out of 





of five years, compared to 22 percent of Latino students, 18 percent of Black students, and 20 
percent of Native American (Hurtado et al., 2010). 
As a result, STEM education has been elevated as a national priority in the U.S. and 
considered to be in high demand in the global economy. A report by the President‘s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology (2012) suggests substantial needs to increase the number of 
STEM majors. In fact, federal government agencies and non-profit organizations have 
undertaken different actions to improve STEM education. The National Science Foundation 
(NSF) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have sponsored a number of initiatives aimed 
at increasing undergraduate students‘ interest in studying STEM, improving STEM bachelor‘s 
degree completion rates generally and improving STEM completion rates among 
underrepresented racial minority students specifically.  
The literature has discussed many possibilities for boosting STEM persistence such as 
preparing high-school students better (Bonous-Hammarth, 2000; Sondgeroth & Stough, 1992; 
Tyson et al., 2007; Riegle-Crumb & King, 2010; Arcidiacono et al, 2015), having college 
instructors of your own gender and race (Hoffmann and Oreopoulos, 2009; Carrell et al., 2010; 
Bettinger and Long, 2005; Price, 2010), and improving the quality of peers (Ost, 2010). All of 
these likely reflect important factors in STEM retention and graduation. However, these 
solutions can also be hard to implement and most of these studies do not find statistically 
significant effects on STEM persistence. 
In addition, there has been some discussion of the importance of grades and the 
distortions in major choice decisions that may be associated with differential grading standards 
and grade inflation. Grades reinforce or alter students‘ initial expectations and preferences, 





Crisp et al., 2009; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2011).  In particular, if students enter college 
with incorrect information regarding their relative strengths, grading provides a potentially 
effective mechanism for informing a student which major they should choose (Stinebrickner & 
Stinebrickner, 2009). Lower grades have been linked to major attrition in general (DeBerard, 
Spielmans, & Julka, 2004; Murtaugh, Burns, & Schuster, 1999; Nora, Cabrera, Hagedorn, & 
Pascarella, 1996; Reason, 2009) and in STEM specifically (Campbell Jr, 1993; Strenta, Elliott, 
Adair, Matier, & Scott, 1994); Ost, 2010; Crisp et al., 2009; K. Rask, 2010).   
Equalizing average grades differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses may 
potentially improve the number and composition of STEM graduates (Sabot & Wakeman-Linn, 
1991; K. Rask, 2010; Arcidiacono et al., forthcoming). Students might be vulnerable to grades 
differentials due to differences in the cost of study and grading standards between STEM and 
non-STEM fields. STEM majors generally require more effort, greater investment of time and 
money
4
 (Stange, 2013) and are associated with higher grading standards than non-STEM majors 
(Arcidiacono, 2011; Barnes, Bull, Campbell, & Perry, 2001; K. Rask, 2010; Johnson, 2003). In 
fact, in most colleges and universities STEM majors have more rigorous grading policies than 
non-STEM disciplines (Arcidiacono, 2011; Barnes, Bull, Campbell, & Perry, 2001; K. Rask, 
2010; Johnson, 2003). These disparities in grading policies translate into an emerging grading 
gap between STEM and non-STEM fields, which could be partially explained by grade inflation 
and its disproportionate effect on non-STEM grades (Ost, 2010).  
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 Differential pricing is associated with a sizable reduction in the fraction of degrees granted in 
engineering, with an elasticity share with respect to price of -0.51 compared to that of business that is less 
responsive (elasticity=-0.30). The author also found that women and minorities have larger proportionate effects 





A discrepancy between grades in STEM and non-STEM courses may discourage students 
from majoring in subjects from low-grading departments or STEM fields,
5
 by pushing them 
away from their STEM intended major when obtaining high grades in non-STEM courses (Ost, 
2010). Moreover, STEM minorities and non-minorities may respond differently to disparities in 
grading policies (K. Rask, 2010; Ost, 2010). Therefore, reducing disparities in grading policies 
might improve STEM graduation as well as the gender and race gap in STEM attrition.  
Concerns over grade inflation and disparities in grading practices are widespread in 
higher education and have led institutions in the United States to adopt various grading policies. 
Institutions have commonly followed one of three types of policies: (i) implementing grade 
targets; (ii) changing the grading scale, and (iii) providing information on the distribution of 
grades in different courses to students, graduate schools, and employers. Even though the main 
objective of these grading policies has been to make grades more informative and to curb grade 
inflation, grading policies are also considered as a possible channel for influencing the number 
and composition of STEM majors (Arcidiacono et al., forthcoming).  
In this study, I evaluate the effect of a change in grading scale on patterns of early college 
grades and STEM graduation/major choice. Specifically, I test three related hypotheses. First, all 
else equal, a more continuous and refined grading scale will lead to reduce grade differentials 
between STEM and non-STEM courses. Second, a reduction in grading disparities will make 
students more attracted to STEM, which in turn will improve STEM graduation/major choice.  
Third, a reduction in grading disparities will lead to an improvement in the gender and race gap 
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 Rojstaczer and Healy (2010) looked at contemporary grades from over 160 colleges and universities in 
the United States with a combined enrollment of over 2,000,000 students and historical grades from over 80 schools. 
They conclude that nationally for all colleges and universities, science departments grade on average roughly 0.4 





in STEM attrition, based on the empirical evidence that suggests that STEM minorities value 
grades more than their counterparts.  
In the early 2000s, two universities in Florida, the University of Central Florida (UCF) 
and University of South Florida (USF), changed their grading scale from whole-letter to 
plus/minus grades. This grading reform aimed to more clearly reflect the academic achievement 
of individual students in their courses.   
Research on changing the grading scale has been mostly descriptive and produced in the 
context of curbing grade inflation. The adoption of a plus/minus grading system may reduce 
grade inflation and enhance the accuracy of the grade as a reflection of a student performance 
(Quann, 1978; Gosselin, 1997; Bressette, 2002). To date these studies have yielded conflicting 
results. While some authors found a reduction in grade inflation using plus/minus grading 
(Shannon, 1979; Farland & Cepeda, 1989; Bressette, 2002), others have reported no effect 
(Baker III & Bates, 1999).  This research, however, also points out that the effect of this grading 
reform could be differentiated across courses and departments (Bressette, 2002 and K. D. Barnes 
& Buring, 2012).  
To my knowledge, there is no study that had thoroughly analyzed the differential effect 
of a change in the grading scale and between STEM and non-STEM departments (low-and high-
grading departments) and particularly for lower-division courses. Furthermore, most grading 
reforms have mainly been evaluated with respect to its expected effect on grade inflation rather 
than on other academic and more policy-relevant outcomes such as major choices, persistence, 
and graduation rates.  
 This study provides the first quasi-experimental estimates of the effect of a change in the 





I applied a difference-in-difference approach, comparing similar students whose grading 
differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses changed over time at institutions with or 
without the change to estimate the effect of this institutional grading policy on STEM outcomes. 
To preview the results, I find that a change in the grading scale from whole-grade grading 
scale to plus/minus grading has a substantial effect on first year grade differentials between 
STEM and non-STEM lower-division courses. Students who attended institutions that changed 
their grading scale experienced a smaller difference between their STEM and non-STEM GPAs 
during the first year of enrollment than similar students attending institutions that did not 
implement any grading reform (approximately a reduction of 0.152 points). This significant 
effect on grade differentials is translated into large impacts on STEM graduation/major choice 
outcomes. For example, after the grading policy change, students attending treated institutions 
were 3 percentage points more likely to graduate in STEM in 6 years or less, or to choose a 
STEM major at the beginning of their second and third year of enrollment. On average before the 
implementation of the new grading scale, about 7 percent of students attending treated 
institutions graduated in STEM, therefore a 3 percentage point increase is substantial. These 
positive effects on STEM outcomes seem to be equally explained by a reduction in the 
probability of majoring in non-STEM and dropping out of college without earning a BA.  
I also find that after this grading policy students attending treated institutions were about 
3 percentage points more likely to graduate in STEM in 6 years or less, which corresponds to an 
increase of about 40 percent. Finally, my analysis demonstrates that this grading policy has 
complex heterogeneous effects in the way students are discouraged from leaving STEM. This 
policy has larger effects for men than women and for racial minorities than non- minorities. 





probability of leaving STEM by switching into non-STEM, whereas for men these effects come 
from a decrease in the probability of dropping out of college. In fact, men were relatively more 
affected at the bottom of their grade distribution which might explain why overall impact 
estimates are higher for men. These results represent the first direct, quasi-experimental evidence 
regarding the effect of a change in the grading scale. 
Section II presents a conceptual framework to explain how a reduction in grading 
differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses may improve the number and composition 
of STEM graduates. Section III examines the existing empirical literature of grading reforms. 
Section IV describes the policy background and the dataset in detail. Section V presents the 
empirical strategy and main results. Section VI presents results of a subgroup analysis. Section 
VII discusses the results and implications for future research.  
Conceptual Framework 
During college, grades in introductory courses serve as one of the few signals students 
receive about their progress in a course and field of study. Grades can serve as a feedback 
mechanism through which students define their comparative advantage or relative performance 
and choose their courses and majors on that basis, particularly if students enter college with 
incorrect information regarding their relative strengths (Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2009). 
Thereby, grades reinforce or alter students‘ initial expectations and preferences, which, in turn, 
influence their major choices (Attewell, Heil, & Reisel, 2011; Crisp et al., 2009; Stinebrickner & 
Stinebrickner, 2011).  
Differences in grading between STEM and non-STEM fields have motivated a scant 
literature exploring the effects of equalizing grades on course and major choices. The starting 





rigorous grading standards than non-STEM majors (Arcidiacono, 2011; Barnes, Bull, Campbell, 
& Perry, 2001; K. Rask, 2010; Johnson, 2003). This suggests that concurrent with a potential 
disconnect between grades and ability due to grade inflation that has disproportionately affected 
non-STEM fields (Ost, 2010), there is an argument to be made that grade differentials between 
STEM and non-STEM courses might be influencing the number and composition of STEM 




STEM minorities, who value higher grades more than non-STEM minorities (Rask & 
Bailey, 2002; Rask & Tiefenthaler,2008), will tend to choose majors that yield good grades 
because they might have lower perceptions of ability and are more vulnerable to lower grades in 
a stereotyped, competitive and male-and-nonminority dominated environment. Experimental and 
psychological studies have documented that equally skilled men and women exhibit differences 
that might affect their career choices, including differences in self-perceptions of ability or self-
confidence (and how they update their beliefs when processing information), competitive 
attitudes, levels of risk aversion and expectations about future performance (Elliot & 
Harackiewicz, 1994; Niederle & Yestrumskas, 2008; Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Ertac, 2011; 
Mobius et al.,2011). On the top of this, some influential economists have modeled how 
stereotype threat and individual‘s social identity differentially affect choices by influencing both 
student effort (and career choice) and performance (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Dee, 2009; 
Humlum et al., 2012). Consequently, differences in grading policies between STEM and non-
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 For a given student relative grades measure relative performance in introductory STEM courses relative 
to the same student in other non-STEM courses. The literature has studied the importance of relative performance of 
college students in introductory courses as a determinant of undergraduate major choice (Sabot & Wakeman-Linn, 
1991; Horvath et al., 1992; Dynan & Rouse, 1997; Robb & Robb, 1999; Chizmar, 2000; Jensen & Owen, 2001; 
K. Rask, 2010; K. N. Rask & Bailey, 2002; Ost, 2010; Seymour & Hewitt, 1997; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 





STEM fields might be deterring students from majoring in STEM not necessarily because they 
are not interested or disproportionally have changed their minds, but because they want to pursue 
something they perceived they can excel at by choosing a major that matches their prescribed 
social category
7
 in a more ―favorable‖ environment. 
These ideas are operationalized in a model that integrates student course choice and effort 
decisions as well as professor decisions regarding grading standards. Arcidiacono et al. 
(forthcoming) develop a model of course choice where the payoff associated with a bundle of 
courses is given by the sum of payoffs for each of the individual courses. This model serves as 
the basis for students to choose between aggregated bundles of STEM and non-STEM courses, 
for which payoffs will be different based on differences in the cost of studying and grading 
standards between STEM and non-STEM fields (Arcidiacono, 2011; Barnes, Bull, Campbell, & 
Perry, 2001; K. Rask, 2010; Johnson, 2003). Thereby, this maximization process would 
influence STEM graduation/major choice.  
Incorporating grading policies into the utility function, Arcidiacono et al. (forthcoming) 
propose the following general utility function for individual i,  
 
where the payoff of a particular course j depends on course preferences, , study effort,  
     and the expected grade conditional on study effort,  [   |   ]. Implying that grades is a 
function of academic preparation,      the amount of study effort,    , the grading policies of the 
                                                 
7 Social categories are associated with the prescribed or ideal characteristics and behavior and individuals 
see themselves as belonging to a specific category and are by others considered to be in that category. For instance, 
men have a high status in STEM because these fields are manly and stereotyped, whereas women have a lower 
status in STEM because they are supposed to choose a girly major like non-STEM fields. In this environment 
women might feel misplaced and men might contribute to making them feel like that. Thus, women who intend to 
major in STEM have already deviated from the ideals of their category and start off with an identity disutility, which 





professor (or the department),  and an idiosyncratic shock, the authors specify the grading 
process as:   
 
The basic idea is that incorporating grading policies into the utility function can help 
explain how differences in grading practices across fields of study affect, partly as a result of 
demand-side estimates, the share of courses taken in different fields. On the demand-side, the 
proposed representation of utility also accounts for differences in student characteristics 
(academic preparation, student ability, and study effort), course preferences (taste for courses 
and female professor preference) and value of grades. For example, women who value grades 
more than men and find studying less costly
8
 will not only study more but also be more attracted 
to courses from high-grading departments. This would explain why women, who enter college as 
prepared as men in math and sciences and exert more effort by spending more hours studying a 
week than their male counterparts (Arcidiacono, Aucejo, & Spenner, 2012), leave STEM fields 
by disproportionally switching into non-STEM majors or high-grading departments (Chen, 
2013). Therefore, grading policies aimed at reducing the grade differentials between STEM and 
non-STEM courses can also potentially improve the composition of STEM graduates.    
According to this framework, a student will maximize utility taking into account that 
grades affect utility not only through the demand-side estimates but also through grading 
policies. In fact, when the authors decompose differences in course choices, grades, and study 
effort to examine the sources of the gender gap in STEM, they find that grading policies can 
have explanatory power for course choice above and beyond differences in preferences, value of 
grades, and in study costs. As a result, they find that the gender ratio tilts significantly towards 
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 Lower study costs and higher value of grades result in women studying a little over 7 percent more than 





females after equalizing expected grades, although they also observe a higher probability of men 
taking STEM courses. Overall, the proportion of women and men in STEM would increase, 
though differentially.  
Even though the general framework of utility and grading policies is used to predict 
course choices, I will consider major choice to be equivalent to course choice. Thus, based on 
this framework I will first expect that all else equal a grading policy that exogenously reduce 
grade differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses will make students more attracted to 
STEM courses, which in turn will improve STEM graduation/major choice. This is expected to 
happen by a reduction in the probability of leaving STEM by both switching into non-STEM and 
dropping out of college. Second, I will also expect an improvement in the gender and race gap in 
STEM attrition based on empirical evidence that suggests that STEM minorities value grades 
more than non-STEM minorities. Since the gender gap in STEM fields is mainly explained by 
more women switching into non-STEM and reducing grade differentials mitigates the 
importance of relative grades, I would expect a disproportional reduction of the probability of 
women switching into non-STEM fields.  
Review of Empirical Literature 
Concerns over disparities in grading standards and grade inflation have led institutions to 
adopt various grading reforms. Transcript readers (e.g. employers and graduate schools) might 
have less information on which to base their decisions and students might not obtain reliable 
signals regarding their own academic and relative abilities (Bar, Kadiyali, & Zussman, 2012), 
which in turn distorts students‘ course and major choices across fields. Therefore, the main 
objective of these grading reforms is to equalize average grades differentials between STEM and 





Institutions have commonly followed one of three types of grading reforms: 
(i) implementing grade targets; (ii) providing information on the distribution of grades in 
different courses to students, graduate schools, and employers, and (iii) changing the grading 
scale. Even though studies aimed at evaluating the impact of these grading reforms on curbing 
grade inflation do not address the effect of these policies on STEM graduation/major choice, it is 
worth to review this line of research.  
Grade targets restrict instructors‘ choice of grading policies. In April 2004, the Princeton 
University adopted a grading policy that aimed to provide common grading standards across 
academic departments and to give students clear signals from their teachers about the difference 
between good work and their very best work. The policy recommended that, over time, each 
department award no more than 35 percent of A-range grades for course work and no more than 
55 percent of A-range grades for junior and senior independent work.  
In 2013, an ad hoc faculty committee surveyed current faculty members and 
undergraduates to evaluate their perspectives and experiences under the grading policy. Even 
though, both the average GPA and the fraction of A-range grades declined after the 
implementation of the current grading policy, while the fraction of B-range grades increased 
significantly, the faculty report suggests that increased faculty attention to grade inflation— not 
the grading reform — may have played the key role in reducing grades. Based on self-reported 
and online responses, this report asserts that the grading policy does not help to maintain fair and 
consistent grading standards across academic departments. Nonetheless, a descriptive analysis 





departments, but depending on the department and course level.
9
 Following these results, 
Princeton‘s president eliminated the 35 percent rule. 
Another grade rationing policy aimed to curb grade inflation and enhance institution‘s 
credibility and reputation was implemented in Wellesley College. This grading policy, as 
opposed to that of Princeton, took into account the nature of its departments and course levels. In 
Fall 2004 Wellesley College implemented the following: average grades in lower-level courses 
with at least 10 students should not exceed a 3.33, or a B +. Only courses in high-grading 
departments in the humanities and social sciences (except economics) needed to change grading 
practices in order to comply. Butcher, McEwan, and Weerapana (2014) evaluate the 
consequences of the policy by comparing outcomes in departments that were obligated to lower 
their grades with outcomes in departments that were not.  
Using a standard difference-in-differences methodology, the authors found that the policy 
brings average grades down in high-grading departments, reducing compression at the top of the 
grade distribution: students were 14 percentage points less likely to get an A in the treated 
departments and there is little evidence that they increased the use of very low grades. For 
African-American students and students with low initial test scores, the gap in GPA with their 
peers increased in the departments where grades were reduced. This policy also affected course 
choice by reducing enrollment in treated departments by about 19 percentage points. 
Consequently, students were 30 percentage points less likely to major in one of these courses, 
indicating that students‘ choices about their majors are linked with grades. The fraction of a 
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graduating class majoring in, harder grading, economics
10
 (and to a lesser extent in the sciences) 
increased, and the fraction of a graduating class majoring in other, easier grading, social sciences 
fell, with the fraction remaining flat in the humanities.  
Grade reporting policies are based on providing transcript readers with information on the 
distribution of grades in different courses with the aim of improving the reliability of grades as 
signals of student quality. Those who support this type of policy expect students to have weaker 
incentives to select leniently graded courses, which, in turn, may assist in curbing grade inflation. 
Some proponents of this approach also expect that faculty would be more reluctant to grade 
leniently if they knew this information would be exposed to their colleagues and to readers of 
transcripts (Bar et al., 2012).  
In 1996, the Cornell University‘s Faculty Senate approved two new grade reporting 
policies: (i) the Office of the University Registrar would publish median grades and enrollments 
for undergraduate courses in a median grade report, and (ii) transcripts would record the mean 
grade and course enrollment, as well as a student‘s grade, for all courses with at least 10 
students. The first ―median grade report‖ was available online by the Spring of 1998; however, 
the reporting of course median grades in the transcripts was not implemented until the Fall 2008. 
Bar et al. (2009) evaluate the effect of the first policy change on patterns of course choice and 
grade inflation by using a dataset of grades assigned in undergraduate level courses at the 
College of Arts and Sciences between the spring semester of 1990 and the fall semester of 2004. 
The authors exploit persistent differences in course medians that are in place prior to the policy 
change. They find that the provision of grade information led to increased enrollment into 
leniently graded courses and that this has significantly accelerated grade inflation and could have 
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a negative effect on social welfare. They also find that the tendency to select leniently graded 
courses was weaker for high-ability students.  Based on these results, the Cornell‘s Faculty 
Senate voted in May 2011 to cease the online posting of median grade reports for Cornell 
courses; however, median grades will continue to be published on students‘ transcripts. 
A recent study, Bar et al. (2012), provides a model to demonstrate how grading 
information provision regimes can have complex effects on patterns of student course 
enrollment. In fact, they show that the provision of information about grading policies could 
result in an increase in grade inflation and in a decrease in the reliability of information on 
student ability conveyed to transcript readers. When information of grades is given only to 
students, some of them become more attracted to leniently graded courses.  When information is 
provided to both students and employers, some students have an incentive to take strictly graded 
courses. Other students may prioritize grades instead of their careers or choices of major by 
choosing leniently graded courses where they can receive a higher grade and be pooled with 
higher ability students. This study concludes that the effect of providing information about 
grades on grade inflation ultimately depends on changes in students‘ course selection patterns.   
A change in grading scale from whole-grade grading scale to plus/minus grading has 
been widely adopted in US universities as a way to reduce grade inflation, enhance better 
differentiation among students, and increase student motivation.
11
 The existing literature of the 
effect of plus/minus grading on college grades is scarce and mostly descriptive with conflicting 
results. Although several studies have reported a reduction in grade inflation using plus/minus 
grading (Shannon, 1979; Farland & Cepeda, 1989; Bressette, 2002), other institutions have 
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reported that the use of plus and minus qualifiers have no effect on curbing the grade inflation 
(Baker III & Bates, 1999).  
Bressette (2002) analyzes the differential effect of this change across departments and 
concluded that schools with higher GPAs were associated with larger predicted reductions in 
overall GPAs while schools with lower average GPAs tended to have lower predicted reductions 
in their average GPAs. Using data from Washington State University, North Carolina State 
University, and Berry College, the author showed that a plus/minus grading scale decreased the 
common inflation in GPA of 1 percent per year, suggesting a corresponding decrease in grade 
inflation. The author concludes that the finer distinctions available from the plus/minus grading 
scale allow a better representation of a student‘s level of performance reducing the likelihood 
that faculty will bump students up to the next grade level.  
K. D. Barnes and Buring (2012) also investigated the change in grading scales from 2005 
to 2010 at the University of Cincinnati College of Pharmacy. The authors found that the type of 
grading scales used did not affect the mean cumulative GPA. The use of a plus/minus grading 
scale led to an increase in mean GPA for 3 courses and a decrease of mean GPA of 4 courses.  
It is also argued that students are motivated to work harder under a plus/minus system. 
Bressette (2002) finds that the use of plus/minus grading system increases student effort on all 
assignments and examinations through the entire semester. According to him, if the benefit of 
receiving a high grade (i.e. a B+ compared to a B) is not a strong motivator, the fear of moving 
to a lower grade (i.e., a B- compared to a B) from a lack of effort might be an even stronger 
motivator. Evidence to the contrary is presented in a study of economics classes at a mid-size 
Midwestern university that concluded students who chose plus/minus grading were not 





The evidence pertaining to the likely effects of grading policies can be best described, 
then, as inconclusive. This literature, however, suggests that grading policies can have 
heterogeneous effects between STEM and non-STEM departments, and students may respond 
differently based on disparities in grading practices within a school. This study aims to advance 
research by providing the first direct examination of the effects of changing the grading scale on 
STEM graduation/major choice. To my knowledge, there is no study that had analyzed the 
differential effect of a change in grading scale across different departments and between high and 
low-grading departments and particularly for lower-division courses. Furthermore, most grading 
reforms have mainly been evaluated with respect to its expected effect on grade inflation rather 
than on other academic and more policy-relevant outcomes such as major choices, persistence 
and graduation rates.  
Policy Background and Data 
Policy Background  
Grades are assigned by either a whole-letter system (e.g., A, B, C, D, F) or a plus/minus 
system (e.g., A, A-, B+, B, B- etc.). A change in grading scale from whole-grade grading scale to 
plus/minus grading has been adopted in US universities as a way to reduce grade inflation, 
enhance better differentiation among students, and increase student motivation.
 12
  
Two universities in Florida, the University of Central Florida (UCF) and University of 
South Florida (USF), changed their grading scale from whole-letter to plus/minus grades. At the 
beginning of Fall 2000, USF implemented a plus/minus grading system that aimed to more 
clearly reflect the academic achievement of individual students in their courses. Similarly, but a 
year later, in the Fall 2001, UCF implemented the same grading scale. According to the UCF 
                                                 
12





Undergraduate Policy and Curriculum Committee, their previous whole-letter grade grading 
system (A, B, C, D, F) placed students with widely different achievements with the same grade. 
This is why they decided to adopt a more continuous grading scale. While this option was not 
mandatory for both universities, faculty, particularly at UCF, expressed a preference for the 
greater exactness plus and minus grades provide.
13
  
Drawing on prior literature, I hypothesize that a more refined grading scale would reduce 
grade differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses by potentially reducing grade 
inflation in non-STEM fields and/or increasing student effort in STEM fields. A reason that has 
motivated a more refined grading scale is that it tends to decelerate grade inflation, which has 
disproportionally affected non-STEM fields, by reducing non-STEM grades. The reasoning is as 
follows. Professors are under pressure to give higher grades, which causes a professor to bump 
grades up to the next grade, and in particular, if a grade is borderline to award the higher grade. 
With the possibility of pluses and minuses, rather than giving an A instead of a B, a professor 
may give the student a B+ or an A-. In addition to this, in Florida the distribution of numeric 
grades within the A scale is not symmetric. The A+ point value has the same 4.0 points as does 
the grade of A. Because non-STEM fields have a higher proportion of A‘s than STEM fields, the 
proportion of A‘s downgraded to A- is expected to be relatively higher in non-STEM courses 
and this would depress non-STEM GPAs.
14
 
Plus/minus grades may also provide students with greater motivation to do better, 
particularly if the student intends to major in STEM upon initial enrollment. With the change in 
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the grading scale, students interested in STEM, who on average receive lower grades than in 
non-STEM courses, may have a greater chance to improve their grades by allocating more effort 
to STEM courses. Also, students who are at the margin of earning a higher grade may feel more 
motivated to achieve it. Under a whole-letter system a student running a B in a STEM course 
may feel that an A is almost impossible to reach, while a B+ or even an A- is within her grasp 
with an additional effort. Similarly, a student satisfied with a B in a STEM course, may be 
slacking off since the risk of falling to a C is relatively low with whole-letter grades, whereas 
with plus/minus grades a B- might be a real possibility.
15
  
 Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of whole and plus/minus letters assigned before and after 
the grade reform among the two institutions that implemented a plus/minus scale (hereafter 
called treatment institutions) and the remaining 8 institutions (or untreated institutions). On 
average, before the change in the grading scale, students who attend treated institutions during 
their first year of enrollment do not receive plus-minus grades, while those in untreated 
institutions obtained almost 30 percent of plus/minus grades.  After the adoption of the 
plus/minus grading system, treated institutions significantly increased the percentage of 
plus/minus grades assigned to GPAs by approximately 23 percentage points.  
Although a change in the grading scale does not seem to affect overall average grades, it 
has had a differential effect on grade distribution between STEM and non-STEM departments 
and particularly in treated institutions. Figures 2.2.1-2.2.3 provide actual grade distributions in 
the A, B, C and D/F ranges for all courses taken as well as for those taken in STEM and non-
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STEM departments. An initial glance at data from three cohorts of students who first enrolled in 
1996 (pre-policy change), and in 2000 and 2003 (post-policy change) suggests that the 
proportion of students attending treated institutions who received more than B+ in all lower-
division courses has increased by 24 percent post-policy change. Similarly, the proportion of 
those who received grades less than B- decreased by 20 percent. This pattern is also manifested 
in untreated institutions but with a change of 2 percentage points (about 5 percent growth) in the 
proportion of grades at the top and bottom of the grade distribution.  
After the grade reform was implemented in treated institutions, the grade distribution 
shifted higher for STEM courses than for non-STEM courses. In fact, the grade distribution for 
non-STEM courses followed closely the pattern of the overall distribution of grades. For these 
courses the change in the proportion of grades at the top and bottom of the grade distribution was 
about the same, 7 percentage points. In contrast, for STEM courses the proportion of students 
receiving grades higher than B+ has increased from 21 percent to 31 percent and the proportion 
receiving less than B- has decreased from 51 percent to 39 percent. Moreover, comparing the 
pre-and post-policy change periods, the proportion of grades earned in STEM courses at the top 
of the grading scale changed at a higher rate than the proportion at the bottom of the grading 
scale (45 percent increase versus 24 percent decrease, respectively). Therefore, there is evidence 
that the grade distribution strongly changed in treated institutions after the change in the grading 
scale and especially for students taking STEM courses.   
For students attending untreated institutions, the change in the grade distribution for 
STEM courses was rather small, and the distribution of grades pre-and post-policy change is 
very similar. The proportion of students who received less than B- has risen by 3 percentage 





increased by 1 percentage point. Moreover, this change was 3 percentage points smaller than that 
in the proportion of students receiving above B+ in non-STEM courses.  
As a consequence, after the change in the grading scale the difference in average grades 
between treated and untreated institutions substantially decreased as well as the grade 
differentials between STEM and non-STEM departments in treated institutions. Figure 2.3.1 and 
2.3.2 show what happened to average STEM and non-STEM GPAs in treated and untreated 
institutions before and after the change in the grading scale. STEM grades actually show a 
substantial catch up between treated and untreated institutions after the change in the grading 
scale was in effect. Even though both STEM and non-STEM grades rose after the change in the 
grading scale, this change was much bigger among treated institutions and STEM departments 
and especially during the first year of enrollment. In the first semester of 1996 and the first 
semester of 2000 and 2003, the average STEM grades climbed from around 2.42 to 2.75 among 
treated institutions, an increase of more than 13 percent.
16
   
Figure 2.4.1 shows that differences in grades between STEM and non-STEM lower-
division courses among treated institutions was reduced during the first two semesters of 
enrollment post-policy change. Among untreated institutions the average differences in grades 
between STEM and non-STEM courses practically did not change after the change in the grading 
scale. Similarly, on average the proportion of STEM grades that are higher than non-STEM 
grades increased by 11 percentage points between the first year of enrollment pre-policy change 
and post-policy change (2000 and 2003), as shown in Figure 2.4.2.  
Figure 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 show how the distribution of the differences in grades between 
STEM and non-STEM courses changes during the first year of enrollment before and after the 
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new grading scale and between students attending treated and untreated institutions. While the 
distribution of grade differentials for students attending treated institutions shifts upward towards 
reducing the first year GPA differentials, the distribution for those attending untreated 
institutions shifts backwards, which implies a secular grade inflation. 
The decrease in grade differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses by a 
disproportional increase in STEM grades does not completely support my hypothesis. A more 
refined grade scale seems to accelerate grade inflation in STEM departments, leaving grades in 
non-STEM departments mostly unaffected. Yet, my results provide support for the possibility of 
equalizing grades using this grading policy, although it is not totally obvious why STEM grades 
increased. Professors‘ responses to the change in the grading scale together with students‘ 
decisions to allocate more effort to STEM versus non-STEM courses might explain how grades 
differentials are reduced under this policy. The latter hypothesis is hard to prove because I would 
have to measure the effect of the policy on students who are at the margin of achieving a higher 
grade and then check if the shift in the distribution of STEM grades stems from those who could 
have been potentially motivated to exert more effort. Without having data on numerical scores or 
study time, it is hard to assess this hypothesis.    
My findings could also be potentially explained by professors‘ preferences for ―inflating‖ 
STEM grades to better differentiate students. In both STEM and non-STEM fields, professors 
are under pressure to give higher grades. However, professors in STEM fields might care more 
about having a grade distribution at all to better differentiate students, while professors in non-
STEM fields might be more comfortable with the idea of compressing grades at the top.  
Moreover, the cost of grading associated with student complaints while keeping fair distinctions 





the case if relatively more students in STEM are at the margin of achieving higher grades than in 
non-STEM fields. Consequently, plus/minus grades allow STEM professors to inflate grades like 
in other fields, but without losing distinctions between students.
17
  
Even though future research is needed to investigate why professors in STEM 
departments are more sensitive to this grading policy, it seems that professors in STEM are 
making relatively more distinctions among students by using a higher percentage of plus/minus 
grades than in non-STEM courses. After the change in the grading policy, plus/minus markers 
were 5 percentage points more used in STEM than in non-STEM departments.
18
  
Data and Sample 
This paper uses data from the Florida Department of Education‘s K-20 Education Data 
Warehouse (K-20 EDW), an integrated longitudinal dataset that covers all public school students 
in the state of Florida. Florida‘s student data-tracking system is very comprehensive and allows 
me to control for demographic characteristics (including if the student qualified for free lunch), 
SAT/ACT scores,
 19
 and degree and major intentions at first enrollment. This administrative data 
also include college characteristics such as term-by-term college enrollment (credits 
attempted/completed, term and cumulative GPA, and major), transcript and degree information 
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 This estimate only considers courses that actually change the grading scale given that not all faculty 
members in treated institutions used plus/minus markers after the policy. Without restricting my sample, this 
estimate is 2 percentage points less.  
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 Unfortunately, 44 percent of my sample from the 1996/07 cohort has missing values for high school 





for all post-secondary students at public institutions in Florida. The data were supplied to the 
author by the Florida Department of Education.
 20
  
The benefit of using this information is that it had detailed information pertaining to the 
college experience and pre-collegiate human capital. Thus, I can observe students in each 
semester and year and evaluate how a change in the grading scale might differentially affect 
average STEM and non-STEM grades during college. These data also allow me to identify 
students pursuing STEM fields who take STEM and non-STEM courses in college so as to 
explore how college grades might differentially affect STEM graduation/major choice. STEM 
majors are classified using the 2011 NCES list
21
 which in turn used a U.S. immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) list of designated STEM degree programs.
 22
 STEM instructional 
programs were then classified into six STEM fields: computer and information sciences; 
engineering and engineering technologies; biological and biometrical sciences; mathematics and 
statistics; physical sciences; and science technologies. See Appendix Table A1 for a detailed list 
of the Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) codes used in the six STEM fields. Non-
STEM majors include all fields that are not STEM fields as well as general studies, undeclared 
or unknown majors.  Finally, STEM courses were identified using Jacobson and Mokher (2009) 
classification of courses by field of concentration. See Appendix Table A2 for the list of courses 
used to differentiate STEM from non-STEM courses.  
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My sample is restricted to high school graduates who entered a 4-year public institution 
straight from high school for the first time in 1996, 2000 and 2003. These students were tracked 
forward to 2012 although the last term enrolled for most of these students is Fall 2000, Fall 2005 
and Fall 2008, respectively. For these students, I have complete college transcript records. I 
further limit the sample to students who in May of their high school completion year were less 
than 21 years old, which is the baseline sample used for the descriptive analysis. Across these 
three cohorts I have about 59,927 observations, which is the baseline sample used for the 
descriptive analysis and the difference in difference analysis.  
I separate colleges into institutions that changed their grading scale from whole-letter to 
plus/minus grades (or treated institutions) and other 4-year public institutions (or untreated 
institutions). For each student and type of college, my outcome variable of interest is STEM and 
non-STEM graduation/major choice as well as the probability of never earned a BA.
23
  STEM 
and non-STEM major choice was identified at two points in time: (i) at the beginning of their 
second year of enrollment; and (ii) at the beginning of the third year of enrollment when most 
undergraduates formally declare their major.  STEM and non-STEM graduation outcomes are 
based on graduation in 6 years or less.  
 Table 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 display descriptive statistics separately for the periods before and 
after the change in the grading scale and for those students attending treated and untreated 
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graduated in STEM or never graduated. Finally, the probability of never earned a BA is one if the student never 





institutions. Thirty-one percent of the sample attended treated institutions.
24
  Students attending 
treated institutions are less likely to be female and Black, and they have lower SAT reading and 
math scores. Students attending treated institutions are more likely to intend to major in STEM 
upon first enrollment. Most differences between the two groups are stable over time. As the last 
column shows,
 25
 during the period of analysis there is a statistically significant negative effect 
on the proportion of students who are Hispanics and qualified for free lunch in grade 12  (also 
see Appendix Table A3). Students attending treated institutions are differentially trending 
towards better economic background. The differences between the two groups in the proportion 
of Hispanics and low-income students suggests that students at untreated institutions look worse 
on a number of dimensions that might predict grade differentials and STEM graduation/major 
choice. I address this potential concern in the next section.  
 Table 2.1.2 also shows probabilities of majoring and graduating in STEM and non-
STEM, number of credits attempted in STEM and non-STEM courses, and STEM and non-
STEM grades and grade differentials. For the cohort of high school graduates who entered a 
4-year public institution straight from high school for the first time in 1996, those who attended 
treated institutions are less likely to major in STEM and graduate in 6 years of less with a STEM 
major than students in untreated institutions: 7 percent graduated with a STEM major by 2002, 
while 10 percent of students who attended an untreated institution had done so.  The differences 
in STEM major choice between these two groups increase from the second year of enrollment to 
the sixth year by 2.3 percentage points. For the younger cohorts of students, 2000 and 2003, the 
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pattern is reversed:  the difference in the probability of graduating with a STEM major between 
students attending treated and untreated institutions is no longer statistically significant. In fact, 
the proportion of students choosing a STEM major at the beginning of their second and third 
year of enrollment is now higher than that of the control group.  
 This table also illustrates the means in grades and first year grade differentials as well as 
the number of credits attempted in STEM and non-STEM courses. These college academic 
characteristics are focused on lower-division courses, which are mainly suitable for freshmen 
and sophomores, given that these courses are those that students are expected to complete in the 
first two years of study in their major choice, and sometimes they serve as prerequisites for 
upper-division courses. Grade differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses are measured 
using two variables: the probability of doing better in STEM (STEM GPA higher than non-
STEM GPA) and the differences between STEM GPA and non-STEM GPA. For the empirical 
analysis, I will focus on the grades earned during the first year of enrollment.  
Empirical Strategy and Results 
Empirical Strategy 
 In this section, I estimate the effect of changing the grading scale from whole letter 
grades to plus-minus grades using one cohort of students before (1996-97) and two cohorts after 
(2000-01 and 2002-03) this grading reform was implemented. I then compare their grade 
differentials between in STEM and non-STEM lower-division courses and STEM major choice 
and graduation outcomes over the six years following initial enrollment.  
 A difference-in-difference approach enables me to compare similar students over time at 





new grading scale on average first year grade differentials. Then, I will use the same 
identification strategy to estimate the reduced-form difference-in-difference equation: 
 
where if the student i in school j chose a STEM at the beginning of her 
second and third year of enrollment and graduates with a STEM major in 6 years or less. Afterj is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if the student entered a 4-year public institution 
straight from high school for the first time in the Fall of 1996, and 1 if the student entered in the 
Fall of 2000 and 2003. Instreatij  takes the value 1 if the institution change its grading scale and 0 
if the institution did not change its grading scale. InstFEij is a complete set of institution fixed 
effects, and Xij is a vector of covariates that controls for demographic and pre-college 
characteristics. Covariates include dummy variables for female, US citizen, those who qualified 
for free lunch in grade 12, age and age squared at first entry, and STEM initial major intention, 
SAT reading and math scores, and SAT reading and math scores squared. The coefficient of 
interest in this model is β, which is the difference-in-difference estimate conditional on the 
observable characteristics as well as on those characteristics interacted with Instreat and After 
indicators. The same equation will be estimated for non-STEM graduation/major choice 
outcomes as well as for the probability of never completing a BA.  
 The critical identifying assumption in the differences-in-difference approach is that the 
coefficient on the interaction term from Equation (1) would be zero in the absence of the grading 
reform. In other words, there are fixed, time-invariant differences across students attending 
treated and untreated institutions and that the change in the grading policy is the only factor 
altering these differences over time. Pre- and post-policy cohorts of students may be different, 





it cannot be the case that there is something different about being a post-policy student attending 
a treated institution, other than the new grading scale. Trends in pre-grading reform cohorts 
should provide good predictors of what would have happened in the absence of this grading 
reform. Basically, trends in grades and STEM graduation/major outcomes do not differ pre-
policy change. 
 To test this assumption, I estimate a version of Equation (1) with no covariates, with 
background characteristics as the dependent variable as shown in the last column of Table 2.1.1. 
As previously noted, it seems that students attending treated institutions are relatively getting 
slightly better in SAT scores and economic background. If the interaction terms have a 
significant effect on these observable characteristics, it raises the concern that there may be 
unobservable differences too, which could cofound my impact estimates. I find significant 
differences in the proportion of students who are Hispanics and qualified for free lunch in 
grade 12. All these background characteristics will be included as controls in the analysis, but it 
is worth noting that these variables only explain 17 percent of the post-policy change in the first 
year GPA in STEM lower-division courses (See Appendix Table A5). It may also be unfeasible 
for these differences to differentially affect the GPA differentials between STEM and non-STEM 
courses. 
 Students‘ assignment would invalidate the parallel trends assumption of the difference-in-
difference; however, it is very unlikely to think that those who are more interested in graduating 
in STEM may have chosen an institution that changed its grading scale. This kind of policy has 
not been designed to differentially affect grades and graduation rates across departments, but to 
reduce overall grade inflation. In fact, when the policy was implemented, research about the 





inexistent. Even if students‘ college choice were potentially endogenous, the difference-in-
differences framework would address this problem to the extent that differences between the 
students attending treated and untreated institutions show up in the baseline levels of STEM 
major intention. As shown in Table 2.1.2, these differences are insignificant and negative, which 
suggests that control institutions are relatively attracting more students who intend to major in 
STEM.  
Yet, differences in changes in STEM graduation/major choice outcomes due to 
unobserved differences between the students of both treated and untreated institutions might 
invalidate the parallel trend assumption. In particular, if for example the average STEM grades in 
lower-division courses among students who attend treated institutions were increasing over time, 
I could confound this secular increase with the effect of the change in the grading scale. Ideally, I 
would like to observe students in treated institution under the new grading scale for many 
cohorts before the policy change. Unfortunately, I only have data for three cohorts-the pre-policy 
cohort and two cohorts after.  
To assess if there were differential pre-treatment trends, the Appendix Figure A1-
Figure A6 provide details about trends in grades during the first two semesters of enrollment for 
the three cohorts. In the Appendix Figure A7-Figure A9, I plot the fraction of students who 
graduate in STEM, and non-STEM and who never earned a BA. Pre-policy change treated and 
untreated institutions were using a different grading scale, which means that post-policy change I 
should expect trends to be more comparable. Before the policy, the gap in the percentage of A 
and C/F grades in STEM lower-division courses between students attending treated and 
untreated institutions is around 10 to 20 percentage points; after the policy, this gap was 





insignificant before and after the policy. Students attending untreated institutions should not be 
affected by the change in the grading scale, and indeed there is no shift in grades and the fraction 
of STEM and non-STEM graduates among this group after the policy. Prior to the grading 
reform, there is a downward (upward) trend in the percentage of A (C/F) grades in STEM 
courses among students attending treated institutions. But after the reform, this trend reverses. 
Overall, the trends in STEM and non-STEM grades (and STEM and non-STEM grade 
distributions) as well as in STEM graduation strongly changed after the new grading scale was 
implemented among treated institutions to catch up with that of untreated institutions.   
The parallel trend assumption also implies that in the absence of the policy change 
students attending treated institutions would have been exposed to the same institutional policies 
or environment as the students attending untreated institutions. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that 
treated institutions and untreated institutions systematically implemented policies oriented to 
differentially affect graduation outcomes between STEM and non-STEM departments at the 
same time.  
 For policy purposes, my results can be reconciled with the general framework of utility 
and grading policies by estimating the effect of reducing grade differentials on STEM outcomes. 
Equation (2) would measure the effect of a change in the grading scale on outcomes, providing 
an ―intent to treat‖ effect. Because the change in the grading scale is expected to mainly affect 
grade differentials for those who were enrolled in institutions that implemented this reform, an 
IV (or 2SLS) approach is used to estimate the effects of actual change in grade differentials on 
STEM outcomes. Thus, students who were enrolled in institutions that did not implement any 





choice outcomes, before and after the change in the grading scale, for students whose grade 
differentials were affected versus students who were not affected by this grading reform.  
First, I will use Equation (1) to determine the relationship between the grading reform and 
student-level grade differentials (i.e., dependent variable), using Instreat as the plausibly 
exogenous instrument. I can then construct a ―predicted grade differential‖ measure and use 
Equation (2) below to model STEM graduation/major choice outcomes as a function of predicted 
grade differentials, controlling for student-level covariates and institution fixed effects.   
 
By including the same covariates in both equations, I ensure that only the change in grade 
differentials generated by the idiosyncratic change in the grading scale is used for the causal 
identification. The identifying assumption is that (1) the interaction between the new grading 
scale and the years after this reform was implemented is correlated with grade differentials, and 
(2) the interaction between the new grading scale and the years after this reform only affects 
STEM graduation/major choice outcomes through its effect on grade differentials between 




The first and second columns of Table 2.2 show ―first stage‖ results from estimating 
Equation (1) and find that after controlling for the after years, whether or not the student was 
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 Even though the first assumption for the IV specification is complied as discussed in the results section, 
the second assumption is not directly testable. However, this specification intends to provide policy relevant 
estimates to contribute to the discussion about the effect of reducing grade differentials in academic outcomes. In 
this set-up, in order to hold the exclusion restriction I do not expect to be another mechanism outside of changing 
grade differentials to affect the relative difference in STEM graduation/major choice outcomes after the grading 
reform. Moreover, the new grading policy was not designed or intended neither to directly affect major choices and 
graduation outcomes nor to change grading differentials between STEM and non-STEM departments. Yet, I do 
acknowledge that the effect of absolute grades, or STEM grades only, could also be a potential channel explaining 





enrolled in an institution that change the grading scale, institutional fixed effects, and student 
background characteristics, there is a significant relationship between the interaction term and 
the two measures of grade differentials (i.e. STEM GPA higher than non-STEM GPA and the 
difference in STEM GPA and non-STEM GPA). Model 1 reports the difference-in-difference 
estimate with institutional fixed effects. Model 2 controls for math and reading SAT scores (and 
SAT scores squared). It also includes the same dummy variables included in Equation (1), and it 
is reassuring that the overall pattern of results remains consistent. Having attended an institution 
that changed its grading scale leads to 8 more percentage points in the probability of earning a 
higher cumulative STEM GPA than non-STEM GPA after the new grading scale was in effect. 
On average, before the new grading scale was enacted, about 24 percent of students who 
attended treated institutions did better in STEM than in non-STEM during their first year of 
enrollment, so this percentage grew about 30 percent. 
Similarly, the impact of the change in the grading scale on the difference between STEM 
and non-STEM GPAs during the first year of enrollment is about 0.152, a relative increase of 
about a sixth of a grade differential in treated institutions. It is worth noting that the effect on the 
difference in grades is embedding a triple difference-in-difference, which assumes that there is 
no shock after the change in the grading scale that had differentially affected grade differentials 
of students who attended treated institutions. This effect is mainly explained by the impact of the 
policy on STEM grades, which is about 0.28 grade points.   
The third and fourth columns of Table 2.2 present the main reduced-form results. For 
each outcome, Model 1 shows estimates from the most basic difference-in-difference model, 
with the interaction term, and fixed effects for institution, but no covariates. Model 2 adds 





errors without altering the overall pattern of results. The results from Model 2 indicate large, 
positive and statistically significant impacts on STEM graduation/major choice outcomes and 
very small and insignificant results on non-STEM graduation/major choice as well as on the 
probability on never completing a BA. However, these results suggest that the relative increase 
in the probability of majoring in STEM is mainly explained by a reduction in the probability of 
dropping out of college.  In fact, results also indicate large and statistically significant impacts on 
the number of lower-division courses enrolled in 6 years or less in both STEM and non-STEM 
fields due to a relatively lower dropout rate.  
Focusing on Model 2 from Table 2.2 column (4), after the grading policy change, 
students were about 3 percentage points more likely to graduate in STEM in 6 years or less or to 
choose a STEM major at the beginning of their second and third year of enrollment in the treated 
institutions. On average before the implementation of the new grading scale, about 7 percent of 
students attending treated institutions graduated in STEM, hence my impact estimate represents 
an increase of about 40 percent. Results are mostly significant among STEM graduation/major 
choice outcomes. The results in Table 2.2 for non-STEM outcomes are noisier and indicate no 
statistically significant impacts of the change in the grading scale on non-STEM and BA 
completion outcomes.  
A similar recent research that also relies on a difference-in-differences methodology 
supports these findings. Butcher et al. (2014) evaluate the effect of an anti-grade-inflation policy 
that reduces grades in high-grading departments and find that students‘ choices about courses 
and majors are sensitive to grades. Their results suggest that majors declined in high-grading 
departments by about 30 percent while the fraction of a graduating class majoring in economics 





grades in low-grading departments (STEM fields), the mechanisms through which this policy 
works are similar to those studied in Butcher et al. (2014). My results can be scaled for 
comparison with the -0.17 grade point impact found in their treated departments. Thus, the 0.28 
grade point impact found on STEM grades would correspond with a 50 percent increase in the 
probability of graduating in STEM. This estimate is not significantly bigger than what I found.  
Consistent with the framework developed by Arcidiacono et al. (forthcoming), I expect 
that a change in grading policy would lead students to make different choices about which course 
to take or in which department to major. More specifically, I expect this impact on major choice 
to be mediated by a change in grading differentials between STEM and non-STEM departments. 
For policy purposes, I reconcile my results with this framework to estimate the effect of reducing 
grade differentials on STEM outcomes. The first column of Appendix Table A6 indicates that a 
change in GPA differences in STEM and non-STEM lower-division courses during the first year 
of enrollment generates a significant increase in STEM graduation/major choice (about 36 
percentage points).
27
 These point estimates are much larger than the reduced-form estimates 
because they have been scaled up by the inverse of the first-stage estimate. This result suggests 
that an increase of one standard deviation in the first year GPA differential would result in 
roughly a 5 percentage points increase in STEM graduation. These positive effects on STEM 
outcomes seem to be equally explained by a reduction in the probability of majoring in non-
STEM and dropping out of college without earning a BA. This finding should be interpreted 
cautiously because I am assuming that the only mechanism that explains the relative change in 
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 Using the change in the probability of earning a higher STEM GPA than non-STEM as an instrumented 





STEM outcomes is the change in grading differentials, when the effect of the policy on STEM 
grades only might also explain these impacts.  
Subgroup Analysis 
Gender 
Table 2.3 and 2.4 show results using the preferred specification (Model 2), estimated 
separately for women and men. The first column of Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 suggests that a 
change in the grading scale has a positive and significant effect on the reduction of first year 
GPA differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses for women and men at similar rates. 
This is consistent with the effects on STEM graduation/major choice outcomes, which are not 
significantly different between women and men. Proportionally, after the change in the grading 
scale both women and men are relatively increasing their graduation rates in STEM by about 50 
percent.  
As shown in column (2) of Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, the estimated drop in grade 
differentials in treated institutions is larger and statistically significant for women whereas the 
relative increase in first year STEM GPA is larger for men. The impact of the policy on 
graduating in STEM is around 3 percentage points for women and 5 percentage points for men. 
Interestingly, for women the positive effects on STEM graduation/major choice outcomes seem 
to be mainly explained by a reduction in the probability of leaving STEM by switching into non-
STEM fields, whereas for men these effects accounted for primarily a decrease in the probability 
of leaving STEM by dropping out of college. This could suggest that for women grade 
differentials are perceived as a signal of relative ability in STEM versus non-STEM courses, and 
therefore they might be discouraged from pursuing STEM because they think they can do better 





a signal of absolute ability or of their capacity to succeed in college irrespective of how better or 
worse they are in non-STEM fields.    
Results from the IV model presented in Appendix Table A6 show significant results for 
women and insignificant results for men. For women a reduction of one point in grade 
differentials increases the probability of graduation in STEM by 25 percentage points, and for 
men the change in grading differentials has a larger but insignificant effect. Despite the relatively 
large difference in means between women and men, the standard errors associated to the point 
estimates for men are much larger than those for women. Thus, the differences in means are not 
statistically significant. These results are comparable to Owen‘s (2010) findings for economics 
(high-grading department), which were a change from a B to an A increases the probability of 




These results do not necessarily contradict my hypothesis, but suggest that the differential 
effect of the policy between women and men is complex. If anything, men seemed to be more 
sensitive to the grade signal than women, which is counter to my prior hypothesis. If women 
value grades and benefit from higher-grades more than men, the effect of reducing grade 
differentials on STEM graduation/major choice was expected to be higher for women. However, 
the fact that women mainly increase their STEM graduation rates by reducing their probability of 
graduation in non-STEM together with insignificant IV estimates for men suggest that women 
may value relative grades more than men. If women tend to value higher grades that are ―easier‖ 
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 Owen (2010) utilizes an alterative sample to test her baseline results for which she uses an institution 
without plus/minus grades and finds results in the range of 15 to 18 percentage points. When using a selective 






to achieve in non-STEM courses, then a larger relative reduction in grade differentials might 
explain why women are more discouraged from graduating in non-STEM than their peers.    
To understand this, I evaluate what part of the grade distribution was mostly affected by 
the change in the grading scale so as to explore why men were more responsive to this policy. If 
relatively more men are at the margin of dropping out of college (or at the bottom of the grading 
distribution), then these overall impacts mask important patterns of heterogeneity. Appendix 
Table A10 and Table A11 present the distribution of grades by gender for both treatment and 
control groups before and after the change in the grading scale. Prior to the policy change men 
attending treated institutions earned a significantly higher proportion of D/F grades in STEM 
courses than women. Table 2.7 shows results for the effect of the policy on the distribution of 
grades for women and men. There is a higher reduction in the percentage of D/F grades for men 
than for women, 6 percentage points versus 3 percentage points, and these differences are 
statistically significant. This suggests that men were more influenced to persist in STEM by not 
failing STEM courses, which might explain why there is a higher reduction in the probability of 
dropping out of college for men than for women. The fact that women value higher-grades more 
than men and men were relatively more affected at the bottom of their grade distribution might 
explain why overall impact estimates are higher for men.  
Minority Status 
 Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show that for minorities and non-minorities a change in the 
grading scale has a similar positive and significant effect on the reduction of first year GPA 
differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses. Although, in general, the effects on STEM 
graduation/major choice are positive and statistically significant, for racial minorities the 





and men. Impact estimates for STEM graduation/major choice are generally larger for minorities, 
with a higher probability of choosing and graduating in STEM. The overall pattern of results, 
however, is noisier for minorities, and the differences in means between both groups are 
insignificant. However, proportionally, after the change in the grading scale racial minorities had 
a larger increase in their STEM graduation rates than non-racial minorities, 67 percent versus 44 
percent.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Concerns over disparities in grading standards and grade inflation have led institutions to 
adopt various grading reforms. Changing the grading scale from whole-grade grading scale to 
plus/minus grading has been widely adopted to curb grade inflation and enhance better 
differentiation among students. Yet, this grading policy has never been studied directly as a way 
to influence STEM outcomes.  
STEM majors are usually associated with higher and more rigorous grading standards 
than non-STEM majors. Since grade inflation has disproportionately affected non-STEM majors, 
this policy was hypothesized to mitigate the effects of grade inflation by reducing grade 
differentials between STEM and non-STEM courses. This reduction would make students more 
attracted to STEM courses, which in turn may improve the number and composition of STEM 
graduates. In the Fall semester of 2000 and 2001, two universities in Florida, the University of 
Central Florida (UCF) and University of South Florida (USF), changed their grading scale.  
My analysis finds that this grading policy significantly decreases the first year GPA 
differential between non-STEM and STEM courses, by mainly increasing STEM grades. The 
consequences of changing the grading scale on STEM grades are theoretically ambiguous. My 





to better differentiate students, particularly if relatively more students in STEM are at the margin 
of achieving higher grades than in non-STEM fields. Students who value higher grades could 
also respond to this policy by exerting more effort now that they can get better information 
regarding their potential for success or suitability for STEM courses. 
I also find that after this grading policy students attending treated institutions were about 
3 percentage points more likely to graduate in STEM in 6 years or less, which corresponds to an 
increase of about 40 percent. Finally, my analysis demonstrates that this grading policy has 
complex heterogeneous effects in the way students are discouraged from leaving STEM. This 
policy has larger effects for men than women and for racial minorities than non- minorities. 
However, for women the effects on STEM outcomes seem to be explained by a reduction in the 
probability of leaving STEM by switching into non-STEM, whereas for men these effects come 
from a decrease in the probability of dropping out of college. In fact, the IV results indicate no 
statistically significant effects for men. While women and men follow different STEM 
persistence patterns, the differences in STEM persistence patterns between racial minorities and 
non-minorities are not as affected by the change in the grading scale.  
These results indicate that some students may come to college with lower perceptions of 
ability believing they are not "naturally inclined" toward STEM simply because it is harder to get 
good grades in those courses. Others might come with the idea of majoring in STEM and then 
end up majoring in non-STEM or dropping out of college because they get low grades 
and cannot prove themselves they are academically good enough to graduate in STEM. If 
anything, low grades in STEM matter and might be steering students away at a time when the 





How these results are interpreted depends on whether they are viewed from an 
institutional or student perspective. From an institutional perspective, my results encourage the 
adoption of a plus/minus scale to improve STEM graduation outcomes and reduce drop-out rates. 
Yet, further research is needed to investigate long-term effects of this policy and why professors 
and/or students in STEM departments are more sensitive to this particular grading policy. Still, 
irrespective of the grading policy to be implemented at institutional level, this study sheds the 
light on the importance of understanding differential responses to grading policies among high-
and low-grading departments due to the fact that grade inflation has not favored all departments 
equally. In addition to this, even within departments, students respond differently to grading 
policies depending upon where they are on the grade distribution and how much they value 
grades.  
From the student perspective, the results indicate that students may be following higher 
grades, particularly women. If students do so as a response to grade inflation and grade 
differentials among departments and not because they develop new interests, then there is an 
argument for intervention. At first, it is not totally obvious that this policy improves the 
composition of STEM graduates because effects across subgroups are not significantly different. 
But, the higher overall impact estimates for men are mainly explained by the fact that men are 
relatively more affected at the bottom of the grade distribution. Also, the effect on STEM 
graduation for women is fully explained by a decrease in the probability of switching into non-
STEM, which suggests that for women grade differentials are perceived as a signal of relative 
ability in STEM versus non-STEM courses.  
The existing literature of the effect of grading policies on major choices is scarce, and 





(high-grading department) and economics departments (low-grading department) influence 
student‘s major choices at Wellesley (Butcher et al., 2014). My results contribute to this 
literature by demonstrating that students‘ major choices are affected by grades and that grading 
policies, intended to reduce grade inflation, increase graduation in STEM (low-grading 
departments). While the focus of this study is on two 4-year public institutions in Florida, these 
results might have broader applicability than those from the prior literature, which has been 
mainly focus on very selective institutions.
29
  Moreover, this study evaluates the impact of a 
more sustainable and relatively cheaper grading policy that a growing number of institutions are 
adopting.   
Finally, if we are interested in higher STEM graduation rates for racial minorities and 
women, before diverting more resources towards STEM departments by trying to make these 
departments more diverse, having more college guidance counselors, or even freezing STEM 
tuition rates, it may be more cost-effective to adopt grading policies intended to reduce grade 
differentials first so as to send reliable signals to students who are sensitive to grades. This new 
equilibrium could be reached by assigning higher workload to STEM courses to deter over-
enrollment or by offering a few lower-division courses with ―easy‖ grading rules to offset stricter 
grading curriculum in STEM courses. 
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 For example, while the national average SAT scores in reading and math between 1996 and 2003 are 
around 506 and 515, respectively, at these two Florida public institutions SAT scores are 538 and 544 for reading 
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Figure 2.1 Pre-and-post Policy Percentage of Whole and Plus/Minus Grades by Enrollment Term 
 
 
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: The figure displays percentages of whole and plus/minus grades in lower-and upper-division courses during the Fall 1996 and Spring 1997, 
before the change in the grading scale, and the Fall 2000/03 and Spring 2000/03, after the grading reform was in effect. 
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                                      Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
                    Note: These figures display the share if student-course observations that were assigned a letter grade  
                    before and after the change in the grading scale by treatment status.  Grades for lower-division  
                    STEM courses taken during the first year of enrollment.  The percentage of whole and plus/minus  
  grades are stacked in the graph, (+) is for pluses and (-) for minuses.   
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                                      Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
                    Note: These figures display the share if student-course observations that were assigned a letter grade  
                    before and after the change in the grading scale by treatment status. Grades for lower-division  
                    non-STEM courses taken during the first year of enrollment. The percentage of whole and plus/minus  




Figure 2.3.1 STEM Grades by Enrollment Term 
 
 
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: The figure displays mean STEM GPAs in lower-division courses during the Fall 1996 and Spring 1997, before the change in the 
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Figure 2.3.2 Non-STEM Grades by Enrollment Term 
 
 
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: The figure displays mean Non-STEM GPAs in lower-division courses during the Fall 1996 and Spring 1997, before the change 
in the grading scale, and the Fall 2000/03 and Spring 2000/03, after the grading reform was in effect. 
 
 
Figure 2.4.1 Percentage of STEM GPA higher than non-STEM GPA by Enrollment Term 
 
 
                         Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: The figure displays average percentage of STEM grade that are higher than Non-STEM grade in lower-division courses   
during the Fall 1996 and Spring 1997, before the change in the grading scale, and the Fall 2000/03 and Spring 2000/03, after the 
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Figure 2.4.2 Difference between STEM GPA and non-STEM GPA by Enrollment Term 
 
 
                  Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: The figure displays average difference between STEM grade and Non-STEM grade in lower-division courses during the Fall 
1996 and Spring 1997, before the change in the grading scale, and the Fall 2000/03 and Spring 2000/03, after the grading reform was 
in effect. 
 




                      Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: The figure displays the distribution of the difference between first year STEM and Non-STEM GPAs in lower-
division courses before and after the change in the grading scale for students attending treated institutions. The vertical 
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              Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: The figure displays the distribution of the difference between first year STEM and Non-STEM GPAs in lower-
division courses before and after the change in the grading scale for students attending untreated institutions. The vertical 













2000 and 2003 
Difference-in-
Difference   Control Treatment Control Treatment 
       
Demographics       
       
Female 0.602 0.566 0.601 0.583 0.017  
White non-Hispanic 0.624 0.698 0.603 0.693 0.017  
Black non-Hispanic 0.180 0.122 0.174 0.119 0.003  
Hispanic 0.126 0.117 0.156 0.112 -0.033 ** 
Asian or pacific islander  0.051 0.050 0.050 0.055 0.006 * 
Other or unknown race 0.019 0.014 0.017 0.021 0.008 *** 
Student is a US citizen  0.936 0.956 0.943 0.960 -0.003  
Age in May of HS completion year 18.431 18.427 18.201 18.194 -0.003  
Qualified for Free Lunch in Grade 12 0.069 0.076 0.087 0.067 -0.027 ** 
       
High School Performance       
       
Highest SAT reading Score  552.173 536.658 552.733 541.806 4.588  
Highest SAT math Score  555.870 539.403 559.584 550.358 7.241  
Table 2.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Before: Cohort 1996 




Difference   Control Treatment Control Treatment 
       
College Experience       
       
STEM semester 1 0.208 0.247 0.179 0.217 -0.002  
First Semester STEM GPA 2.249 1.882 2.100 2.084 0.352 ** 
Second Semester STEM GPA 2.479 2.031 2.419 2.340 0.370 ** 
First Year STEM GPA 2.273 1.881 2.189 2.153 0.355 *** 
       
First Semester Non-STEM GPA 2.500 2.404 2.438 2.546 0.203 * 
Second Semester Non-STEM GPA 2.838 2.691 2.947 2.845 0.046  
First Year Non-STEM GPA 2.646 2.437 2.660 2.619 0.168 ** 
       
First Year STEM GPA>Non-STEM GPA 0.309 0.238 0.286 0.297 0.082 *** 
First Year GAP Diff. -0.430 -0.583 -0.498 -0.500 0.150 *** 
       
# STEM lower-division courses enrolled 18.591 12.016 20.526 18.038 4.087 *** 





  Before: Cohort 1996 




Difference   Control Treatment Control Treatment 
Six-Year STEM credits earned  10.888 7.346 15.687 13.242 1.096  
       
# Non-STEM lower-division courses enrolled 26.883 19.939 27.582 25.525 4.886 ** 
Six-Year Non-STEM credits attempted  51.510 40.892 62.627 58.164 6.155  
Six-Year Non-STEM credits earned  56.836 51.4527 63.160 59.752 1.975  
       
Graduated in 6yrs with a STEM major 0.104 0.073 0.093 0.090 0.028  
STEM year 2 0.145 0.121 0.128 0.138 0.034 * 
STEM year 1 0.178 0.170 0.155 0.177 0.030  
Graduated in 6yrs a Non-STEM major 0.551 0.445 0.540 0.456 0.021  
Non-STEM year 2 0.604 0.527 0.619 0.577 0.036 ** 
Non-STEM year 1 0.579 0.564 0.598 0.603 0.019  
       
Number of Observations 9,843 3,852 31,508 14,724 59,927  
 
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors in the difference-in-difference column adjusted for clustering at the institution level. 





Table 2.2 First Stage and Reduced Form Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of 
the Change in the Grading Scale between STEM and non-STEM courses 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 First Stage Reduced Form  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
First Year STEM GPA> Non-STEM GPA  0.086 0.080   
 (0.012)*** (0.012)***   
First Year GPA Diff.  0.162 0.152   
 (0.039)*** (0.036)***   
First Year STEM GPA 0.299 0.281   
 (0.098)** (0.086)***   
First Year Non-STEM GPA 0.122 0.105   
 (0.078) (0.072)   
STEM Major year 2   0.020 0.030 
   (0.021) (0.005)*** 
STEM Major year 3   0.026 0.033 
   (0.015) (0.006)*** 
Graduating in 6yrs with a STEM major   0.020 0.025 
   (0.015) (0.006)*** 
STEM credits attempted in six years or less   0.523 0.820 
   (0.943) (1.326) 
Number of STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less  3.610 3.685 
   (0.896)*** (0.815)*** 
Non-STEM Major year 2   0.011 0.001 
   (0.026) (0.015) 
Non-STEM Major year 3   0.022 0.014 
   (0.013) (0.024) 
Graduating in 6yrs with a Non-STEM major   -0.000 -0.008 
   (0.055) (0.064) 
Non-STEM credits attempted in six years or less  4.127 3.741 
   (4.008) (4.410) 
Number of Non-STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less  4.004 3.970 
   (1.747)** (1.666)** 
Did not earn a BA in 6yrs   -0.020 -0.017 
   (0.068) (0.067) 
          
Note: This table shows results for the first stage and reduced form estimates. Model 1 only includes institution fixed 
effects. Model 2 controls for covariates and institution fixed effects. Variables are imputed to zero if missing; missing 
data flags are included for all variables with missing data. Standard errors clustered at institution level. Sample size for 
the reduced form of Model 1 is 59,899 and for Model 2 is 59,779; sample size for the first stage of Model 1 is 48,165 
and for Model 2 is 48,086 due to missing values in grade differentials. The covariates used for Model 2 includes dummy 
variables for female, black, Hispanic, Asian, other race, US citizen, those who qualified for free lunch in grade 12, age 
and age squared at first entry, STEM initial major intention, SAT reading and math scores, and SAT reading and math 
scores squared. My sample is restricted to high school graduates who entered a 4-year public institution straight from 





Table 2.3 Gender Subgroup Analysis: First Stage and Reduced Form Difference-in-
Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Change in the Grading Scale for Females 
 




Form  VARIABLES 
   
First Year STEM GPA> Non-STEM GPA  0.068  
 (0.024)**  
First Year GPA Diff.  0.173  
 (0.066)**  
First Year STEM GPA 0.277  
 (0.118)**  
First Year Non-STEM GPA 0.086  
 (0.066)  
STEM Major year 2  0.025 
  (0.008)** 
STEM Major year 3  0.029 
  (0.009)** 
Graduating in 6yrs with a STEM major  0.026 
  (0.006)*** 
STEM credits attempted in six years or less  0.226 
  (1.783) 
Number of STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 3.232 
  (0.807)*** 
Non-STEM Major year 2  0.005 
  (0.010) 
Non-STEM Major year 3  0.001 
  (0.027) 
Graduating in 6yrs with a Non-STEM major  -0.025 
  (0.067) 
Non-STEM credits attempted in six years or less 4.439 
  (4.601) 
Number of Non-STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 3.735 
  (1.445)** 
Did not earn a BA in 6yrs  -0.000 
  (0.064) 
      
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: This table shows results for the first stage and reduced form estimates. These models include controls 
for covariates and institution fixed effects. Variables are imputed to zero if missing; missing data flags are 
included for all variables with missing data. Standard errors clustered at institution level. Sample size for 
the reduced form is 35,554; sample size for the first stage is 28,482. The covariates used these models 
include in dummy variables for black, Hispanic, Asian, other race, US citizen, those who qualified for free 
lunch in grade 12, age and age squared at first entry, STEM initial major intention, SAT reading and math 
scores, SAT reading and math scores squared. My sample is restricted to high school graduates who 






Table 2.4 Gender Subgroup Analysis: First Stage and Reduced Form Difference-in-
Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Change in the Grading Scale for Males 
 




Form  VARIABLES 
   
First Year STEM GPA> Non-STEM GPA  0.068  
 (0.024)**  
First Year GPA Diff.  0.173  
 (0.066)**  
First Year STEM GPA 0.296  
 (0.049)***  
First Year Non-STEM GPA 0.132  
 (0.088)  
STEM Major year 2  0.049 
  (0.016)** 
STEM Major year 3  0.061 
  (0.013)*** 
Graduating in 6yrs with a STEM major  0.049 
  (0.015)** 
STEM credits attempted in six years or less  1.402 
  (1.152) 
Number of STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 4.288 
  (0.917)*** 
Non-STEM Major year 2  -0.019 
  (0.021) 
Non-STEM Major year 3  0.010 
  (0.020) 
Graduating in 6yrs with a Non-STEM major  -0.012 
  (0.059) 
Non-STEM credits attempted in six years or less 2.895 
  (4.367) 
Number of Non-STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 4.273 
  (1.985)* 
Did not earn a BA in 6yrs  -0.037 
  (0.073) 
      
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: This table shows results for the first stage and reduced form estimates. These models include controls 
for covariates and institution fixed effects. Variables are imputed to zero if missing; missing data flags are 
included for all variables with missing data. Standard errors clustered at institution level. Sample size for 
the reduced form is 24,225; sample size for the first stage is 19,604. The covariates used these models 
include in dummy variables for black, Hispanic, Asian, other race, US citizen, those who qualified for free 
lunch in grade 12, age and age squared at first entry, STEM initial major intention, SAT reading and math 
scores, and SAT reading and math scores squared. My sample is restricted to high school graduates who 





Table 2.5 Minority Status Subgroup Analysis: First Stage and Reduced Form Difference-
in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Change in the Grading Scale for Minorities  
 




Form  VARIABLES 
   
First Year STEM GPA> Non-STEM GPA  0.076  
 (0.023)**  
First Year GPA Diff.  0.156  
 (0.060)**  
First Year STEM GPA 0.264  
 (0.096)**  
First Year Non-STEM GPA 0.087  
 (0.102)  
STEM Major year 2  0.043 
  (0.004)*** 
STEM Major year 3  0.058 
  (0.010)*** 
Graduating in 6yrs with a STEM major  0.043 
  (0.015)** 
STEM credits attempted in six years or less  1.865 
  (2.188) 
Number of STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 4.620 
  (1.620)** 
Non-STEM Major year 2  0.044 
  (0.028) 
Non-STEM Major year 3  0.013 
  (0.029) 
Graduating in 6yrs with a Non-STEM major  -0.018 
  (0.080) 
Non-STEM credits attempted in six years or less 6.626 
  (5.449) 
Number of Non-STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 5.274 
  (2.130)** 
Did not earn a BA in 6yrs  -0.024 
  (0.068) 
      
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: This table shows results for the first stage and reduced form estimates. Minorities include blacks non-
Hispanics and Hispanics. These models include controls for covariates and institution fixed effects. 
Variables are imputed to zero if missing; missing data flags are included for all variables with missing data. 
Standard errors clustered at institution level. Sample size for the reduced form is 17,684; sample size for 
the first stage is 13,855. The covariates used these models include in dummy variables for female, US 
citizen, those who qualified for free lunch in grade 12, age and age squared at first entry, STEM initial 
major intention, SAT reading and math scores, and SAT reading and math scores squared. My sample is 
restricted to high school graduates who entered a 4-year public institution straight from high school for the 





Table 2.6. Minority Status Subgroup Analysis: First Stage and Reduced Form Difference-
in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Change in the Grading Scale for Non-
Minorities 




Form  VARIABLES 
   
First Year STEM GPA> Non-STEM GPA  0.074  
 (0.010)***  
First Year GPA Diff.  0.148  
 (0.036)***  
First Year STEM GPA 0.2893  
 (0.099)**  
First Year Non-STEM GPA 0.107  
 (0.067)  
STEM Major year 2  0.034 
  (0.007)*** 
STEM Major year 3  0.038 
  (0.008)*** 
Graduating in 6yrs with a STEM major  0.033 
  (0.010)** 
STEM credits attempted in six years or less  0.420 
  (0.988) 
Number of STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 3.374 
  (0.554)*** 
Non-STEM Major year 2  -0.023 
  (0.011)* 
Non-STEM Major year 3  0.005 
  (0.025) 
Graduating in 6yrs with a Non-STEM major  -0.020 
  (0.060) 
Non-STEM credits attempted in six years or less 2.637 
  (4.153) 
Number of Non-STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 3.533 
  (1.563)* 
Did not earn a BA in 6yrs  -0.013 
  (0.069) 
      
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: This table shows results for the first stage and reduced form estimates. Minorities include blacks non-
Hispanics and Hispanics. These models include controls for covariates and institution fixed effects. 
Variables are imputed to zero if missing; missing data flags are included for all variables with missing data. 
Standard errors clustered at institution level. Sample size for the reduced form is 42,095; sample size for 
the first stage is 34,281. The covariates used these models include in dummy variables for female, US 
citizen, those who qualified for free lunch in grade 12, age and age squared at first entry, STEM initial 
major intention, SAT reading and math scores, and SAT reading and math scores squared. My sample is 
restricted to high school graduates who entered a 4-year public institution straight from high school for the 





Table 2.7. First Stage Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Change in the 
Grading Scale on Grade Distribution 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES 
ALL Female  Male Minority 
Non-
Minority 
      
ALL GRADES       
      
A 0.022 0.014 0.036 0.012 0.024 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.029) 
B 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) 
C -0.010 -0.009 -0.013 -0.016 -0.007 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) 
D/F -0.024 -0.016 -0.033 -0.003 -0.030 
 (0.012)* (0.010) (0.015)* (0.020) (0.010)** 
STEM Grades      
      
A 0.095 0.086 0.111 0.072 0.103 
 (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.015)*** (0.024)*** 
B 0.020 0.026 0.011 0.076 0.000 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.029) (0.028)** (0.015) 
C -0.069 -0.082 -0.053 -0.069 -0.044 
 (0.029)** (0.022)*** (0.047) (0.029)** (0.025) 
D/F -0.046 -0.029 -0.069 -0.007 -0.059 
 (0.022)* (0.019) (0.029)** (0.027) (0.021)** 
      
Non-STEM Grades     
      
A 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.004 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.033) 
B 0.018 0.011 0.024 -0.006 0.027 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) 
C -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.009 -0.006 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) 
D/F -0.020 -0.015 -0.026 -0.005 -0.024 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.019) (0.009)** 
      
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: This table shows results for first stage estimates. Estimates are shown for Model 2 which controls for 
covariates and institution fixed effects. Variables are imputed to zero if missing; missing data flags are 
included for all variables with missing data. Standard errors clustered at institution level. The covariates 
used for the "ALL" specification include in dummy variables for female, black, Hispanic, Asian, other race, 
US citizen, those who qualified for free lunch in grade 12, age and age squared at first entry, STEM initial 
major intention, SAT reading and math scores, and SAT reading and math scores squared. My sample is 
restricted to high school graduates who entered a 4-year public institution straight from high school for the 
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Table A1. List of STEM fields and associated 2000 CIP codes 
 
CIP code CIP title  
11.0101 Computer and Information Sciences, General.  
11.0102 Artificial Intelligence and Robotics.  
11.0103 Information Technology.  
11.0201 Computer Programming/Programmer, General.  
11.0202 Computer Programming, Specific Applications.  
11.0203 Computer Programming, Vendor/Product Certification.  
11.0301 Data Processing and Data Processing Technology/Technician.  
11.0401 Information Science/Studies.  
11.0501 Computer Systems Analysis/Analyst.  
11.0701 Computer Science.  
11.0801 Web Page, Digital/Multimedia and Information Resources Design.  
11.0802 Data Modeling/Warehousing and Database Administration.  
11.0803 Computer Graphics.  
11.0901 Computer Systems Networking and Telecommunications.  
11.1001 System Administration/Administrator.  
11.1002 System, Networking, and LAN/WAN Management/Manager.  
11.1003 Computer and Information Systems Security.  
11.1004 Web/Multimedia Management and Webmaster.  
14.0101 Engineering, General.  
14.0201 Aerospace, Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering.  
14.0301 Agricultural/Biological Engineering and Bioengineering.  
14.0401 Architectural Engineering.  
14.0501 Biomedical/Medical Engineering.  
14.0601 Ceramic Sciences and Engineering.  
14.0701 Chemical Engineering  
14.0801 Civil Engineering, General.  
14.0802 Geotechnical Engineering.  
14.0803 Structural Engineering.  
14.0804 Transportation and Highway Engineering.  
14.0805 Water Resources Engineering.  
14.0901 Computer Engineering, General.  
14.0902 Computer Hardware Engineering.  
14.0903 Computer Software Engineering.  
14.1001 Electrical, Electronics and Communications Engineering.  
14.1101 Engineering Mechanics.  
14.1201 Engineering Physics.  
14.1301 Engineering Science.  





CIP code CIP title  
14.1801 Materials Engineering.  
14.1901 Mechanical Engineering.  
14.2001 Metallurgical Engineering.  
14.2101 Mining and Mineral Engineering.  
14.2201 Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering.  
14.2301 Nuclear Engineering.  
14.2401 Ocean Engineering.  
14.2501 Petroleum Engineering.  
14.2701 Systems Engineering.  
14.2801 Textile Sciences and Engineering.  
14.3101 Materials Science.  
14.3201 Polymer/Plastics Engineering.  
14.3301 Construction Engineering.  
14.3401 Forest Engineering.  
14.3501 Industrial Engineering.  
14.3601 Manufacturing Engineering.  
14.3701 Operations Research.  
14.3801 Surveying Engineering.  
14.3901 Geological/Geophysical Engineering.  
15 Engineering Technology, General.  
15.0101 Architectural Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0201 Civil Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0303 Electrical, Electronic and Communications Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0304 Laser and Optical Technology/Technician.  
15.0305 Telecommunications Technology/Technician.  
15.0401 Biomedical Technology/Technician.  
15.0403 Electromechanical Technology/Electromechanical Engineering Technology.  
15.0404 Instrumentation Technology/Technician.  
15.0405 Robotics Technology/Technician.  
15.0501 
Heating, Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Technology/Technician 
(ACH/ACR/ACHR/HRAC/HVAC/AC Technology).  
15.0503 Energy Management and Systems Technology/Technician.  
15.0505 Solar Energy Technology/Technician.  
15.0506 
Water Quality and Wastewater Treatment Management and Recycling 
Technology/Technician.  
15.0507 Environmental Engineering Technology/Environmental Technology.  
15.0508 Hazardous Materials Management and Waste Technology/Technician.  
15.0607 Plastics Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0611 Metallurgical Technology/Technician.  
15.0612 Industrial Technology/Technician.  
15.0613 Manufacturing Technology/Technician.  





CIP code CIP title  
15.0702 Quality Control Technology/Technician.  
15.0703 Industrial Safety Technology/Technician.  
15.0704 Hazardous Materials Information Systems Technology/Technician.  
15.0801 Aeronautical/Aerospace Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0803 Automotive Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.0805 Mechanical Engineering/Mechanical Technology/Technician.  
15.0901 Mining Technology/Technician.  
15.0903 Petroleum Technology/Technician.  
15.1001 Construction Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.1102 Surveying Technology/Surveying.  
15.1103 Hydraulics and Fluid Power Technology/Technician.  
15.1201 Computer Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.1202 Computer Technology/Computer Systems Technology.  
15.1203 Computer Hardware Technology/Technician.  
15.1204 Computer Software Technology/Technician.  
15.1301 Drafting and Design Technology/Technician, General.  
15.1302 CAD/CADD Drafting and/or Design Technology/Technician.  
15.1303 Architectural Drafting and Architectural CAD/CADD.  
15.1304 Civil Drafting and Civil Engineering CAD/CADD.  
15.1305 Electrical/Electronics Drafting and Electrical/Electronics CAD/CADD.  
15.1306 Mechanical Drafting and Mechanical Drafting CAD/CADD.  
15.1401 Nuclear Engineering Technology/Technician.  
15.1501 Engineering/Industrial Management.  
26.0101 Biology/Biological Sciences, General.  
26.0102 Biomedical Sciences, General.  
26.0202 Biochemistry.  
26.0203 Biophysics.  
26.0204 Molecular Biology.  
26.0205 Molecular Biochemistry.  
26.0206 Molecular Biophysics.  
26.0207 Structural Biology.  
26.0208 Photobiology.  
26.0209 Radiation Biology/Radiobiology.  
26.021 Biochemistry/Biophysics and Molecular Biology.  
26.0301 Botany/Plant Biology.  
26.0305 Plant Pathology/Phytopathology.  
26.0307 Plant Physiology.  
26.0308 Plant Molecular Biology.  
26.0401 Cell/Cellular Biology and Histology.  
26.0403 Anatomy.  
26.0404 Developmental Biology and Embryology.  





CIP code CIP title  
26.0406 Cell/Cellular and Molecular Biology.  
26.0407 Cell Biology and Anatomy.  
26.0502 Microbiology, General.  
26.0503 Medical Microbiology and Bacteriology.  
26.0504 Virology.  
26.0505 Parasitology.  
26.0506 Mycology.  
26.0507 Immunology.  
26.0701 Zoology/Animal Biology.  
26.0702 Entomology.  
26.0707 Animal Physiology.  
26.0708 Animal Behavior and Ethology.  
26.0709 Wildlife Biology.  
26.0801 Genetics, General.  
26.0802 Molecular Genetics.  
26.0803 Microbial and Eukaryotic Genetics.  
26.0804 Animal Genetics.  
26.0805 Plant Genetics.  
26.0806 Human/Medical Genetics.  
26.0901 Physiology, General.  
26.0902 Molecular Physiology.  
26.0903 Cell Physiology.  
26.0904 Endocrinology.  
26.0905 Reproductive Biology.  
26.0906 Neurobiology and Neurophysiology.  
26.0907 Cardiovascular Science.  
26.0908 Exercise Physiology.  
26.0909 Vision Science/Physiological Optics.  
26.091 Pathology/Experimental Pathology.  
26.0911 Oncology and Cancer Biology.  
26.1001 Pharmacology.  
26.1002 Molecular Pharmacology.  
26.1003 Neuropharmacology.  
26.1004 Toxicology.  
26.1005 Molecular Toxicology.  
26.1006 Environmental Toxicology.  
26.1007 Pharmacology and Toxicology.  
26.1101 Biometry/Biometrics.  
26.1102 Biostatistics.  
26.1103 Bioinformatics.  
26.1201 Biotechnology.  





CIP code CIP title  
26.1302 Marine Biology and Biological Oceanography.  
26.1303 Evolutionary Biology.  
26.1304 Aquatic Biology/Limnology.  
26.1305 Environmental Biology.  
26.1306 Population Biology.  
26.1307 Conservation Biology.  
26.1308 Systematic Biology/Biological Systematics.  
26.1309 Epidemiology.  
27.0101 Mathematics, General.  
27.0102 Algebra and Number Theory.  
27.0103 Analysis and Functional Analysis.  
27.0104 Geometry/Geometric Analysis.  
27.0105 Topology and Foundations.  
27.0301 Applied Mathematics.  
27.0303 Computational Mathematics.  
27.0501 Statistics, General.  
27.0502 Mathematical Statistics and Probability.  
52.1304 Actuarial Science.  
40.0101 Physical Sciences.  
40.0201 Astronomy.  
40.0202 Astrophysics.  
40.0203 Planetary Astronomy and Science.  
40.0401 Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology, General.  
40.0402 Atmospheric Chemistry and Climatology.  
40.0403 Atmospheric Physics and Dynamics.  
40.0404 Meteorology.  
40.0501 Chemistry, General.  
40.0502 Analytical Chemistry.  
40.0503 Inorganic Chemistry.  
40.0504 Organic Chemistry.  
40.0506 Physical and Theoretical Chemistry.  
40.0507 Polymer Chemistry.  
40.0508 Chemical Physics.  
40.0601 Geology/Earth Science, General.  
40.0602 Geochemistry.  
40.0603 Geophysics and Seismology.  
40.0604 Paleontology.  
40.0605 Hydrology and Water Resources Science.  
40.0606 Geochemistry and Petrology.  
40.0607 Oceanography, Chemical and Physical.  
40.0801 Physics, General.  





CIP code CIP title  
40.0804 Elementary Particle Physics.  
40.0805 Plasma and High-Temperature Physics.  
40.0806 Nuclear Physics.  
40.0807 Optics/Optical Sciences.  
40.0808 Solid State and Low-Temperature Physics.  
40.0809 Acoustics.  
40.081 Theoretical and Mathematical Physics.  
29.0101 Military Technologies.  
41.0101 Biology Technician/Biotechnology Laboratory Technician.  
41.0204 Industrial Radiologic Technology/Technician.  
41.0205 Nuclear/Nuclear Power Technology/Technician.  
41.0301 Chemical Technology/Technician.  
51.1401 Medical Scientist (MS, PhD)  
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, STEM Designated 
Degree Programs, retrieved April 30, 2010, from http://www.ice.gov/sevis/stemlist.htm. 
NOTE: The Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) codes corresponding to science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields were selected based on a U.S. Immigration and Customs 







Table A2. List of STEM courses  
 
  STEM 
1 Aeronautical Science 
2 Biochemistry 
3 Biological Science 
4 Biomedical Engineering 
5 Chemical/Nuclear Engineering 
6 Chemistry 
7 Civil/Environmental Engineering 
8 Computer Math/Materials Engineering 
9 Computer Science and Computing Technologies 
10 Digital Media 
11 Electrical Engineering 
12 Electrical-Electronic Technology 
13 Engineering Technologies 
14 Engineering: General/Support 
15 Environmental Studies 
16 Geology 
17 Industrial Engineering 
18 Interdisciplinary Science/Natural Science 
19 Mathematics 
20 Mathematics Education 
21 Mechanical Engineering 
22 Meteorology 
23 Oceanography/Ocean Engineering 
24 Office Systems Technology 
25 Physics 
26 Science Education 
27 Statistics   















Table A3. Difference-in-Difference Estimates for Student Characteristics 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 













        
After -0.001 -0.005 0.029 0.017 0.561 3.714 -0.029 
 (0.008) (0.026) (0.011)** (0.008)** (4.834) (5.420) (0.012)** 
PostPolicy*Treated  0.017 0.003 -0.033 -0.027 4.588 7.241 -0.002 
  (0.013) (0.027) (0.011)** (0.009)** (6.671) (6.610) (0.028) 
Treated -0.036 -0.058 -0.010 0.007 -15.515 -16.467 0.039 
 (0.019)* (0.088) (0.053) (0.026) (18.935) (23.527) (0.037) 
        
Constant  0.602 0.180 0.126 0.069 552.173 555.870 0.208 
 (0.012)*** (0.084)* (0.053)** (0.021)*** (17.933)*** (21.930)*** (0.035)*** 
        
Observations 59,933 59,933 59,933 59,884 49,790 49,790 59,933 
R-squared 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 
                
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the institution level.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
 
Table A4. Grade and Grade Point Value for Treated Institutions 
 
Plus/minus 
Grades UCF USF 
A  4 4 
A-  3.75 3.67 
B+  3.25 3.33 
B  3 3 
B-  2.75 2.67 
C+  2.25 2.33 
C  2 2 
C-  1.75 1.67 
D+  1.25 1.33 
D  1 1 
D-  0.75 0.67 






Table A5. Grade and Grade Point Value for Treated Institutions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables β X β*X 
Female 0.225 0.583 0.131 
Black non-Hispanic -0.172 0.119 -0.021 
Hispanic -0.060 0.112 -0.007 
Asian or pacific islander  0.045 0.055 0.002 
Other or unknown race -0.083 0.021 -0.002 
Student is a US citizen  -0.172 0.960 -0.166 
Age in May of HS completion year 0.025 18.194 0.461 
Age squared 0.000 331.017 -0.068 
Qualified for Free Lunch in Grade 
12 0.136 0.067 0.009 
    
High School Performance    
    
Highest SAT reading Score  0.005 541.792 2.823 
Highest SAT math Score  -0.004 550.346 -1.957 
SAT Read Squared 0.000  293,539  -1.045 
SAT Math Squared 0.000  302,880  2.063 
Constant -0.298  -0.298 
(1) Predicted STEM GPA (only using background covariates) 1.927 
(2) Before STEM GPA  1.881 
(3) After STEM GPA 2.153 
(4) % of Change explained by background covariates 16.8% 
           
         Note: Using pre-policy background characteristics, first year GPA in introductory STEM courses  
         was predicted for treated institutions. Row (1) at the bottom of the Table estimates predicted STEM 
GPAs using coefficients from column (1) multiplied by pre-policy averages in background      







Table A6 and Instrumental Variable Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the 
Change in the Grading Scale 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
ALL Female Male Minority 
Non-
Minority VARIABLES 
      
STEM Major year 2 0.338 0.184 0.616 0.376 0.312 
 (0.077)*** (0.119) (0.545) (0.171)** (0.103)*** 
STEM Major year 3 0.413 0.241 0.711 0.490 0.365 
 (0.097)*** (0.117)** (0.617) (0.182)*** (0.107)*** 
Graduating in 6yrs with a STEM major 0.355 0.214 0.596 0.357 0.340 
 (0.100)*** (0.101)** (0.579) (0.142)** (0.113)*** 
STEM credits attempted in six years or less 12.779 6.781 23.154 21.000 9.822 
 (9.751) (14.062) (18.580) (15.246) (7.345) 
Number of STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 21.336 15.850 32.122 26.896 19.245 
 (8.147)*** (11.921) (22.025) (12.636)** (7.119)*** 
Non-STEM Major year 2 0.004 0.107 -0.193 0.233 -0.092 
 (0.095) (0.100) (0.252) (0.167) (0.036)** 
Non-STEM Major year 3 0.002 0.007 0.010 -0.013 0.025 
 (0.124) (0.120) (0.151) (0.169) (0.118) 
Graduating in 6yrs with a Non-STEM major -0.171 -0.158 -0.174 -0.236 -0.140 
 (0.358) (0.383) (0.304) (0.285) (0.386) 
Non-STEM credits attempted in six years or less 17.832 19.604 14.404 32.279 12.257 
 (21.803) (11.624)* (41.621) (30.743) (19.334) 
Number of Non-STEM courses enrolled in 6yrs or less 21.861 17.200 30.860 29.112 18.950 
 (8.467)*** (5.764)*** (35.335) (15.061)* (5.700)*** 
Did not earn a BA in 6yrs -0.184 -0.056 -0.421 -0.122 -0.200 
 (0.410) (0.297) (0.866) (0.279) (0.440) 
           
Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
Note: This table shows results for estimates. IV results are from Model 2 and include controls for covariates and 
institution fixed effects. Variables are imputed to zero if missing; missing data flags are included for all variables 
with missing data. Standard errors clustered at institution level. The covariates used these models include in dummy 
variables for black, Hispanic, Asian, other race, US citizen, those who qualified for free lunch in grade 12, age and 
age squared at first entry, STEM initial major intention, SAT reading and math scores, and SAT reading and math 
scores squared. My sample is restricted to high school graduates who entered a 4-year public institution straight 





















                             Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
           Note: These figures display the share of student-course observations that were assigned a letter grade  
           before and after the change in the grading scale by treatment status.  Grades for lower-division courses taken  


































                             Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
           Note: These figures display the share of student-course observations that were assigned a letter grade  
           before and after the change in the grading scale by treatment status.  STEM Grades for lower-division courses taken  



































                             Source: Author using student-transcript-level data from Florida Department of Education 
           Note: These figures display the share of student-course observations that were assigned a letter grade  
           before and after the change in the grading scale by treatment status.  Non-STEM Grades for lower-division 





























Figure A1. Percentage of A Grades in all courses 
 
 
                          Note: Fall 96 and Spr 97 correspond to the first two semesters of enrollment for the pre-policy  
        cohort (1996).  Fall 00/03 and Spr 00/03 are the first two semesters of enrolment of the post- policy 
        cohorts (2000 and 2003).    
 
 
Figure A2. Percentage of C/F Grades in all courses 
  
 
                          Note: Fall 96 and Spr 97 correspond to the first two semesters of enrollment for the pre-policy  
        cohort (1996).  Fall 00/03 and Spr 00/03 are the first two semesters of enrolment of the post- policy 
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Figure A3. Percentage of A Grades in STEM courses 
 
 
                    Note: Fall 96 and Spr 97 correspond to the first two semesters of enrollment for the pre-policy  
       cohort (1996).  Fall 00/03 and Spr 00/03 are the first two semesters of enrolment of the post- policy 




Figure A4. Percentage of C/F Grades in STEM courses 
 
 
                           Note: Fall 96 and Spr 97 correspond to the first two semesters of enrollment for the pre-policy  
         cohort (1996).  Fall 00/03 and Spr 00/03 are the first two semesters of enrolment of the post- policy 
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Figure A5. Percentage of A Grades in Non-STEM courses 
 
 
                         Note: Fall 96 and Spr 97 correspond to the first two semesters of enrollment for the pre-policy  
       cohort (1996).  Fall 00/03 and Spr 00/03 are the first two semesters of enrolment of the post- policy 
       cohorts (2000 and 2003).    
 
 
Figure A6. Percentage of C/F Grades in Non-STEM courses 
 
 
                     Note: Fall 96 and Spr 97 correspond to the first two semesters of enrollment for the pre-policy  
        cohort (1996).  Fall 00/03 and Spr 00/03 are the first two semesters of enrolment of the post- policy 
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Figure A10. Distribution of STEM Grades of Students by Gender 
Treatment Group 
 
Male      Female 
 
 
 Note: Distribution of STEM GPAs in lower division courses during the first year of enrollment before and after the change in the grading policy, 










































Figure A11. Distribution of STEM Grades of Students by Gender 
Control Group 
 
Male       Female  
 
 
Note: Distribution of STEM GPAs in lower division courses during the first year of enrollment before and after the change in the grading policy, 
pre-policy and post-policy cohorts for students attending untreated institutions. Each letter range includes pluses and minuses. 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
ABCD/F
After Before
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
ABCD/F
After Before
